



INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL PROGRAMS DEPARTMENT

*Intal*

Institute for the Integration  
of Latin America and the Caribbean

*ITD*

Integration, Trade and  
Hemispheric Issues Division

*STA*

Statistics and  
Quantitative Analysis Unit

## Free Trade Area of the Americas: The Scope of the Negotiations

Herminio Blanco M.  
Jaime Zabludovsky K.

*Special Initiative on Trade and Integration*

# Free Trade Area of the Americas: The Scope of the Negotiations

Herminio Blanco M.  
Jaime Zabludovsky K.

*Intal* ITD-STA

June, 2003  
Working Paper -SITI- 01

The Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL), the Integration, Trade and Hemispheric Issues Division (ITD) and the Statistics and Quantitative Analysis Unit (STA) of the Integration and Regional Programs Department of the IDB have organized a joint publication series:

***WORKING PAPERS***

Refereed technical studies providing a significant contribution to existing research in the area of trade and integration.

***OCCASIONAL PAPERS***

Articles, speeches, authorized journal reprints and other documents that should be of interest to a broader public.

**Integration and Regional Programs Department**

Nohra Rey de Marulanda	Manager, Integration and Regional Programs Department
Robert Devlin	Deputy Manager, Integration and Regional Programs Department
Peter Kalil	Chief, Integration, Trade and Hemispheric Issues Division, INT
Juan José Taccone	Director, Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, INT
Michael McPeak	Chief, Statistics and Quantitative Analysis Unit, INT

Inter-American Development Bank

Integration and Regional Programs Department

Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean IDB - INTAL

Esmeralda 130, 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> Floors (C1035ABD) Buenos Aires, Argentina - <http://www.iadb.org/intal>

Integration, Trade and Hemispheric Issues Division

Statistics and Quantitative Analysis Unit

1300 New York Avenue, NW. Washington, D.C. 20577 United States - <http://www.iadb.org/int>

The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the IDB and/or INTAL-ITD-STA, or its member countries.

Printed in Argentina

INTAL-ITD-STA

Free Trade Area of the Americas:

The Scope of the Negotiations

Buenos Aires, 2003. 100 pages.

Working Paper -SITI- 01

Available in pdf format at:

<http://www.iadb.org/intal> and/or <http://www.iadb.org/int/itd>

I.S.B.N. 950-738-151-1

US\$ 5.00

Editing:  
Mariela Marchisio

## CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY	3
III.	MAIN INTERESTS AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THE FTAA	7
	3.1. Market access and agriculture	7
	3.1.1. <i>Nonagricultural products' market access</i>	7
	3.1.2. <i>Agriculture</i>	19
	3.1.3. <i>Rules of origin and customs procedures</i>	21
	3.2. Investment	28
	3.2.1. <i>Participation and type of investment agreement</i>	29
	3.3. Competition policies	32
	3.4. Government procurement	32
	3.5. Intellectual property	34
	3.6. Services	35
	3.7. Subsidies, anti-dumping and countervailing duties	36
	3.8. Dispute settlement	37
	3.9. Other topics: Environment, labor rights and the participation of "civil society"	37
IV.	CONTEXT OF THE FTAA NEGOTIATIONS	39
	4.1. Number of participants	39
	4.2. The participants' heterogeneity	40
	4.3. Coincidence of the FTAA process with other multilateral and sub-regional negotiations	41
	4.3.1. <i>FTAA and WTO negotiation scenarios</i>	42
	4.4. Coexistence of the FTAA with other regional agreements	45
	4.5. The U.S. Congress	46
V.	FINAL COMMENTS	47
	Offensive and defensive interests of the FTAA participants	47
	APPENDIX 1	57
	APPENDIX 2	77
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	



## **Special Initiative on Trade and Integration**

This Working Paper was prepared under the Inter-American Development Bank's Special Initiative on Trade and Integration approved by the IDB's Board of Executive Directors and managed by the Integration and Regional Programs Department. Begun in 2002, the purpose of the Special Initiative is to strengthen the Bank's capacity to: (i) contribute to the policy debate in trade and integration; (ii) provide technical support to governments; and (iii) support public outreach on trade and integration initiatives.

This document is part of the first component of the Initiative.

## **Acknowledgements**

Herminio Blanco Mendoza and Jaime Zabudovsky prepared this paper in the framework of the Special Initiative for Trade and Integration, developed by the Integration and Regional Programs Department at the Inter-American Development Bank.

The authors thank Nohra Rey Marulanda, Robert Devlin, Peter Kalil as well as the rest of the Integration and Regional Programs Department team for their support in the preparation of this work. The content of this paper was enriched by the comments of Inés Bustillo, Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, Robert Fisher, Peter Hakim, Norberto Iannelli, Felipe Jaramillo, Nicolás Lloreda, José Luis Machinea, Alister McIntyre, Miguel Rodríguez Mendoza, José Manuel Salazar, Jeffrey Schott and John Weekes.

They also acknowledge the collaboration of Cecilia Autrique, José Luis Paz, Ricardo Vera and Sergio Gómez Lora.

## FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS: THE SCOPE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

**Herminio Blanco M.\***  
**Jaime Zabudovsky K.\***

### I. INTRODUCTION

The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) is the region's most ambitious foreign policy initiative in recent decades. Since the project was launched at the Miami Summit of the Americas in December 1994, the thirty-four participating countries have worked to build a free trade area spanning the hemisphere. The process has made significant headway in the eight years since 1994, and has managed not to be derailed either by the macroeconomic problems and political crises besetting some countries of the region or by the U.S. executive's lack of negotiating authority.<sup>1</sup> As a result, by now the nine negotiating groups have very clear mandates and deadlines for their completion. The initiative has also produced a text intended to reconcile the various countries' positions.

Despite this progress, the challenge ahead is a daunting one. With the deadline for completion of the FTAA less than two years away -a relatively short window given everything that needs to be accomplished- the negotiations *per se* are just starting. The parties have recently put forward their liberalization offers and demands, and the "consolidated" text is still more of a litany of the countries' positions than a document identifying points of disagreement, suggesting solutions and facilitating negotiations. Completion of the negotiations by the mandated December 31, 2004 deadline will require a major technical push on the part of the negotiating teams and a strong political commitment on the part of the hemisphere's leaders. Otherwise, the momentum of the process will be difficult to sustain and the significant hurdles that will doubtless crop up along the way will be all the more difficult to clear.

The FTAA is perhaps the most ambitious negotiation of a free trade agreement ever attempted. One would be hard-pressed to find a similar process that has had to face so many complex challenges. A number of factors make the FTAA negotiation initiative unique: (1) the negotiation agenda is not only an ambitious one but has to be covered in a relatively short time frame; (2) the fact that so many countries are participating exponentially increases the array of products that potentially qualify for trade liberalization, and the negotiating timetable has to steer around elections, government shifts and changes in administrations; (3) the countries involved vary in size and productive structure; (4) the FTAA negotiations coincide with the Doha round and the negotiation of trade agreements that a significant number of countries in the region have embarked upon (Mexico and

---

\* Consultants of the Integration, Trade and Hemispheric Issues Division of the Integration and Regional Programs Department of the Inter-American Development Bank. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Inter-American Development Bank.

<sup>1</sup> Previously referred to as "fast track" authority. After a long and contentious analysis and debate, the United States Congress recently passed "trade promotion authority" (TPA).



Brazil; the United States and Central America; Mexico and Panama; Chile and the United States; Chile and the European Union (EU); Canada and Central America; Mercosur and the EU; Mercosur and the Andean Community); (5) the future hemispheric agreement will coexist with the free trade agreements and other agreements already in force in the hemisphere; (6) the political climate in which all this must unfold is not the most friendly to trade liberalization in the U.S., as seen from the long and hard-fought battle to win TPA passage in its Congress.

This paper will examine the negotiation agenda, the participants' main interests, and the fundamental issues that might come up along the way. It will also review the implications that the interaction of the six factors mentioned above may have on the FTAA negotiations.

## II. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY

The FTAA process has been organized into the following negotiating groups:

1. Market access
2. Agriculture
3. Investment
4. Services
5. Government procurement
6. Intellectual property
7. Subsidies, anti-dumping and countervailing duties
8. Competition policies
9. Dispute settlement

The main interests that the participating countries are pursuing in each negotiating group are examined in Section III. The emphasis is on the fundamentals of the process. Tactical positioning or procedural debates may influence the negotiating dynamics but ultimately are unlikely to determine the FTAA's fate.

For purposes of this analysis, interests are classified as either "defensive" or "offensive". Defensive interests are those that try to preserve the *status quo* and are generally associated with protecting the domestic market. Offensive interests, on the other hand, look to obtain free access to the other participants' markets. Clearly, at the end of the day, the FTAA negotiations will be counted a success only if they manage to strike the right balance between the offensive and defensive interests of all participating countries.

In order to examine the participants' interests in the negotiations, 30 of the 34 countries were organized into the following four sub-regional groups, based on their membership in customs unions, the similarity of their trade regimes, and possible common interests in the negotiation.<sup>2</sup>

1. *Central America*:<sup>3</sup> Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.
2. *Caribbean*: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic,<sup>4</sup> Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
3. *Andean Community*: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.

---

<sup>2</sup> Although, as will become apparent later, in some topics there are significant differences among the members of the sub-regional groups, which means that the situation of some countries has to be examined separately.

<sup>3</sup> Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador generally act as a block, while Costa Rica takes individual positions on a number of issues.

<sup>4</sup> Although the Dominican Republic has not participated in the FTAA negotiations as a member of any regional agreement or block, it is included in the Caribbean sub-regional group for purposes of facilitating the current analysis.

4. *Mercosur*: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.

Although they are party to free trade agreements, the four remaining countries have their own negotiating agendas and hence will be examined separately:

1. Canada
2. Chile
3. United States
4. Mexico

To identify the offensive and defensive interests of the countries participating in the FTAA as well as the potential conflicts that might arise during negotiations, various sources of public information were analyzed.

First to be analyzed were the import tariff schedules and the official databases of the countries participating in the FTAA. These documents contain valuable information both on the principal exporting interests of these countries as well as on the tariff and non-tariff barriers that obstruct the flow of exports to markets in the hemisphere.

Second, the main international treaties and agreements that the countries in the hemisphere have signed in the relevant areas for a free trade agreement were examined. These documents are a rich source of information, because they indicate just how far the countries have been willing to go in negotiating -and consolidating in an international treaty- the liberalization disciplines and commitments likely to be included in the FTAA.

However, the strategy of drawing conclusions from a "revealed negotiation position" does have its limits. For example, it should be borne in mind that the refusal to agree to certain conditions in one international agreement may be due, on occasions, more to tactical reasons, i.e., to keep one's negotiating powder dry for another more important negotiation, than to fundamental difficulties in accepting the commitments in question. Nevertheless, the scope of commitments reached in international treaties generally reflects the legislative and regulatory framework established domestically in the various countries. Similarly, the reservations and exclusions adopted internationally tend to be good indicators of those sectors sensitive to liberalization and, therefore, of the interests likely to be defended in a negotiation.

A third useful reference is the annual report documenting foreign trade barriers to U.S. exports prepared by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) "National Trade Estimate (NTE) Report on Foreign Trade Barriers". This report sets forth clearly the most important offensive interests of the world's leading trading power. Finally, the debate in the U.S. Congress over passage of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the text of that legislation provide revealing information on the U.S.' main interests and negotiating sensitivities.

The methodology adopted for the following sections uses the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a parameter to measure the possible scope of some of the disciplines in the FTAA negotiations. We believe that this "NAFTA bias" is justified and, perhaps, indispensable for a realistic evaluation of the FTAA process for the following reasons:

First, there is the impact that the scope and coverage of NAFTA has had on other negotiations. The comprehensive liberalization of the trade in goods and the inclusion of topics previously excluded from other free trade agreements made NAFTA the most ambitious agreement of its kind and set an important precedent for subsequent negotiations.

This became evident on the multilateral front at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in December 1993, just a few weeks after the passage of NAFTA by the U.S. Congress. The United States took full advantage of its weight as the world's leading trading power to ensure that some of the disciplines included in NAFTA would decisively influence the multilateral agenda and serve as a model for what was agreed upon in the Final Act at Marrakech. As a result, topics and texts that at the time seemed novel within the context of NAFTA are today part of the accepted and multilaterally applied disciplines by WTO members.

Second, NAFTA's impact was not limited to the multilateral front. On the contrary, as a result of intense bilateral negotiating activity undertaken chiefly by Mexico, and, to a lesser degree, by Canada and Chile, the NAFTA model has been replicated throughout the hemisphere. Between 1995 and 2001, Mexico negotiated five free trade agreements with nine Latin American partners. Canada concluded treaties with two other countries in the hemisphere,<sup>5</sup> while Chile signed similar agreements with Mexico, Canada, and five Central American countries. These agreements are of course not identical to NAFTA, nor could they be, given that, as in any successful negotiation, the special interests of the different countries involved must be taken into consideration. Still, all these agreements share the same philosophy and format of NAFTA, and in many cases the texts of the disciplines are identical to the North American agreement. Consequently, as Table 1 shows, a large number of countries in the hemisphere have several years of experience in implementing disciplines of this type. Accordingly, use of the NAFTA model as a parameter for what might be expected in the FTAA negotiation was considered a natural choice and, to a certain extent, inevitable.

**TABLE 1**  
**FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE HEMISPHERE**  
**THAT REPLICATE THE "NAFTA" MODEL**

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT	ENTRY INTO FORCE
Mexico - Bolivia	January 1, 1995
Mexico - Costa Rica	January 1, 1995
Mexico - Colombia - Venezuela	January 1, 1995
Canada - Chile	July 5, 1997
Mexico - Nicaragua	July 1, 1998
Mexico - Chile	August 1, 1999
Mexico - Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador	Mexico-El Salvador: March 15, 2001 Mexico-Guatemala: March 15, 2001 Mexico-Honduras: June 1, 2001
Chile - Central America *	Costa Rica-Chile: February 15, 2002 El Salvador-Chile: June 3, 2002
Canada - Costa Rica	November 1, 2002

Note: \* The entry into force of the agreement for Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua is pending.

<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, it has a negotiating process underway with Central America.

An additional reason validating the use of NAFTA as a reference for the FTAA is the relative weight of the U.S. in this negotiation. From our perspective, it is unlikely that U.S. negotiators can significantly deviate from the precedents established in their free trade negotiations in the region, the NAFTA precedent, and, more recently, the agreement reached with Chile. At present, the text of the agreement with Chile is still not available, but it will of course be analyzed in detail when it is published. Here again, comparison with NAFTA will be a valuable source of information for any changes that may have occurred in the U.S. negotiating agenda during the nine years since the approval of the North American agreement.

### III. MAIN INTERESTS AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THE FTAA

#### 3.1. Market access and agriculture

The elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods is the central issue of these negotiations and a necessary requisite of any free trade agreement according to the WTO disciplines. This is the only negotiating group where everyone around the table has both offensive and defensive interests at stake. For some, the elimination of the tariff and non-tariff barriers that their exports face and the certainty of access to markets are the principal if not the only objectives they are pursuing in this negotiation.

The negotiation of the liberalization of trade in goods has been organized into two groups: market access and agriculture. The mandate of the Market Access negotiating group is to agree upon the methods, modalities and timetables for eliminating barriers to nonagricultural products, rules of origin, customs procedures, safeguards and technical barriers on goods of all types, including agricultural goods. The Agriculture group is concerned with the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers in the agricultural sector, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and their impact on trade. This group is also examining subsidies and other provisions that might skew agricultural trade in the region.

##### 3.1.1. *Nonagricultural products' market access*

Negotiating modalities and timetables for liberalizing trade in nonagricultural goods is one of the most intricate aspects of the FTAA process. This issue vividly illustrates just how difficult it is to negotiate a free trade agreement among so many and such diverse parties. While it is true that major efforts have been made in the region in recent years to open up trade, it is also true that protectionism is still strong in some countries and will be tough to eliminate. Table 2 contains the average Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff and the maximum tariff that the FTAA participants levy on nonagricultural imports.<sup>6</sup> As Table 2 shows, in some countries and groups the average most favored nation tariff levels are over 10%; the maximum rate on individual imports from almost all the participants is also very high.

---

<sup>6</sup> The figures in Table 2 convey the level of tariff protection but disregard any impact caused by the liberalization effected under the free trade agreements and other preferential mechanisms in force in the region. For Mexico in particular, the figure does not reflect the fact that 86 percent of its imports are from the 31 countries (12 of them in this hemisphere) with which it has free trade agreements. The figure is useful, however, to illustrate the tariffs with which exports from countries that do not have MFN status with Mexico must contend: Mercosur, the Caribbean countries, Belize, Panama, Ecuador and Peru.

**TABLE 2**  
**INDICATORS OF TARIFF PROTECTION (MFN) APPLIED TO NONAGRICULTURAL IMPORTS BY**  
**FTAA PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES \***  
(Percentages)

Region	Average	Maximum Rate	Standard Deviation	Average	Mode
Mexico	16.7	40.6	8.0	13	13
Mercosur	14.7	35	7.0	15	5
Andean Community	11.4	99	5.6	10	10
Caribbean	9.8	100	11.6	2.5	2.5
Chile	9.0	9	0.6	9	9
Central America	5.7	87	6.8	3	0
Canada	4.6	248.7	6.5	2.5	0
U.S.	4.0	58.8	5.8	3	0

Note: \* Simple average of the tariff rates from chapters 25 to 97.

Source: DATAINTAL for all countries, except for: U.S. (USDOC), Canada (Statistics Canada) and Mexico (Secretariat of Economy). Data from 2000, except Saint Kitts and Nevis (1997) and Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Barbados and Grenada (1999).

A major challenge for the FTAA tariff negotiations will be to find solutions to the interaction between all participants. An all-too-common assumption is that the only negotiations that count are those between the United States and the rest of the countries, underestimating the problems that the other bilateral relations can cause. In fact, as the information in Table 3 shows, some of the toughest negotiations will be those between Latin American countries. The matrix in that table contains the average tariffs (AT)<sup>7</sup> that each group's nonagricultural exports (NAX) encounter on the other relevant markets<sup>8</sup> and identifies those cases where protection is being eliminated through free trade agreements.

<sup>7</sup> The AT was obtained using the following formula:

$$AT_{jk} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n X_{ij} T_{ik}}{\sum_{i=1}^n X_{ij}}$$

where  $AT_{jk}$  is the average tariff that the exports from country j will find in country k;  $X_{ij}$  is the value of country j's total exports under subheading i; and  $T_{ik}$  is country k's average (MFN) tariff under subheading i.

<sup>8</sup> Relevant markets are defined as those with which there are no free trade agreements. In the case of Mexico and the Andean Community, and Mexico and Mercosur, the indicators remained the same. This is because while there are already FTAs between Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia (G3), Mexico and Bolivia, and Mexico and Uruguay, there are no FTAs between Mexico and the other Andean countries (Ecuador and Peru) and the other members of Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay). On the other hand, although the FTA negotiations between Mexico and Panama have not yet concluded, the other Central American countries already have free trade agreements with their neighbor to the north, which is why Table 3 does not include figures on protectionism between Central America and Mexico.

Not included, however, are the tariff preferences several countries benefit from through the Economic Complementarity Agreements signed in the framework of ALADI because the updated databases in order to sum up such preferences, in an exhaustive manner, do not exist. Furthermore, most trade agreements under the ALADI umbrella do not offer the same market access certitude than FTAs concluded in accordance with Article XXIV<sup>9</sup> of the 1994 GATT.

**CENTRAL AMERICA.** Central America's exports of nonagricultural products face the stiffest tariff protection elsewhere in the hemisphere. As Table 3 illustrates, the ATs on Central American exports can range anywhere from 14 percent in Mercosur to 4.5 percent in the United States. This is basically because of the enormous importance that the garment industry has in the sub-region's sales abroad and the relatively high levels of protection that imports of articles of apparel encounter in almost every country of the hemisphere. Of Central America's 20 major export manufactures, 11 are in the garment sector. The tariffs on these products are often higher than 20 percent (Table 4). The high weight that the garment industry has on Central America's export composition is particularly evident in the AT on Central American exports to the United States market. The 4.5 percent rate is 66 percent higher than the next highest AT, which is 2.75 percent on Mercosur's exports to the United States. While it is true that because of the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) Central America is not presently paying the full amount of the United States tariffs implicit in the AT shown in Table 3, the CBTPA is a temporary arrangement and -as recently demonstrated by the United States Congress' unilateral amendment of the rules of origin- is uncertain and one-sided. One of Central America's main objectives in the FTAA and, now, in its negotiation underway for a bilateral FTA with the United States, is precisely to free itself from the uncertainty associated with one-sided arrangements like the CBTPA and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).

Although on average the Central American countries have a relatively low level of trade protection -i.e., 5.7 percent for nonagricultural products- some tariffs are very high and are used to raise fiscal revenues or to protect sensitive sectors. The fiscal reliance on foreign trade is particularly notable in the case of Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, as shown in Table 5, and is concentrated in a handful of sectors, one of which is the automotive sector. The great importance of tariff collection on vehicle purchases abroad explains, for example, why this sector is excluded from the free trade agreement between Mexico and the Northern Triangle. Mexico's negotiations with the Central American countries also allow other sensitivities within the region to be identified.

Table 6 lists the products that were either excluded from the tariff elimination schedules or for which an exceptionally long tariff-elimination period was established in FTAs between Mexico and countries in the region: cement, vehicles, iron and steel products, to name just a few. These will likely be Central America's defensive interests.

---

<sup>9</sup> A substantial part of the ALADI preferences have an expiration date and their renewal process has the risk of being contaminated with non-trade issues. In addition, on many occasions, the base rate for calculating preferences is a moving target, since it is the current duty at the time of importation, instead of a fix base rate that cannot be increased once the agreement has entered into force.



**TABLE 3**  
**AVERAGE TARIFFS (AT)\* ON EXPORTS OF NONAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS**

Region	Total Exports (millions US\$)	Non farm Exports (1)	%	Central America	Caribbean	Andean Community	Mercosur	Canada	Chile	U.S.	Mexico
Central America	13,513,506	7,782,525	57.5	--	12.34	12.59	14.05	6.35 (2)	8.88	4.48	FTA
Caribbean	6,653,922	5,575,254	83.7	5.11	--	12.83	5.95	3.54	8.99	1.89	10.46
Andean Community	56,909,772	49,324,011	86.6	4.50	7.09	--	4.17	1.60	8.99	1.69	FTA
Mercosur	78,167,334	52,948,713	67.7	5.04	9.98	11.15	--	2.71	FTA	2.75	14.59
Canada	261,220,962	243,006,691	93.0	5.95	11.05	12.15	12.70	--	FTA	FTA	FTA
Chile	17,746,046	13,132,886	74.0	2.86	6.58	8.64	FTA	FTA	--	FTA	FTA
U.S.	690,570,013	636,300,990	92.1	3.70	9.11	10.06	11.28	FTA	FTA	--	FTA
Mexico	166,329,392	158,001,687	94.9	FTA (3)	13.25	FTA (4)	15.14	FTA	FTA	FTA	--

Notes: \* The average tariff was obtained using the formula described in footnote 7.

(1) Non-agricultural exports are those in chapters 25 to 97 of the Harmonized System of Tariffs.

(2) Canada and Costa Rica signed a FTA on April 23, 2001, which is in the approval process.

(3) Mexico has FTAs with Costa Rica, with Nicaragua and with El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, but not with Panama.

(4) The G3 includes Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia, but not Peru and Ecuador.

Source: DATAINTAL for all countries, except for: U.S. (USDOC), Canada (Statistics Canada) and Mexico (Secretariat of Economy). Data from 2000, except Saint Kitts and Nevis (1997) and Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Barbados and Grenada (1999).

**TABLE 4**  
**20 MAIN SUBHEADINGS OF MANUFACTURE EXPORTS FROM CENTRAL AMERICA**

Subheading	Description	Millions of dollars	%	Andean Community		Canada	Caribbean		Chile	Mexico		Mercosur		U.S.			
		Exp. O.*	Exp. O.	Avg.	Max Tariff	Avg.	Max Tariff	Avg.	Max Tariff	Avg.	Max Tariff	Avg.	Max Tariff	Avg.	Max Tariff		
847330	Parts and accessories of automatic data processing equipment	1,627,396	30.03	7.4	12	0.00	0.0	3.75	15.0	9	9	0.00	0	4.80	26	0.0	0.0
610910	Cotton t-shirts, vests, singlets, knitted	261,575	4.83	18.0	20	20.50	20.5	20.50	27.5	9	9	35.00	35	23.00	23	18.30	18.3
901839	Dental instruments	170,940	3.15	10.0	12	0.00	0.0	12.50	35.0	9	9	16.30	23	13.80	19	0.00	0.0
620462	Women's cotton trousers, bib overalls	161,658	2.98	8.0	20	19.00	19.0	21.50	27.5	9	9	35.00	35	23.00	23	8.825	17.0
610821	Women's cotton pajamas, bathrobes, etc.	157,555	2.91	18.0	20	20.50	20.5	20.50	27.5	9	9	35.00	35	23.00	23	7.80	7.8
490700	Unused postage, revenue or similar stamps of current or new issue; banknotes, checks, etc.	137,026	2.53	18.0	20	2.25	4.5	10.67	35.0	3	9	8.67	23	7.00	19	0.00	0.0
620342	Men's cotton trousers	97,384	1.80	14.4	20	19.00	19.0	21.50	27.5	9	9	35.00	35	23.00	23	9.80	17.0
620520	Men's or boys' cotton shirts	94,202	1.74	18.0	20	19.00	19.0	21.50	27.5	9	9	35.00	35	23.00	23	14.60	20.2
854390	Parts for electrical machinery	93,127	1.72	18.0	12	0.80	2.5	5.75	35.0	9	9	13.00	13	12.75	18	1.70	2.6
621210	Brassieres	76,893	1.42	8.0	20	20.50	20.5	22.50	35.0	9	9	35.00	35	23.00	23	14.80	17.3
300490	Medicaments containing vitamins	76,395	1.41	19.0	12	0.00	0.0	11.25	15.0	9	9	7.20	20	13.10	17	0.00	0.0
610510	Men's and boys' cotton shirts, knitted or crocheted	75,220	1.39	18.0	20	20.50	20.5	21.50	27.5	9	9	35.00	35	23.00	23	20.20	20.2
611511	Panty hose of synthetic fibers	60,652	1.12	8.7	20	20.50	20.5	22.50	35.0	9	9	35.00	35	20.25	23	16.40	16.4
610711	Men's and boys' cotton underpants and briefs	54,635	1.01	18.0	20	10.25	20.5	20.50	27.5	9	9	35.00	35	23.00	23	7.60	7.6
851631	Hair dryers	50,704	0.94	18.0	20	0.00	0.0	23.25	45.0	9	9	23.00	23	20.75	25	3.90	3.9
610990	T-shirts of synthetic fibers	48,231	0.89	18.0	20	20.50	20.5	20.50	27.5	9	9	35.00	35	23.00	23	15.85	32.8
340600	Candles, tapers and the like	47,711	0.88	15.5	20	7.50	7.5	22.50	35.0	9	9	30.00	30	19.00	19	0.00	0.0
620711	Men's cotton underpants and briefs	45,511	0.84	18.0	20	19.00	19.0	20.50	27.5	9	9	35.00	35	23.00	23	6.30	6.3
853224	Ceramic dielectrics, multiplayer	44,282	0.82	5.5	12	0.00	0.0	5.75	35.0	9	9	11.75	18	12.875	19	0.00	0.0
401693	Gaskets, washers and other seals	40,469	0.75	13.4	15	4.30	6.5	22.25	35.0	9	9	14.80	25	16.75	19	2.50	2.5
<b>TOTAL (20 subheadings)</b>		<b>3,421,566</b>	<b>63.16</b>														

Note: \* Exp.O: Exports outside Central America.

Source: DATAINTAL for all countries, except for: U.S. (USDOC), Canada (Statistics Canada) and Mexico (Secretariat of Economy). Data from 2000, except Saint Kitts and Nevis (1997) and Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Barbados and Grenada (1999).

**TABLE 5 \***  
**TARIFF REVENUES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TAX REVENUES**

	3 year average
<b>Central America</b>	
Costa Rica	8
El Salvador	11
Guatemala	14
Honduras	20
Nicaragua	23
Panama	21
<b>Caribbean</b>	
Antigua and Barbuda	38
Bahamas	58
Barbados	9
Belize	31
Dominica	44
Dominican Republic	37
Grenada	24
Guyana	13
Haiti	19
Jamaica	28
St. Kitts and Nevis	38
St. Lucia	26
St. Vicent and the Grenadines	41
Suriname	33
Trinidad and Tobago	7
<b>Andean Community</b>	
Bolivia	7
Colombia	9
Ecuador	15
Peru	9
Venezuela	9
<b>Mercosur</b>	
Argentina	7
Brazil	4
Paraguay	13
Uruguay	4
<b>Chile</b>	8
<b>Mexico</b>	4
<b>Canada</b>	2**
<b>U.S.</b>	1***

Notes: \* Most averages are from 1998, 1999 and 2000.

\*\* Average from 2000, 2001 and 2002, *Annual Financial Report 2001-2002*: 2, Statistics Canada.

\*\*\* U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Income and Product Account Tables*, Table 3.2, Federal Government Current Receipts and Expenditures.

Source: Schott [2001] pp. 78-79.

**TABLE 6  
SENSITIVE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS \***

<b>Bolivia</b>	<b>Colombia</b>	<b>Venezuela</b>	<b>Guatemala</b>	<b>Honduras</b>	<b>El Salvador</b>	<b>Nicaragua</b>	<b>Costa Rica</b>
Chemicals	Vehicles	Textile chain	Cement	Cement	Cement	Gypsum	Salt
Toilet paper	Auto parts	Vehicles	Lime	Textile chain	Limestone	Articles of plaster	Jute products
Diapers and napkins	Polystyrene	Auto parts	Vehicles	Vehicles	Vehicles	Soap and detergents	Citric acid
Certain woolen and cotton garments		Polystyrene	Auto parts	Auto parts	Auto parts	Vehicles	Ascorbic acid
Garments			Public transportation buses	Public transportation buses	Public transportation buses	Matches	
Ceramic tiles			Certain steel products (nails, screws, steel rods, steel fabric, barbed wire, etc.)	Certain steel products (nails, screws, steel rods, steel fabric, barbed wire, etc.)	Certain steel products (nails, screws, steel rods, steel fabric, barbed wire, etc.)	Candles or tapers	
Unwrought lead			Petroleum oils	Petroleum oils			
Accumulators							
Sewing machines and their parts			Wood in the rough				
Electric lamps							
Transformers							

Note: \* Products identified through the free trade agreements these countries have signed with Mexico. These are the products not included in the tariff elimination schedules and products whose tariffs will be removed ten years after the entry into force of the relevant free trade agreement with Mexico. Source: Secretariat of Economy, Mexico.

**CARIBBEAN.** 48 percent of the Caribbean's sales abroad are in nonagricultural products. A good portion of these are petroleum, steel and other mine products. In general, protection levels on these products are quite low. By extension, the average tariffs on their exports are comparatively small on all markets in the hemisphere, save that of the Andean Community (12.8 percent) and Mexico (10.5 percent). For example, the average tariffs on the Caribbean's two principal nonagricultural exports -aluminum oxide and crude oils, which together account for 28% of the region's nonagricultural exports- are 9.4 and 10.4 percent in the Andean Community and 8 and 13 percent in Mexico. In the rest of the hemisphere, however, average tariffs on those two products range from zero to 2.8 percent, except for Chile's uniform 6 percent current rate (9 percent in 2000).

The ATs on Caribbean exports in these markets would be even lower were it not for the relatively high tariffs on some products in the garment industry, which represent a considerable share of the Caribbean's exports. As in the case of Central America, the CBTPA somewhat eases the effects of the protection when products enter the United States market. But as noted earlier, the access that the CBTPA affords is limited, temporary and unpredictable. Therefore, one of the Caribbean's priorities in the hemispheric negotiations is to broaden that regime and make it permanent.

One of the most important challenges for the FTAA is the elimination of the tariffs on the Caribbean countries. Being relatively small and not highly industrialized, the economies of this region rely heavily on imports. Even so, their levels of protection are relatively high, particularly for industrial products. This is because -like the Central American countries- taxes on foreign trade are an important source of revenues for government coffers (Table 5). This is evident in the Caribbean's tariff schedule, which is far and away the one with the most tariff peaks. On 13.2 percent of the lines, the tariffs are over 30% (Table 7). For the most part, these are frequently imported items like automobiles and the capital goods listed under chapter 84.

**TABLE 7  
TARIFF LINES (TOTAL) \***

Region	Total %	MFN = 0%	0 < MFN <= 5%	5 < MFN <=10%	10 < MFN <= 20%	20 < MFN <= 30%	MFN > 30%
Central America	100	31.6	26.6	16.3	23.0	1.9	0.7
Caribbean	100	5.9	51.7	3.3	19.9	6.0	13.2
Andean Community	100	1.9	21.6	27.7	47.8	0.9	0.1
Mercosur	100	4.0	20.7	11.9	46.3	16.8	0.2
Canada	100	47.5	15.3	23.5	9.6	2.7	1.5
Chile	100	0.3	0.0	99.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
U.S.	100	30.9	34.8	20.3	10.4	1.9	1.7
Mexico	100	2.3	14.0	2.1	59.9	16.4	5.2

Note: \* MFN: Most Favored Nation tariff.

Source: DATAINTAL for all countries, except for: U.S. (USDOC), Canada (Statistics Canada) and Mexico (Secretariat of Economy). Data from 2000, except Saint Kitts and Nevis (1997) and Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Barbados and Grenada (1999).

In the year 2000,<sup>10</sup> Caribbean imports of these products totaled 2.448 billion dollars, which was 18.5 percent of the region's purchases abroad. The tariffs on some of these products are as high as 100 percent. Clearly, for these countries to be able to fully undertake the commitments in the FTAA, the tariff-elimination process will have to be matched by some type of fiscal reform.<sup>11</sup>

**ANDEAN COMMUNITY.** Nonagricultural exports from the countries of the Andean Community encounter relatively low tariffs. Indeed, the highest AT -not including Mexico, which has free trade agreements with Colombia and Venezuela (G3) and with Bolivia- is Chile's , at 6 percent (9 percent in 2000),<sup>12</sup> followed by the Caribbean, at 7 percent (Table 3). The ATs for the Andean Community countries are low because petroleum, minerals and derivatives account for a large share of their exports. Generally speaking, tariffs on such products are low across the globe, the members of the FTAA (Mexico and the Andean Community itself excluded) are no exception.

It is reasonable to expect that one of the Andean Community's main offensive interests would be to obtain or, as appropriate, to consolidate unrestricted market access for textiles, garments and footwear. These sectors face high tariffs on most markets in the hemisphere. The Andean countries, in particular, will work to consolidate the U.S. market access they enjoy under the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA),<sup>13</sup> thus avoiding the uncertainty inherent in a unilateral concession. The uncertainty factor was made evident during the slow and lengthy process the U.S. Congress undertook to pass the TPA and the rest of the trade package, including the ATPA.

On the defensive side, the Andean Community has one of the highest levels of protection in the region, particularly on exports from the Caribbean, Central America and Canada (12.8, 12.6 and 12.15, respectively, Table 3). These relatively high ATs are a function of the degree of protection enforced, mainly for textile manufactures, petroleum oils and the automotive industry.<sup>14</sup> Other products for which the Andean countries will likely have a defensive strategy appear in Table 6.

**MERCOSUR.** Negotiating market access is particularly complex for Mercosur. Defensive interests are very important, whereas the offensive interests, at least insofar as nonagricultural tariffs are concerned, do not appear to be as crucial. Of all the participants in the FTAA process, after Central America, Mercosur is the one with the lowest percentage of nonagricultural exports (68 percent). On the whole, its exports encounter relatively low average tariffs, especially on the Canadian and U.S. markets, at 2.71 and 2.75 percent, respectively. This is because products from the aeronautical, automotive, pulp-and-paper, and aluminum industries figure prominently among its exports. Such products enter the Canadian and U.S. market either tariff-free or with very low

---

<sup>10</sup> In general, the data on imports are from 2000. However, the data for St. Kitts and Nevis are from 1997; the data for The Bahamas, Belize, Barbados and Grenada are from 1999.

<sup>11</sup> The reform could be something relatively simple like the establishment of indirect taxes to raise revenues equal to those collected by tariffs, or something more elaborate such as adjustments in other taxes to compensate for the lost fiscal revenues.

<sup>12</sup> It has to be noted that Chile has concluded economic complementarity agreements in the framework of ALADI with all five Andean Community countries.

<sup>13</sup> The ATPA expired on May 16 and was not renewed until August, as part of the trade package associated with the TPA.

<sup>14</sup> The average tariff rate on vehicles with a cylinder capacity in excess of 3,000 cm<sup>3</sup>, for example, is 23 percent, although in some countries it is as high as 35 percent.

tariffs. Of course, some Mercosur countries' exports do come up against strong tariff protection on the Canadian and U.S. markets -mainly certain vehicles and footwear; but these are more the exception than the rule.

It would also be difficult to make the case that Mercosur has some vital stake in negotiating access for nonagricultural products in the hemisphere. Indeed, the question of Mercosur's access to Chilean markets was settled when Mercosur and Chile concluded an Economic Complementarity Agreement in 1996. And so, from the export standpoint, the only markets where Mercosur encounters relatively high average tariffs are the Andean Community, the Caribbean and Mexico, at 11.1, 9.9 and 14.5 percent, respectively (Table 3). Brazil is currently negotiating free trade zones with the Andean Community and with Mexico. If these initiatives are successfully concluded, they will further dampen Brazil's interest in the FTAA.

Although in recent years Mercosur has embarked upon important trade liberalization efforts, the tariffs it maintains for nonagricultural products are among the highest in the region, at an average of 14.7 percent (Table 2). Mercosur's tariffs on exports from the NAFTA countries are a major barrier: 12.7, 11.2 and 15.1 percent for Canada, the United States and Mexico, respectively (Table 3). The strong protection for products from the automotive and electronics industries,<sup>15</sup> which account for a very important share of the three NAFTA countries' sales abroad, goes a long way toward explaining the high ATs that they encounter on the Mercosur market.

**CANADA.** As it has a very open economy, offensive interests clearly figure more prominently on Canada's agenda. The automotive sector is one of its most important export sectors and, as we have already seen, is also one of the most protected sectors in the South American and Caribbean economies. Canadian industrial exports are up against relatively high ATs in Mercosur, the Andean Community and the Caribbean, at 12.7, 12.5 and 11 percent, respectively (Table 3). Canada's main defensive concerns center around labor-intensive industries, like the footwear and garment industries. These are protected by tariffs much higher than the others in Canada's tariff regime.

**CHILE.** Three factors are central to Chile's market-access negotiating agenda: it has FTAs with Mercosur, Mexico, Canada, Costa Rica, and has just concluded negotiations with the U.S.; copper and copper derivatives account for a large percentage of its exports of nonagricultural products; and has undertaken a unilateral trade liberalization policy. As a result of its free trade agreements and the other preferential mechanisms it has in the region (ALADI Partial-Scope Agreements -*Acuerdos de Alcance Parcial*- with the Andean countries and part of Central America and the Caribbean), Chile already has preferential access to the hemisphere's main markets. Even on those markets where it does not have preferential access the protection levels that its nonagricultural exports encounter are relatively low, as tends to be the case with minerals and mineral derivatives. Finally, the Chilean economy has very little in the way of protectionism as the result of an ongoing effort at unilateral liberalization (a uniform MFN tariff of 6 percent in 2003). These factors all suggest that Chile has no fundamental interest in the FTAA market-access negotiations.

---

<sup>15</sup> One of the main hurdles that has to be cleared before Mercosur and Mexico can conclude a bilateral trade agreement has been Mercosur's reluctance to include these sectors. Although this might be strategic maneuvering in anticipation of the FTAA negotiations, industrial-policy decisions or the political problems that liberalization of these sectors will create for Mercosur should not be underestimated.

**UNITED STATES.** When measured by the MFN tariffs it applies to nonagricultural products, the U.S. is the most open economy in the region, with an average tariff of less than 4 percent (Table 2). However, as Table 7 illustrates, its tariff schedule has some very high tariffs (almost 2 percent of its tariffs are over 30%) and there are quantitative restrictions on textile and garment imports. However, in keeping with the commitments undertaken during the Uruguay Round, these quotas will be eliminated before the FTAA enters into force. Furthermore, the U.S. is a NAFTA member, has a FTA with Chile, is negotiating an agreement with Central America and accords preferential treatment to a good number of its trading partners in the region. These factors combine to create a sweeping offensive agenda and a narrow defensive agenda focused on a handful of very politically sensitive sectors.

A common assumption is that in negotiating FTAA tariffs on nonagricultural products, the U.S. is on the defensive and will only negotiate this issue to advance its more important agenda, which includes such issues as services, intellectual property, government procurement, investment and the like. However, as a major trading power, with an economy featuring some of the world's lowest tariffs, for the U.S. the FTAA is a good opportunity to make the hemisphere's markets more accessible to its wide array of exports. Some of those markets are protected by relatively high ATs. This is particularly true for the markets within Mercosur, the Andean Community and the Caribbean, with ATs of 11.2, 10 and 9.1 percent, respectively (Table 3).

The FTAA will also enable the United States to eliminate the discrimination its exporters face when they compete with companies benefiting from various trade agreements in the region to which the U.S. is not a party. Finally, a substantial reduction of industrial tariffs in the FTAA would certainly serve to promote multilateral liberalization in the sector, another important offensive interest of the U.S.

Three examples of sectors where the United States has obvious export interests and faces significant barriers to markets in the hemisphere are electronics, data processing and the automotive industry.

The U.S.' defensive interests are easy to identify. As a result of NAFTA, the U.S. has eliminated its tariffs on much of its imports of manufactures; under the CBTPA, the GSP and the ATPA it accords unilateral preferences to other partners in the region for nonagricultural products. As a result, the duties on the vast majority of items in the U.S. tariff schedule are very low for the other FTAA countries. However, a handful of politically sensitive products are protected with high tariffs. These same products are offensive priorities for the other FTAA participants. These sectors are: ceramics, footwear, some automotive vehicles, textiles and garments. The last two are also subject to quota restrictions.<sup>16</sup>

**MEXICO.** In some respects, Mexico's situation is similar to Chile's. Like Chile, it has a number of free trade agreements with various countries in the hemisphere. However, three distinctive features of Mexico's agenda make its situation much more complicated: manufactures account for a much higher percentage of its total exports (85 percent of the total); it has no free trade agreement with Mercosur; and Mexico's MFN tariffs are among the highest in the region.

---

<sup>16</sup> As a result of the Uruguay Round, the quotas will be lifted before the FTAA enters into force.



As Table 3 shows, the highest of all the ATs are those that Mexico's exports encounter on the Mercosur market (15.1 percent);<sup>17</sup> the AT its exports encounter in the Caribbean is also high (13.2 percent). This is because the automotive and electronics industries figure prominently in Mexico's exports; both are heavily protected industries on those two markets. Similarly, countries that do not have preferential trade agreements with Mexico encounter relatively stiff duties there. And so, Mexico will have to strike some kind of balance between its offensive interests, which want access to the hemisphere's markets, and internal protectionist pressures, which would prefer that the market liberalization process be discontinued.

Until recently, Mexico's incentives to promote the progress of the FTAA were, in the best of cases, rather low. This was because Mexico was the only Latin American country to enjoy free trade with the United States. Consequently, conclusion of the FTAA would force Mexican exporters to share their preferences with the rest of the hemisphere. In the absence of bilateral trade negotiations by the U.S., the FTAA represented the only opportunity to modify Mexico's place of privilege in the U.S. market.

Recently, however, this situation has changed. Spurred on by the approval of negotiating authority for its Executive, U.S. trade policy is now displaying new vigor. Renewal of the CBTPA, conclusion of the FTA with Chile and initiation of negotiations with Central America have altered the scene for Mexico. Today, it is no longer the sole Latin American beneficiary of free trade with the world power. Furthermore, if the strategy of negotiating bilaterally in the region continues, the U.S. could be converted into the strategic hub for trade and investment in the hemisphere. In addition to being the largest domestic market, exports from this market would benefit from preferential access to a growing number of countries in the hemisphere.

A bilaterally-focused U.S. negotiating agenda would also have other implications for Mexico. Specifically, the use of Mexican inputs in Latin American exports to the U.S. market within the framework of bilateral free trade agreements would be hampered. In contrast, the FTAA, by implementing a hemispheric free trade zone that would allow the accumulation of origin among its members, would open the gate for Mexican inputs to participate in preferential exports to the U.S. coming from other countries of the region.

This new reality could modify Mexico's incentives for concluding the FTAA. In view of the U.S.' active policy of bilateral negotiations, the FTAA might be the way for Mexico to avoid being excluded from the network of trade agreements the U.S. is planning to conclude in the region.

Finally, the FTAA market access negotiation for nonagricultural products offers Mexico the opportunity to widen the scope of agreements already signed with countries in the hemisphere. For example, cement and autos were excluded from the tariff phase-out in the treaty between Mexico and Central America. The Mexican FTA with Colombia and Venezuela does not provide for tariff dismantling on some chemical products of exporting interest to Mexico. The FTAA is an occasion to address these, and other similar provisions, in Mexican free trade agreements in place in the hemisphere.

---

<sup>17</sup> Aside from its negotiations with Brazil, Mexico has been expanding tariff preferences with Argentina, within the framework of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI, for its Spanish acronym) and has concluded an economic complementarity agreement with Uruguay, which is essentially a free trade agreement.

### 3.1.2. Agriculture

The agricultural sector is probably the most complex FTAA sector and the most relevant for the exporting interests of a number of countries participating in the negotiations. Agricultural exports account for 42.4, 32.1 and 25.4 percent of the total exports of Central America, Mercosur and Chile, respectively. From the offensive standpoint, this sector will also be an important issue on the U.S.' negotiating agenda. Although its agricultural exports represent only 8 percent of its sales abroad, the United States is one of the major agricultural participants on the international market, with sales abroad of 54 billion in the year 2000. Gaining market access for its primary products -grains, dairy products, some fruits (apples and peaches), and meat products, in particular- are likely to be among the U.S.' offensive objectives, especially given the fact that the agriculture and livestock sectors are the most heavily protected sectors in the economies of all the FTAA participants,<sup>18</sup> the only exception being Mercosur (Table 8).

The agriculture negotiating table in the FTAA is further complicated by the various protectionist and price support measures applied in the sector. The "tariffication" of permits and licenses introduced as a result of the Uruguay Round has materialized into very high agricultural tariffs for imports above the agreed upon minimum quotas. In addition, price bands, supports and subsidies and, finally, sanitary and phytosanitary measures are used to restrict agricultural imports' access to markets in the hemisphere.

**TABLE 8**  
**AVERAGE MOST FAVORED NATION (MFN) TARIFF AND THE MAXIMUM TARIFF RATE**  
**ON AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS FROM THE FTAA PARTICIPANTS**

Agricultural Products		
Region	Average	Maximum Rate
Mexico	27.0	260
Caribbean	19.6	260
Andean Community	15.1	30
Mercosur	13.1	32
Central America	11.5	300
Canada	10.5	314
Chile	9.0	9
U.S.	4.8	350

Source: DATAINTAL for all countries, except for: U.S. (USDOC), Canada (Statistics Canada) and Mexico (Secretariat of Economy). Data from 2000, except St. Kitts and Nevis (1997) and Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Barbados and Grenada (1999).

<sup>18</sup> The figures in Table 8 should not be taken at face value, as they do not reflect all the mechanisms for agricultural protectionism in the region. The often-simultaneous use of *ad valorem* duties, specific duties, tariff quotas, and price bands make measuring protectionism in the agricultural sector a complex undertaking. Take Chile, for example, which uses price bands for oilseeds, wheat, wheat flour and beet sugar.

The levels of protection that the combination of these measures has produced make the FTAA agricultural negotiations very difficult. In a process involving 34 countries, with productive structures and export interests as diverse as those of the FTAA, some of the more important offensive interests of a number of participants could easily clash with the defensive concerns of others. Certain products where some countries have their most important export advantages fall into other regional partners' most sensitive areas.

Table 9 conveys an idea of just how challenging this proliferation of sensitivities is for the FTAA negotiators. The table lists those agricultural products that were so sensitive that they were treated as exceptions<sup>19</sup> in the free trade agreements that Mexico concluded in the region. This information suggests that access to the U.S. market is a particularly difficult case, not just because of the number of sensitive products, but also because almost all are of enormous export interest to one or more FTAA countries. For example, sugar is Central America's fourth most important export and the Caribbean's sixth; frozen orange juice ranks eleventh on Mercosur's list of important exports, bringing in around a billion dollars.

**TABLE 9**  
**SENSITIVE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS \***

	Sugar and products with sugar content	Beef products	Vegetable oils	Tobacco	Poultry products	Coffee	Corn	Dairy products	Banana plantain	Other
U.S.	X			X						Groundnuts and byproducts, orange juice, seasonal vegetables: broccoli, asparagus, pepper, dehydrated onion, garlic; some seasonal fruits: melons, watermelon.
Mexico	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Orange juice, bean, apple, wheat flour, pork sector, cocoa bean.
Canada	X		X		X			X		
Chile	X		X	X			X			Wheat flour, bean
Colombia, Venezuela	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	Pork sector, bean, onions
Bolivia		X	X	X		X		X	X	
Costa Rica		X	X	X		X		X	X	
Nicaragua	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	Grains
El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	Pineapple

Note: \* These products are not included in the tariff phase-out schedule, or are products whose tariffs will be eliminated once Mexico's free trade agreements with countries of the hemisphere have been in effect for 10 years.

<sup>19</sup> For example, tariffs on such sensitive products might be eliminated over an especially long period or the products could be excluded altogether from the tariff-elimination timetable.

The enormous political importance of these U.S. defensive interests became apparent during passage of the TPA bill. This legislation provides for a complex mechanism of consultations on a wide assortment of agricultural products, before those products can even be included in any trade negotiation. Some are among the most important agricultural export interests of the countries of this hemisphere.

Mexico's is another complex situation. A number of Mexico's most sensitive agricultural products -cereals, dairy products, meat products, coffee and banana plantain- figure among the fundamental export interests of Mercosur and of the Andean, Central American and Caribbean countries. In addition, the NAFTA dispute between Mexico and the U.S. over sweeteners will certainly make the sugar negotiations with the Caribbean, Central America, Brazil and Colombia much more difficult.

With so many "sensitivities", it would be unrealistic to suppose that liberalization of agricultural trade under the FTAA will be comprehensive and identical for every member. What is most likely to happen, as it did in NAFTA, is that primary sector products will be negotiated bilaterally and *ad hoc* mechanisms will be agreed upon (tariff quotas or limited preferential tariffs, seasonal arrangements, or exceptions like Canada's poultry and dairy products under NAFTA, for example), thus striking a balance between export interests and the defensive sensitivities of other countries.

Finally, in the case of market distortions that subsidies and support programs cause in the markets for some agricultural products, relatively speaking it will be easier to arrive at an agreement to eliminate export subsidies in the hemispheric free trade area. On the other hand, it would be unrealistic to think that the negotiations on domestic subsidies will get anywhere within the FTAA. This is an essentially multilateral issue, the United States is unlikely to be willing to debate it at the regional level, as this would establish a precedent before the U.S. even has a chance to win concessions from its major trading partners and competitors: Japan and the European Union. Such negotiations are yet more unlikely now that the U.S. Congress has passed a farm subsidies package.

### *3.1.3. Rules of origin and customs procedures*

Negotiating the rules of origin for nonagricultural and processed agricultural products may be one of the most complicated issues in the FTAA negotiations. These rules, in combination with the timetables for eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers, will be pivotal in determining how open the hemisphere's markets become. However, unlike the deadlines for eliminating tariffs, which are by nature temporary, rules of origin are a permanent<sup>20</sup> fixture of free trade agreements, which makes them all the more important in the negotiations. However, negotiating a system of rules of origin satisfactory to all 34 FTAA countries will not suffice; its mechanism of administration will have to be transparent, effective and reliable, as it will, to a large extent, determine the FTAA's success, credibility and efficiency.

Four main issues are at the center of the negotiation of the FTAA rules of origin: (a) the degrees of regional content that will confer origin; (b) the method by which to determine the regional value

---

<sup>20</sup> Although the rules usually contain "evolutionary" language so that they can be amended over the course of time.

added; (c) the possible accumulation of origin among FTAA members, and (d) the mechanisms for administering and overseeing the rules of origin.

#### 3.1.3.1. Value added required to confer origin

One of the most important issues during these negotiations will be the decision on the minimum regional content that goods in the FTAA will have to have to qualify for its tariff preferences. It is a question of reconciling two forces pulling in opposite directions: (1) ensuring that the benefits of the liberalization efforts are harvested mainly by the partners in the preferential agreement, and (2) recognizing and allowing the productive integration that partners to a preferential agreement naturally have with countries of other regions. The first objective signals relatively strict rules of origin, demanding strong regional content, whereas the second objective suggests somewhat more relaxed rules that are more generous in the inputs they allow from countries outside of the region.

The negotiations on rules of origin are, in principle, technically complex and slow, as rules have to be agreed upon for every product in which commerce is possible. However, not all products are as difficult to negotiate as others. In the case of agricultural, mining and fishery products,<sup>21</sup> the rules tend to be relatively simple and direct, with the result that the negotiation is basically about the access of processed agricultural products and manufactures.

#### 3.1.3.2. Determinants of the negotiating positions on rules of origin

The main factors that determine positions in the negotiation of rules of origin are the following:

1. The sector's importance for export purposes: the more important the sector is or is anticipated to be, the greater the interest will be in rules that ensure effective market access.
2. The degree to which inputs from outside the region are used: the greater the integration with partners outside the FTAA, the greater the incentive to seek more lax rules of origin.
3. The degree of trade protection *vis-à-vis* third countries: the higher the levels of MFN trade protection, the more relevant the rule-of-origin issue becomes for the importing and exporting countries alike. Producers of goods that compete with imports and that are heavily protected will have a more defensive stake and therefore work for stiffer rules of origin. Exporters, on the other hand, will be looking for rules that do not prevent them from taking advantage of preferences; the level of value added they are willing to accept will depend on how integrated their industry is or could be with the rest of the hemisphere.

With these factors in mind, it would be safe to say that a relatively small number of products and countries will be the most problematic in the FTAA negotiations on rules of origin. As Appendix

---

<sup>21</sup> The practice in the agricultural sector is that for origin to be conferred, products need only be sown and harvested or born and raised in the region. In mining, origin is an even easier proposition, as the place of extraction usually confers origin. In fishing, the major problems in negotiating rules of origin are different from those in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. In the fishery sector, the definition of territorial sea and a fishing vessel's flag are two key considerations (i.e. in national waters, "territory" where the fish is caught is the key factor for granting origin, while at international sea, the fishing vessel's flag confers origin).

1 (A1) shows, manufactures' share in the FTAA participants' export composition varies from one to another.<sup>22</sup> Manufactures are far and away the principal component of the North American countries' exports; not so for the Andean Community and the Caribbean, where they represent just 22 and 39 percent, respectively. In the case of Chile and Mercosur, their exports are fairly evenly divided between primary products and manufactures, with manufactures accounting for slightly more than half of their total exports.<sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, as we shall see, the NAFTA partners -which have the highest percentages of manufactured exports- are also among those with the highest degree of regional integration. Hence, they have fewer problems complying with rules of origin that demand heavy regional content. However, regional producers of these industries' inputs can be expected to oppose lax rules of origin, in order to avoid competition from inputs from outside the region (the garment industry is a good example).

**CENTRAL AMERICA, THE CARIBBEAN AND THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY.** These groups have similar concerns, as their exports are strong on agricultural, mining and fishery products, with manufacture sales abroad concentrated in only a few sectors. Their main interest is offensive. They will undoubtedly be looking for rules that enable them to maintain and grow their in-bond assembly operations, which rely heavily on inputs from outside the region. This is particularly so in the textile and garment sectors, where these countries have comparative advantages and where there are significant preferences to be gained and/or preserved on the markets of the larger countries.

**MERCOSUR.** Of all the participants in the FTAA, Mercosur has the most difficult decisions to make when it comes to rules of origin. Not only is its tariff protection relatively high across the board, but it also has one of the highest percentages of imports sourced outside the region, with 50% of its imports coming from outside the FTAA. Logic would dictate that given its interest in exporting, Mercosur would prefer lax rules that recognize integration with suppliers outside the region.

On the other hand, intentions to defend the domestic market and to keep its negotiating powder dry for the Doha agenda and the free trade agreement with the European Union create incentives to look forward for stricter rules of origin. Of the two factors, the latter will likely loom larger. Relative to other FTAA participants, Mercosur's manufactures represent a smaller share of its regional economic activity (exports of manufactures account for only 4.3 percent of Mercosur's GDP, whereas they are 24.6 percent and 10.9 percent of the Mexican and Central American GDPs, respectively).<sup>24</sup>

For all these reasons, and to get their neighboring countries to use the inputs that their large industrial sector produces, it is reasonable to expect Mercosur to seek rules of origin requiring high levels of

---

<sup>22</sup> The term "manufactures" refers to products included in chapters 25 to 97 of the Harmonized System of Tariffs.

<sup>23</sup> Mercosur's exports to countries participating in the FTAA are more intensive in industrial goods than its sales to the rest of the world. In fact, in 2000, 70% of Mercosur's exports to FTAA members were manufactured products.

<sup>24</sup> These figures are important because they are indicative of what little weight any lobbying in favor of lax rules of origin would carry within Mercosur.

regional value added. Brazil in particular would certainly be opposed to lax rules of origin for electric devices and electronics that favor the use of the preferences by "*maquiladoras*" or in-bond assembly plants in Mexico and the Caribbean.

**CHILE.** Chile, too, has a relatively easy agenda when it comes to negotiations on rules of origin. First of all, its agricultural, mining and fishery exports represent 45 percent of its total sales abroad, which goes a long way toward facilitating its offensive position. Furthermore, in the industrial sector, copper manufactures are not only very important (two subheadings account for half Chile's exports of manufactures) but are also relatively well integrated at the local level. Finally, the tariffs on Chile's principal exports are very low within the region. Moreover, thanks to Chile's agreements with the United States, Mexico, Canada, Mercosur, Costa Rica, Panama, El Salvador and the Andean Community, its principal exports already have preferential access.

Like its market access position, Chile's defensive position is also relatively comfortable. Thanks to Chile's unilateral effort at market liberalization in recent years, Chile's tariff schedule has no tariff higher than 6 percent on imports of manufacturing inputs. This, in combination with the recent conclusion of free trade agreements with the United States and the European Union; and the free trade agreements it already has with other partners in the hemisphere, suggest that Chile will not have a fundamental stake in strict rules of origin to protect specific sectors. All these factors would seem to suggest that rules of origin are not one of Chile's fundamental concerns in the FTAA negotiations. In any event, being a relatively small and very open economy, Chile can be expected, in general, to be inclined toward lax rules of origin.

**UNITED STATES.** Although exports of manufactures represent 90 percent of U.S. sales abroad, the negotiation of rules of origin could turn out to be relatively simple. On the defensive side, the main thrust will be to obtain strict rules of origin on a relatively small number of sectors with relatively high levels of protection and on those whose inputs are produced within the region. As Table A1 in the appendix shows, the United States tariff schedule has only six chapters with average tariffs in excess of 10 percent,<sup>25</sup> and these are all related to textiles, garments and footwear.

As has happened in other negotiations, the U.S. can be expected to work for strict rules of origin in these sectors. The best indicator of what to expect from the United States is the U.S. Congress' amendment of the rules of origin for the textile and garment sector in the Caribbean Basin and Andean initiatives.<sup>26</sup> The other sector for which the U.S. might want strict rules of origin is the steel industry. While the United States tariffs on this industry's products are low (averaging around 2 percent), that figure does not fully reflect all the protection that steel products enjoy. The anti-dumping quotas, countervailing duties and the recently adopted safeguard against steel imports are clear signals of how sensitive this industry is. It is reasonable to assume, then, that the incentives will be there to demand strict rules of origin for products that use steel, in order to encourage their regional use.

---

<sup>25</sup> In addition to the products grouped under chapters with high tariffs, certain individual items are also heavily protected. The U.S. will be looking for strict rules of origin for these items as well. Under the automotive chapter (87), for example, the average tariff is very low (2.7 percent); however, one type of vehicle carries an import tariff of 25 percent. The U.S. may look for a strict rule of origin for this product.

<sup>26</sup> The House of Representatives amended the CBTPA rule of origin to require that fabric finishing and dyeing be done in the U.S.

**TABLE 10**  
**TOTAL EXPORTS: AGRICULTURE, FISHING, MINING AND MANUFACTURES**  
(Billion US\$)

	Total	Agri. (a)	%	Fish	%	Mining (b)	%	Manu. (c)	%
Central America	13.5	5.7	42.4	0.6	4.3	0.5	3.3	7.3	54.2
Caribbean	6.7	1.1	16.2	0.1	2.1	3.0	44.6	2.6	39.2
Andean Community	56.9	7.6	13.3	0.8	1.4	36.7	64.6	12.6	22.1
Mercosur	78.5	25.2	32.1	1.1	1.4	9.2	11.7	43.8	55.7
Canada	277.1	18.2	6.6	2.4	0.9	38.8	14.0	204.2	73.1
Chile	18.2	4.6	25.4	1.3	7.3	3.1	17.1	10.0	55.3
U.S.	690.6	54.3	7.9	2.5	0.4	15.9	2.3	620.4	89.8
Mexico	166.4	8.3	5.0	0.7	0.4	16.7	10.0	141.3	84.9

Notes: (a) Agri: total agricultural exports.

(b) Mining: total mined exports (petroleum included).

(c) Manu: total exports of manufactures.

Source: DATAINTAL for all countries, except for: U.S. (USDOC), Canada (Statistics Canada) and Mexico (Secretariat of Economy). Data from 2000, except Saint Kitts and Nevis (1997) and Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Barbados and Grenada (1999).

The U.S.' defensive concerns *vis-à-vis* other products are relatively insignificant. While U.S tariff protection on the other items in the schedule is already low, the multilateral negotiations will likely produce additional tariff cuts in the not-too-distant future. No pressure appears to be building within the United States in favor of rules of origin to protect a market that is already very open.<sup>27</sup> And so, the United States is likely to be somewhat indifferent about the rules of origin for these sectors.<sup>28</sup>

No major U.S. negotiating interest is anticipated on the offensive front either. It is difficult to imagine rules of origin so stringent as to become serious obstacles limiting U.S. exports' access to the markets of the other FTAA countries.<sup>29</sup> Even though imports from outside the region represent a large percentage of its purchases abroad (64 percent vs. the total average for the region), the U.S. is a highly self-sufficient and well-integrated economy. If there is any FTAA country that can stand up to very strict rules of origin, it is the United States. Only in certain sectors that rely heavily on inputs from outside the region (electronics, mainly) can more lax positions be expected, so as to make the negotiated access effective. However, the U.S. is not alone here: the lack of a

<sup>27</sup> With the exception of those products manufactured with U.S. inputs, the producers of which are opposed to imports from other regions.

<sup>28</sup> Unless that for reasons of consistency with other agreements negotiated by it and assuming that these agreements would coexist with the FTAA, the U.S. tries not to deviate from the rules of origin that it agreed upon with its NAFTA partners, with Chile, and from the ones it will establish with Central America in its current negotiations.

<sup>29</sup> Although U.S. exporters could conceivably fight for strict rules of origin as a strategy to reduce competition from products on other FTAA markets made with foreign sourced inputs.



regional source for the inputs essential in certain sectors of the electronics industry is a problem for all the FTAA participants.<sup>30</sup>

**CANADA.** Canada's situation is very similar. It is unlikely to have any major problems where rules of origin are concerned. Its industry is very tied in with the region's economy and its own economy is very open. Like the U.S., relatively few of its industrial sectors (8) have average tariffs in excess of 10 percent (A1). Specifically, those sectors come under the headings of starch crops, textiles, garments, footwear, boats and ships. These will likely be the sectors that Canada will want to protect with strict rules of origin. Likewise, its industrial exports are concentrated in the automotive, lumbering and paper industries, and will have no difficulty meeting high regional content requirements.

**MEXICO.** While Mexico shares some of its NAFTA partners' concerns, it has its own agenda as well. On the one hand, the bulk of its exports are manufactures (85 percent) and it is well integrated with other North American markets, thanks in large part to NAFTA. However its MFN tariffs on inputs or final products are substantially higher than those of the U.S. and Canada and can best be compared or likened to those of Mercosur (see Tables 2 and 3). The combination of these factors seems to suggest that Mexico will be in favor of strict rules of origin on most products, not just because it is so well integrated with other markets but also in order to maintain the levels of protection it still has *vis-à-vis* countries outside the region.

On the offensive side, Mexico has only a handful of sectors of enormous export importance that rely heavily on foreign-sourced inputs from outside the region. Therefore, Mexico can be expected to favor lax rules of origin,<sup>31</sup> principally for electric devices and electronics.

### 3.1.3.3. Rules of origin methodology

Two methodologies -not mutually exclusive- can be used to devise rules of origin. Participants in the FTAA process have leaned heavily in favor of one or the other. The main features of these methods are as follows:

- (a) The "tariff shift" methodology, whereby in order to satisfy the regional content requirement, inputs imported from outside the region must enter under a subheading<sup>32</sup> of the Harmonized System that is "far enough" (known as the "tariff shift") from the subheading to which the

---

<sup>30</sup> When there is no regional supplier, insisting on a strict rule of origin means that the finished products will be precluded from the benefits of liberalization; the best-case scenario would be to assume that over time, and with preferences as incentives, a regional industry for these inputs will develop.

<sup>31</sup> Within the *fibre-textile-garment* chain, there are opposing positions: the garment link in the chain wants lax rules, while the textile and fibre links favor rules that demand heavy regional content.

<sup>32</sup> The Harmonized System (HS) uses a numerical system to classify merchandise, beginning with the highest level of grouping: the first two digits indicate the chapters (97); the next two digits indicate the headings, while the next two are the subheadings. Thereafter the digits indicate tariff lines. All countries that use the HS share the same classifications up to and including the subheadings level (in other words, the first six digits of the classification are the same for all countries). However, at the tariff line level (eight digits and more) every country is free to add more digits to provide the level of description it considers best for its interests.

finished product belongs. This implies that the foreign-sourced input undergoes substantial transformation.

- (b) The value added methodology. The second methodology is to set a coefficient or minimum level of regional value added that confers origin. In this case, the negotiations are about the coefficient for each sector included in the liberalization.

### **Advantages and disadvantages of the two methodologies**

For the "tariff shift" methodology, rules of origin have to be negotiated for each tariff subheading, which can be a very meticulous, painstaking process. The end result is a very extensive set of rules of origin which, its critics argue, will be difficult to learn and master. However, every exporter has only to learn one small subset of rules. And although the negotiation of this system is a relatively long process, the result is more stable, reliable and predictable. Unlike the value added method, in the "tariff shift" methodology the regional content does not depend on the performance of macroeconomic variables (wages, interest rates, exchange rates, and the like) or different accounting practices among the various countries.

Although it is still too early to say what every FTAA participant's position will be on the rules of origin methodology, some positions are already in evidence. Countries that have had experience with the "tariff shift" system: the U.S., Canada and Mexico, have signaled their preference for this method exclusively.<sup>33</sup> The countries of the Caribbean and Central America lean more toward the value added method that establishes a coefficient of regional content. Mercosur's position is a combination of the rules of the ALADI (regional content) and the "tariff shift" rules.<sup>34</sup>

#### 3.1.3.4. Accumulation

For the FTAA to be a truly hemispheric agreement,<sup>35</sup> the rules of origin must allow for accumulation of national values added *vis-à-vis* the various FTAA participants. However, this principle is difficult to reconcile with one of the vital requests of the small economies: asymmetrical timetables for tariff elimination.

---

<sup>33</sup> Although this means changing those rules in the existing agreements where the alternative or combined methodology was used. NAFTA employs a combination of methodologies. The "tariff shift" is used exclusively for some sectors and the regional content methodology for others; elsewhere the user can opt for the methodology it prefers. The reason NAFTA did not opt for the "tariff shift" methodology exclusively is that at the time of the negotiations, the view was that from a technical standpoint, "tariff shift" was not feasible for all products. However, in the eight years that the NAFTA has been operating, the three countries have relied more and more heavily on the "tariff shift" methodology.

<sup>34</sup> In the rules of origin methodology based on ALADI resolution 78, origin is established when there is a change in the tariff classification at the heading level (the first four digits of the Harmonized System), or when the regional content value (f.o.b.) is 50 percent of the cost of the product. For a more complete description of the various origin methods, see Garay and Cornejo [1999] pp. 288-289.

<sup>35</sup> Otherwise, the FTAA would be nothing more than a "rosary" of bilateral agreements.

If accumulation is accepted and exports from the smaller countries are, at the same time, granted relatively faster access to the other markets, in practical terms, tariff walls would also be falling faster for larger economies' inputs even though the tariff-elimination timetables are slower. Theoretically, there are ways to avoid this situation. One way is through the establishment of additional rules on specific standards of origin that will make it possible to distinguish among suppliers within the region (for example, marking rules). However, getting 34 countries to agree on specific rules of origin for the entire tariff schedule is such a daunting task that it would seem excessive to ask the negotiators to draft an additional set of rules in order to differentiate among suppliers within the region.

Therefore, it is possible that, at least during the transition period, the possibility of accumulating value added from various partners will be limited in order to maintain the unilateral programs that the large countries, mainly the U.S., currently extend to the less developed countries. Assuming this scenario, truly hemispheric integration will materialize only after the tariff-elimination timetables among all the FTAA participants reach their final phase.

#### 3.1.3.5. Administrative and oversight mechanisms for the rules of origin system

The third important issue involved in the rules of origin negotiation is the oversight of compliance. Two options are possible:

- (a) The NAFTA model, which is a combination of exporter self-certification (by completing a certificate of origin) and possible on-site checks by the importing country's customs authorities;
- (b) The Latin American Integration Association's model, where certification is the responsibility of the exporting country.

Although the first model has the obvious advantages of simplicity and facility in the issuance process, the second method is attractive due to the high number of participating countries. Involving the authorities early in the process, from the time the certificate of origin is issued, can help reduce the risks of triangulation and evasion of origin rules. Regardless of which of these two systems is used, the administration of the origin system will be a major challenge for the customs authorities of the countries in this hemisphere.

## 3.2. Investment

Most countries in the hemisphere understand the advantages of having a system of rules that encourages direct investment. Accordingly, they have unilaterally taken steps to liberalize their investment regimes and have concluded international agreements to promote the flow of foreign capital, either through the so-called bilateral investment promotion and protection agreements or through similar disciplines on the chapters included in their trade agreements.

The willingness shown by the countries of the region to enter into investment agreements, the type of agreement they have concluded and the experiences with their enforcement and administration are the three factors that indicate what positions can be expected from the participants in the FTAA negotiations.

### *3.2.1. Participation and type of investment agreement*

The first clue to the position that the various FTAA participants have with regard to investment is how willing they have been to enter into the bilateral investment promotion and protection agreements or to include investment chapters in the free trade agreements they have negotiated.

A second clue is the type of agreement they have concluded. There are basically two models of investment agreements. The first is what one might call the "NAFTA model", which has very strict disciplines and very broad coverage. The principal features of this model are as follows:

- (a) A liberal definition of investment that encompasses direct and indirect investment;
- (b) Strict disciplines of nondiscrimination pre- and post-investment (national treatment, most favored nation treatment, treatment level and minimum standard of treatment);
- (c) Prohibition of performance requirements that are more stringent than the multilateral disciplines that apply to the trade-related investment measures (TRIMS) and that include exportation requirements, national value added, domestic supply, generation of foreign currency, imports tied to the value of exports, technology transfer and so on;
- (d) Freedom for payments and transfers to circulate;<sup>36</sup>
- (e) Strict disciplines for expropriation and for payment of compensation, as appropriate;
- (f) Disciplines that prohibit relaxation of domestic environmental standards as a means to promote investment;
- (g) Establishment of a procedure by which to settle investor/State disputes; and
- (h) A list of explicit reservations and/or exceptions to the chapter's disciplines.

Although the other investment agreements vary greatly, certain important features distinguish them from the "NAFTA model". In general, agreements not patterned along the NAFTA model's lines are less ambitious. Their disciplines often incorporate domestic laws and therefore, contain discriminatory measures (enforcement of the agreement is post-establishment; in other words, when the investment is already made). These disciplines are often applied exclusively to direct foreign investments; there is no clause prohibiting performance requirements and/or any clause wherein the parties undertake not to introduce new rules that might be more restrictive than those in force at the time the agreement is signed.

From the type of agreement they have signed and the parties with which they have concluded such agreements, one can imagine the negotiating position the various countries will take.

Table 11 was put together using information on the investment agreements and on the free trade agreements with specific investment chapters that the FTAA countries have signed.<sup>37</sup> In that table the 34 countries are classified into four groups:

---

<sup>36</sup> A central concern of the United States in negotiating the FTAA will be the unrestricted repatriation of profits of U.S. investors established throughout the hemisphere. Countries like Brazil will certainly be opposed to this position.

<sup>37</sup> Table 11 does not include the NAFTA countries, as the agreements between Canada, the U.S. and Mexico are used as a frame of reference.

- (a) Countries that have signed Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with the United States: Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago. All the agreements that the U.S. has signed follow a format very similar to NAFTA Chapter 11 and have the features listed earlier. The U.S., which is the principal "*demandeur*" in this area, is not expected to get much more in the FTAA than what was individually agreed upon in its FTAs and in its BITs. In the FTAA Mexico, Canada, and Chile<sup>38</sup> for their part, are not likely to have much problem with a FTAA chapter crafted along the lines of their respective FTAs with the United States. The eleven countries that already have BITs with the United States would likely react the same way, although for those countries there would be a major difference between their BITs and the FTAA. Under the hemispheric agreement, the investment chapter would be tied in with the rest of the trade agreement, by way of the dispute-settlement mechanism ultimately agreed upon in the hemisphere.<sup>39</sup>
- (b) Countries that have signed agreements along the lines of the NAFTA model, but not with the United States: Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Venezuela. Although they have signed NAFTA-type agreements with Mexico, these countries have not signed them with the U.S., basically for at least two reasons. The first would be tactical. As the investment chapter is one of the U.S.' fundamental interests in the FTAA, some countries may have opted not to conclude bilateral agreements that might eventually weaken their bargaining position with the U.S. The other reason might be that substantive differences on the scope of the reservations have made it impossible to conclude a BIT with the U.S.

Chile was, until recently, perhaps the best example of these possible explanations. Starting in the early nineties, it initiated talks with the U.S. to negotiate a free trade agreement, first through accession to NAFTA, and later through the recently concluded bilateral process. Clearly, Chile had no incentive to move forward alone on a topic in which the U.S. has so much interest. Then, in its investment negotiations with Canada and Mexico, Chile introduced a reservation in order to be able to keep restrictions in place on short-term capital movements,<sup>40</sup> restrictions that would have to be subsequently negotiated with the United States.

Costa Rica, on the other hand, is an example of the second type of explanation. Even though its FTA with Mexico included an investment chapter patterned along the lines of the NAFTA model, Costa Rica reserved the telecommunications sector, which is a clear U.S. offensive interest.

---

<sup>38</sup> The three NAFTA countries can be expected to try to seize the opportunity to include certain clauses in the FTAA investment chapter based on the experience they acquired in eight years under the three-sided NAFTA agreement. For example, they are likely to favor clauses that prohibit bogus use of the mechanism for settling disputes with the investor and that delimit the scope of the protection given to foreign investors, in accordance with the Note of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, which the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued in July 2001.

<sup>39</sup> Being self-contained investment agreements, under the BITs there is no opportunity to exercise trade retaliation in the event the investment disciplines are violated. In NAFTA, on the other hand, Chapter 11 is an integral part of the trade agreement.

<sup>40</sup> It is likely that Chile and the U.S. have recently concluded negotiations of their free trade agreement. If the investment chapter of that agreement deviates from the NAFTA model on those subjects, this will be indicative of just how much importance Chile attaches to these reservations and/or of the United States' flexibility. An important precedent will be established.

(c) Countries that have signed agreements, but only of the second kind: Barbados, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. This third group of countries does not have NAFTA-type agreements (Table 11), which might suggest that they will want a less stringent chapter in the FTAA. The most obvious cases are three of Mercosur's four members: Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. Although the protocols regulating the investment regime for the Mercosur partners are more ambitious than the traditional investment agreements, they do not go as far as the NAFTA model does. The protocols' non-discrimination disciplines apply as of pre-establishment. However, the reservations and exceptions are broader and, for example, they contain no clause prohibiting performance requirements, which is an essential part of the NAFTA model. The other agreements that these three Mercosur countries have are much narrower in scope. Perhaps what best illustrates the problems that these countries are having with the investment chapter is the fact that the Cologne Protocol, which was signed in 1994 and does not go as far as NAFTA Chapter 11, is still not yet in force.

**TABLE 11  
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS**

	Country	FIPPA with U.S.	FTA Chapter, Mexico or Canada	Other Agreements **	Total
1	Argentina	1		14	15
2	Barbados			2	2
3	Bolivia	1	1	4	6
4	Brazil			3	3
5	Chile	1 *	2	13	15
6	Colombia		1	1	2
7	Costa Rica		2	5	7
8	Dominican Republic			1	1
9	Ecuador	1		8	9
10	El Salvador	1	1	4	6
11	Grenada	1			1
12	Guatemala		1	2	3
13	Haiti	1			1
14	Honduras	1	1	1	3
15	Jamaica	1		1	2
16	Nicaragua	1		2	3
17	Panama	1		4	5
18	Paraguay			6	6
19	Peru			6	6
20	Trinidad and Tobago	1		1	2
21	Uruguay			5	5
22	Venezuela		1	9	9

Notes: \* Chile and the United States included an investment chapter in their FTA.

\*\* Includes the Mercosur Cologne Protocol.

(d) Countries that have no investment agreement (Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Belize, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia and Suriname).

The fact that nine countries have not signed an investment agreement even when the activity on that front was so heavy back in the 1990s, would appear to suggest that theirs will be a defensive position in the negotiations on this topic. For the U.S., investment has not only been a very important issue in all its negotiations, but is also one in which is now advocating a model text of disciplines.

Given the importance of the FTAA negotiation and the precedent that it might set for other negotiations and for the agreements already in place, the U.S. is not expected to alter its position in any substantial way, although recently voices have been raised in the U.S. Congress objecting to the scope of NAFTA Chapter 11. The investment disciplines included in the free trade agreement between Chile and the United States will enable us to identify the type of chapter the U.S. would be willing to agree to in the FTAA. The recently concluded agreement, whose details are still confidential, will be indicative of just how flexible the U.S. would be and of any possible changes in the position of its Congress.

### **3.3. Competition policies**

This is another issue where the interests are clearly staked out and, to some degree, polarized. The U.S. is the most important "*demandeur*"<sup>41</sup> in this area as well, and will want the FTAA competition chapter to establish regimes that require State companies, public monopolies, State-designated monopolies and private monopolies to refrain from engaging in discriminatory practices or measures that could undermine the benefits expected from trade liberalization under the FTAA.

It will also try to persuade all countries to adopt competition policies, including mechanisms whereby national authorities can exchange information and cooperate on the subject. The three NAFTA countries, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela have legislation in place, authorities in force and the designated competent officials at work. They even have international conventions on the subject. However, for the vast majority of the countries in the region, the legislative and institutional challenge that adopting competition policies represents is much greater, so that the negotiation of this chapter may pose some difficulty. The FTAA can be a good vehicle for promoting the reforms needed to adopt these regimes, which not only protect consumers and small-scale producers and vendors, but also ensure that the access obtained when tariffs are eliminated is effective and stable.

### **3.4. Government procurement**

For the U.S., and to a lesser extent Canada and Mexico, the FTAA is an opportunity to have the countries of the hemisphere apply the disciplines of the NAFTA procurement chapter, in order to open up and stabilize access to the government procurement markets in the hemisphere. The United States and Canada are parties to the WTO Government Procurement Code, and parties to NAFTA. Mexico is a NAFTA partner and its trade agreements with Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Bolivia contain chapters establishing disciplines on this subject. The result is that the three North

---

<sup>41</sup> Even though all countries of the region should have an offensive interest in this topic, since the access their products have to markets will depend on whether anti-competitive practices that can impair market access are prohibited.

American countries are required to grant nondiscriminatory treatment and to have transparent and well-defined procedures for competitive bidding and bid letting.

The rest of the hemisphere, save for those countries that have included government procurement chapters in their FTAs with Mexico and Canada, and Chile, who included government procurement disciplines in their agreement with the U.S, do not have international disciplines comparable to those of the WTO's Government Procurement Code or the NAFTA chapter on government procurement. All this suggest that Brazil and other countries can be expected to demand a "price" in the form of concessions before arriving at an agreement on this subject. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the interest that some Latin American countries, mainly the larger ones, may have in eliminating current restrictions in the U.S. government procurement market, such as the "Buy American" program.

As in the case of investment, the participants in the FTAA can be classified into groups, according to the type of international agreements they have concluded in the area of government procurement. For classification purposes, five groups can be identified:

- (a) The NAFTA countries, which already have an agreement among them involving strict disciplines, very well defined competitive bidding procedures, clear mechanisms for filing challenges, wide coverage based on positive lists of goods, services and federal entities and para-State businesses to which the disciplines of the agreement apply. For reasons already explained, these three countries can be expected to have a strong offensive stake in this matter. Subject to reviewing the details once they are made public, the agreement between Chile and the United States is likely to place Chile in this group of countries. Nevertheless, since the text of such agreement was not available when preparing this document, we placed Chile, for the time being, at group c).
- (b) Bolivia, Costa Rica and Nicaragua already have a government procurement chapter with NAFTA-style disciplines and coverage in their free trade agreements with Mexico. Therefore, they should, in principle, have no problem agreeing to similar disciplines in the FTAA negotiations. However, it is one thing to agree upon a government procurement chapter with Mexico, whose suppliers have not a major presence on all government procurement markets in the hemisphere, but quite another thing to agree upon one with the United States and, to a lesser extent, Canada. For that reason, the reservations and thresholds agreed upon in the negotiations with Mexico will not necessarily be the same as those that come out of the FTAA negotiations.
- (c) Chile, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. These four countries -together with Nicaragua and Costa Rica- negotiated a procurement chapter in their free trade agreement. The disciplines and coverage in that chapter, however, are not as ambitious as NAFTA's. Moreover, the fact that Mexico's free trade agreements with the Northern Triangle, its free trade agreement with Chile, and Chile's free trade agreement with Canada did not include a chapter on government procurement is indicative of how difficult it will be for these countries to go as far as the NAFTA partners did. These countries' opposition to the inclusion of a government procurement chapter in their FTAs might also be explained as a tactic to avoid setting a precedent for the FTAA negotiations, where the U.S. will most certainly be the principal "*demandeur*". Having said that, one cannot ignore the fact that securing a competitive bidding mechanism with disciplines as strict as NAFTA's will pose very real difficulties for the FTAA.



- (d) The majority of the other FTAA participants fall into the fourth group, which are countries with no international government procurement commitments. Many of these countries already have relatively open and competitive government-procurement systems. In the smaller economies, in particular, government sectors procure a significant portion of their goods and services abroad. Their main problem will not be agreeing to the nondiscrimination commitment, but rather taking on the burden that administration of a regime as detailed and ambitious as the WTO code or the NAFTA chapter on government procurement will represent. Like the competition issue, the FTAA can be a useful vehicle for promoting institutional reform and administrative modernization in the region. At the same time, however, if the negotiations are to be successfully concluded, the limitations that many countries currently face may have to be acknowledged, perhaps in the form of differential transition periods.
- (e) Finally, there are countries like Brazil for which the government procurement issue is more sensitive. This country has the most attractive government procurement market in Latin America. But while its public bidding regime encourages competition among potential suppliers, it is not embodied in the form of an international agreement. Therefore, there is always the possibility of unilateral changes in its government procurement's regulation, generating a sense of uncertainty among suppliers. Access to Brazil's government procurement market is a major U.S. offensive interest.<sup>42</sup>

### **3.5. Intellectual property**

Despite the fact that all the FTAA countries are party to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (or TRIPS), a good number of them have not completed passage and implementation of the necessary domestic laws. For some years now, protection of intellectual property rights has been a priority on the U.S. trade agenda. Its interest in this issue is so strong that it has set up a periodic review process to check whether its trading partners are complying with the intellectual property protection measures. The process even provides for unilateral retaliation to induce more effective protection. The U.S.' principal intellectual property concerns center around the following issues: inadequate protection during the patent pipeline process, and of the confidential information given when registering the patent, which mainly affects the pharmaceutical and agricultural chemicals industries; falsification and pirating of trademarks, software, videocassettes, and music tapes and CDs; unlawful use of television broadcasts and satellite signals. One of the U.S.' very special and more generalized demands is for more effective enforcement of the laws protecting intellectual property rights.

Other countries certainly have their own intellectual property issues. Some have specific "offensive" issues. Mexico will surely try to use the FTAA negotiations to seek protection of copyright, trademarks, and appellation of origin for tequila and mezcal. Mercosur and the Andean countries, for their part, have announced their intention to work to have germplasm recognized as the property of the countries that have these natural resources. In Doha, it became apparent that there

---

<sup>42</sup> The best gauge of the U.S.' interest in this area is the National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. In the section on Brazil, the report mentions the need to improve transparency in the procurement process, limitations on foreign capital participation, particularly in the energy and construction sectors, and a "buy national" policy. Until recently, these preferences were embodied in the Brazilian Constitution.

are certain defensive interests that are critical for the countries of the developing world, such as authorization of parallel imports and production of generic medicines to treat public health problems (i.e., AIDS).

Having said this, the FTAA's intellectual property chapter is clearly a priority issue for the U.S. and for Canada. At the very least, they will be looking for the TRIPS<sup>43</sup> commitments and, if possible, additional obligations to guarantee more rigorous and effective enforcement of intellectual property laws. An ambitious intellectual property chapter in the FTAA would set a precedent of great value for the U.S., given that it could be used as an example to be followed on the multilateral front. Furthermore, in light of the U.S.' great interest here, the rest of the FTAA participants, mainly those that have still not completed the passage and implementation of the necessary domestic laws for enforcing the commitments acquired within the TRIPS framework, could use this chapter as a negotiating capital.

### **3.6. Services**

There are also major differences in the approach taken by the different countries participating in the FTAA negotiations to the topic of services. The three NAFTA partners, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela and the Central American countries -Panama excluded- have negotiated free trade agreements that establish strict regimes of nondiscrimination and prohibit local presence requirements for foreign providers of a service. Included under these agreements were disciplines that apply to all services, except those stipulated in a list of explicit reservations (negative list). This method affords producers and vendors of services a high degree of certainty.

Mercosur, for its part, has opted for a GATS approach, where the sectors included in the liberalization are only those explicitly named (positive list). Although in principle this method should not stand in the way of achieving ambitious liberalization, the negotiation process in the two cases is very different. The negative list approach is not only more transparent, but is also more conducive to more sweeping coverage. The greater transparency is achieved because this is a self-contained text that includes, in principle, all sectors, unless they appear on a list of explicit reservations or exceptions. The bias in favor of openness comes from the fact that defensive positions looking for exclusions have to shoulder the burden of the negotiation. To win those exclusions, they have to be willing to make other concessions. Clearly, this will be a central theme in this chapter, since the scope of the FTAA chapter on services will largely depend on the format ultimately agreed upon.

In addition to their differing approaches, as briefly summarized here, the participants also have sectorial interests. In the plurilateral negotiations on telecommunications and financial services in the WTO, the United States has been quite successful in furthering its offensive interests. Thanks to the progress made in Geneva and to unilateral liberalization processes, on the whole, the countries of the region have very liberal regimes for the delivery of services. However, in some

---

<sup>43</sup> Even supposing that the FTAA does not go beyond TRIPS, the U.S. would be interested in including TRIPS in the hemispheric agreement as it will enable the U.S. to tie protection of intellectual property rights to the other FTAA rights and obligations. This would mean, for example, that tariff concessions could be withdrawn if the intellectual property chapter was violated.

countries the restrictions on certain sectors are still very tight. The United States can be expected to work to further loosen restrictions in financial services, telecommunications and energy and, as it has in other negotiations, to resist the inclusion of maritime cabotage (Jones Act)<sup>44</sup> in the liberalization process.

### **3.7. Subsidies, anti-dumping and countervailing duties**

Anti-dumping is one of the most divisive and even polarizing issues in the FTAA negotiations. In every trade forum the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government have announced their opposition to negotiating anything that might "weaken" its system to counter unfair trade practices. For the vast majority of the countries of the hemisphere, this offensive interest could doom their access to the U.S. market to an uncertain fate and jeopardize the lowered tariff barriers negotiated in the FTAA.

Appendix 2 (A2) lists the anti-dumping cases that the FTAA participants have amongst themselves. Although the list is not long, the trade impact is quite considerable. Key export products are often affected, demonstrating the relevance of an offensive position on this issue. Take, for example, the cases of Chile, Brazil and Canada, and how their sales to the U.S. market are affected.<sup>45</sup>

In 2000, grapes were Chile's fourth major export with sales abroad totaling 500 million dollars. Sales of fresh salmon came in a distant second, at 47 million. Frozen orange juice is Brazil's ninth major export, bringing in revenues of close to one billion each year. Brazil's steel industry also figures prominently in the country's sales abroad. In fact, as the information in A2 shows, practically all the FTAA countries have resorted to the use of anti-dumping measures to protect this sector.

For Canada, U.S. unfair trade practices law is one of the major irritants in the bilateral relations between the two countries. It has frequently been used as a means to make the U.S. market less accessible. The application of countervailing duties and anti-dumping quotas on Canadian exports of softwood lumber to the United States have been one of the most serious and long-standing sources of friction in relations between the two countries.

In 1985, during negotiation of the free trade agreement between the United States and Canada, one of Canada's priority offensive issues was elimination of the laws prohibiting unfair trade practices. The Canadian proposal was to prevent predatory practices by means of U.S. antitrust laws rather than the anti-dumping legislation. U.S. opposition and Canadian interest were so strong that for this one issue Canada threatened to break off negotiations. To wrap up the negotiations, a compromise solution was found whereby the unfair trade practices legislation would be left intact,

---

<sup>44</sup> The Teamsters Union in the United States has been particularly successful in keeping this sector out of the various regional and multilateral agreements that the U.S. has negotiated in recent years. A case in point would be the letter that all United States senators signed requesting that this sector be excluded during the negotiation of the bilateral free trade agreement between the United States and Canada.

<sup>45</sup> The information in Appendix 2 is useful as an indicator of activity in the area. Nonetheless, it is incomplete, because it does not enable one to distinguish those occasions when anti-dumping protection is applied to a product of little importance in the production chain from those when it is applied to a product that affects major sectors of the economy, such as steel, for example.

but an international panel might review final determinations as to applications (chapter XIX of the United States and Canada Free Trade Agreement [USCFTA], which would eventually become NAFTA chapter XIX). During the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico argued, without success, the same position that Canada had originally defended when negotiating the USCFTA.

Canada's idea of eliminating the anti-dumping legislation in a free trade area resonated with Chile. In their free trade agreement, the two countries agreed that their respective anti-dumping laws would not be applied on trade between them. All the countries, but most especially Canada, Chile, Mexico and Brazil, can be expected to continue to insist that the anti-dumping issue be included on the FTAA agenda. However, strong resistance can be anticipated from the U.S. negotiators, especially to the idea of dealing with this topic at a hemispheric level. The best evidence of the type of problem that the U.S. will be up against in trying to raise this issue in any trade negotiations is the TPA amendment passed by the U.S. Senate that gives Congress a separate vote in the case of any agreement that might undermine the effectiveness of measures to counter unfair trade practices. As with farm subsidies, the most that can be hoped in this area is that the WTO might begin to address this issue.

### **3.8. Dispute settlement**

Negotiation of the chapter on dispute settlement is one of the FTAA's more important topics, as the certainty of the liberalization negotiated will in large part depend on the presence of an expedite, reliable and fair mechanism for settling any differences that might arise once the agreement enters into force. During the negotiating process, no one has come out with a particularly definite position on this topic, although countries with strong defensive interests can be expected to fight for a more lax and more lengthened mechanism.

One topic that will require discussion is the drawing up of the lists of panelists. There are probably not a sufficient number of arbitrators with adequate legal and technical training in all the countries participating in the FTAA. It is therefore quite likely that panelists will have to be drawn from outside the region, particularly when the number of disputes begin to multiply.

### **3.9. Other topics: Environment, labor rights and the participation of "civil society"**

As in other trade negotiations, the United States and Canada have insisted that environment, labor rights, and civil society's participation figure on the FTAA agenda. The basic opposition will come from the other countries of the hemisphere, which fear that their inclusion might undermine their access to the hemisphere's markets, particularly those of the more developed countries.

One of the most hotly debated issues in trade fora and the U.S. Congress has been whether to include environmental and labor concerns on the trade agenda. One of the main reasons for the Seattle failure was the U.S.' insistence on attaching overriding importance to these issues, despite the developing countries' opposition. Similarly, the Doha multilateral negotiations would never have gotten off the ground had the U.S. continued to press this position. The consensus achieved in Qatar was in large part because the U.S.' position was much less intransigent, as it agreed to leave the labor issue out of the ministerial declaration.

The disagreement over how to deal with labor and environmental issues in trade negotiations has been one of the main reasons why it took the U.S. Executive so long to win Congressional approval of TPA. For many Democrat lawmakers -especially those in the House of Representatives- labor and environmental issues must be included in trade negotiations and must go well beyond what was negotiated with Mexico in the NAFTA side agreements on labor and environment. For these congressmen, the NAFTA parallel deals are lacking on a number of fronts, among them the fact that their dispute settlement mechanisms are not as expedite as the NAFTA mechanism, with the result that trade sanctions to retaliate for a failure to comply with the labor and/or environmental disciplines are not as swift in coming.

The strong opposition to the TPA on the part of Democrats in the U.S. Congress is in part because the text approved is not up to these demands. While both bills in the House and the Senate call for labor and environmental issues to be included, they do not necessarily require that trade sanctions be adopted<sup>46</sup> or that the mechanisms for settling these kind of disputes be the same as those for trade disputes. As in the case of investment, with the recent conclusion of the negotiations between the U.S. and Chile, we will all soon have an indication of the type of disciplines the U.S. will want the FTAA to include for these issues.

---

<sup>46</sup> The texts leave open the possibility that the sanctions for violations of labor and environmental disciplines, for example, can be fines to transgressor companies.

## IV. CONTEXT OF THE FTAA NEGOTIATIONS

In addition to the complexity of addressing the interests of 34 different countries in nine negotiating groups, the context in which the FTAA is evolving makes this negotiation a difficult, uncertain and, possibly, narrow-in-scope initiative. 34 countries involved with differing levels of participation and pursuing very different ends, and a U.S. Congress less receptive to trade liberalization are factors that taken together make it difficult to imagine that the FTAA negotiations could achieve a coverage of all products in the tariff schedule. Furthermore, the fact that the FTAA negotiations coincide with the recent launch of the multilateral round in Doha and with the negotiation of other agreements between the countries of the hemisphere will also have important implications for the FTAA and will pose a challenge to the negotiations underway on these many fronts. Eventually a technical and political decision will have to be made as to how the FTAA will coexist with the sub-regional or bilateral agreements already in place in the hemisphere.

### 4.1. Number of participants

The number of parties to a negotiation counts, and counts a great deal. A free trade agreement among 34 countries is unprecedented. Apart from the obvious logistical complications and the pressure on budgetary resources, there are other more substantive problems posed by so many participating countries.

First, as previously noted, the large number of countries involved exponentially increases the difficulty of achieving across-the-board tariff liberalization. In negotiations involving 34 countries, with productive structures and export interests as diverse as the FTAA participants, some countries' more important offensive objectives are bound to be among other countries' principal defensive interests. This is especially so in the agricultural sector, where products that are some countries' best competitive advantages are in other countries' most sensitive areas. So it seems unrealistic to think that trade liberalization under the FTAA -especially in the agricultural sector- will be comprehensive and identical for all members. As in the case of NAFTA, what is most likely is that bilateral negotiations will be conducted for products in the primary sector, and *ad hoc* liberalization mechanisms (tariff quotas or limited preferential quotas, seasonal arrangements and exclusions, for example) will be agreed upon, as a way to reconcile the export interests of some with the sensitivities of others.

With so many countries participating, the negotiations timetable is more likely to be stalled by elections, changes of administrations and other political events, which are also bound to slow the pace of the process and change the degree of commitment and enthusiasm that the various participants have in the FTAA. This factor is one of particular consequence. A *sine qua non* condition for the success of such ambitious initiatives as the FTAA is the presence of leadership and a political commitment on the part of the parties.<sup>47</sup> In the two years between now and the date

---

<sup>47</sup> Virtually every ambitious integration enterprise (the European Union, NAFTA) has always had some "grand vision" and enjoyed the participants' strong political commitment. That vision and commitment have carried the initiative over the hurdles that negotiations of this type invariably come up against. The FTAA is an especially peculiar integration process in this respect, since at one time or another there have been countries that have participated with reluctance bordering on resistance.

on which the FTAA negotiations are to conclude, there will be a new administration in place in Brazil, legislative elections in Mexico, Presidential elections in the U.S., to name just a few such political events. Table 12 contains the major election events that will take place in the FTAA countries in the next few years.

**TABLE 12**  
**ELECTION TIMETABLE IN THE FTAA COUNTRIES, 2002-2005**

Country	Type of Election	Election Date
Guyana	Presidential and Parliamentary	March 2003
Argentina	Presidential	2003
Argentina	Legislative	2003
Grenada	Parliamentary	2003
Guatemala	Presidential	2003
Mexico	Legislative	2003
Paraguay	Presidential	2003
U.S.	Presidential	November 4, 2004
Dominican Republic	Presidential	2004
El Salvador	Presidential	2004
Panama	Presidential	2004
Uruguay	Presidential	2004
Chile	Presidential	2005
Peru	Presidential	December 2005
Mexico	Presidential	July 2006
Venezuela	Presidential	2006

Source: OAS and *CNN World Election Watch*.

## 4.2. The participants' heterogeneity

The sheer number of participants involved is not the only factor complicating the FTAA negotiation process. Another complication is their diversity. The heterogeneity in the levels of economic and institutional development of the countries of this hemisphere will affect the agreement's structure and content. While a handful of countries have the technical, human and institutional means to deal with the FTAA, another group of countries is ill equipped for the negotiation process and to apply the results of the negotiation when the time comes.

The first constraint is related to the negotiating capacity of most of the less developed countries. Many do not have sufficient staff to cover all negotiating fronts. These staffs do not have the technical expertise needed to discuss some topics on the agenda.<sup>48</sup>

---

<sup>48</sup> This challenge is all the greater now that highly complex matters have been included that only recently made their way onto the international trade agenda (for example, intellectual property, competition, investment and services). Fortunately, the institutions that form the Tripartite Committee and a number of sub-regional organizations have provided technical and financial support to those small economies that need assistance in their FTAA process.

The second factor is institutional in nature. Although in the last decade progress toward trade liberalization in the region was recorded, a significant number of economies in the hemisphere still remain relatively closed. In this context, a major challenge and hurdle in the initiative's future is the difficulty that some countries will have implementing the agreements and abiding by the disciplines that the FTAA will introduce. This is true for the more novel elements on the FTAA agenda, as well as for issues as basic as tariff elimination. As the previous section reported, for many countries of the region tariff revenues are a major source of income for the public coffers; without fiscal reforms paralleling the FTAA process,<sup>49</sup> conclusion of the negotiation of the FTAA will be all the more difficult.

No less serious are the institutional constraints that much of the region has to contend with in other areas of the agreement. To name just some of the more obvious difficulties, many countries do not have the juridical and policing mechanisms needed to effectively monitor protection of intellectual property rights; there are no authorities to promote and enforce competition policies, or the government procurement regime has no disciplines and lacks transparency.

#### **4.3. Coincidence of the FTAA process with other multilateral and sub-regional negotiations**

Both the FTAA and the new round of multilateral negotiations are scheduled to end in 2005, which means, first of all, that the 34 American countries will have to negotiate on two fronts at the same time. In addition, a number of bilateral negotiations are in progress (Andean Community-Mercosur, Brazil-Mexico, Panama-Mexico) and have been for some years now. Then, too, negotiations recently got underway between the United States and Central America and would seem to be part of the U.S. strategy to move the FTAA process faster. Undoubtedly, the fact that both sets of negotiations are occurring simultaneously may help bring about important synergies; but it can also be a source of conflict that could end up delaying the conclusion of the FTAA.

The issues related to subsidy and farm-price support programs and the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy legislation have proven to be major sticking points in the FTAA negotiations and could become serious obstacles for conclusion of the agreement. Ideally, the multilateral front could provide an opportunity to iron out what are fundamental issues for some countries, issues that would be difficult to resolve at the regional level. These new disciplines would combine with those things that can be achieved within the FTAA: elimination of tariffs, liberalization of trade and investment regimes. There are many other subjects where there will be an enormous interplay between the strategy and the substance that will be negotiated in the FTAA and the WTO. The key element in all this is that, given the permeability of the information in the sequential or parallel negotiations, establishing precedents may become a basic positive or negative element.

The best example of this is the tariff proposal made in December 2002 by the U.S. at the WTO. The U.S. proposal in Geneva consists of eliminating, completely and reciprocally, tariffs on industrial products no later than 2015. Several weeks later, in February 2003, the U.S. submitted its offer for market access in the FTAA. This offer is consistent with the proposal at the WTO and

---

<sup>49</sup> This reform might be relatively simple where there is no domestic production: it would simply be a matter of replacing tariffs with indirect taxes on consumption. Politically speaking, however, the indirect tax would be much more transparent than the tariff duty.



will allow the U.S. to continue with its strategy of requiring countries to compete in order to gain access to its market in the different negotiations fora.

The U.S. industrial tariff offer in the FTAA seeks to maintain incentives to participate in the hemispheric agreement and not to wait to gain access to the U.S. market until conclusion of the Doha Round. Thus, the tariff elimination offered in the FTAA is more rapid, since a large part of the tariffs would be eliminated either upon the entry into force of this agreement or over the next five years, and only a small percentage would have phase-out periods of ten years.

In this context, the U.S. is offering in the FTAA the elimination of the tariffs on textile manufactures and garments no later than 2010 for those countries that would be willing to offer reciprocity.<sup>50</sup>

In Geneva over the next two years, the thirty-four countries will have to consider some of the implications of any movement in the FTAA and vice versa. When the time comes, they will have to divide their limited political capital between the regional and multilateral fronts.

Perhaps the most important negotiations paralleling those of the FTAA are those between Brazil and Mexico, between Mercosur and the European Union, and between Central America and the United States. The first are negotiations between the two largest Latin American countries. They can be expected to establish important precedents and bolster Brazil's position *vis-à-vis* the United States. The negotiations between the United States and Central America are important for a number of reasons: (1) part of the U.S. strategy is to speed up the FTAA process by means of "competitive negotiations"; (2) as a precedent and incentive for the rest of the hemisphere, these negotiations will move rather quickly; (3) a great many precedents will be established apropos the U.S. position with regard to the small economies and the other economies; (4) Juggling negotiations on all these fronts will be challenging for the participating countries, not just in terms of logistics, but in terms of resources and negotiating strategies as well.

Finally, the recently concluded negotiations between the U.S. and Chile will establish very important precedents for the FTAA. The results of this agreement will provide indications on the scope of the concessions that the United States would work to secure in the FTAA as well as those it would be willing to offer in exchange.

#### *4.3.1. FTAA and WTO negotiation scenarios*

The Doha Round will be one of the factors with the greatest impact on the FTAA process. To improve the chances for success in both fora, the interaction between them will have to be probed for possible sources of conflict and potential opportunities.


The scenarios that seem most likely at the present time are those premised on the hypotheses that the multilateral negotiations and the FTAA negotiations will not conclude simultaneously in December 2004. The current status of the discussions in both fora reveals the reduced possibilities

---

<sup>50</sup> We are currently preparing an analysis of the possible scenarios for the design of the FTAA that will examine in detail, among other aspects, the new dynamic that the U.S. proposal for market access is introducing to hemispheric integration.

that these initiatives will end in less than twenty-four months. Of the two remaining scenarios (specifically, that the WTO finishes before the FTAA, and vice versa), the most likely outcomes are described in Diagrams 1 and 2.

**DIAGRAM 1**  
**THE FTAA NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDE BEFORE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS**



**DIAGRAM 2**  
**THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDE BEFORE FTAA NEGOTIATIONS**




Diagram 1 shows two possible outcomes for the scenario where the FTAA concludes before the Doha Round. The first outcome envisages the possibility of a far-reaching FTAA, i.e., one with ambitious disciplines in all areas, including anti-dumping and domestic agricultural subsidies. Under this outcome, the hemispheric agreement would be a strategic instrument to force the conclusion of the multilateral negotiation. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the U.S. will agree to establish comprehensive disciplines in these areas if the European Union and Japan are not at the negotiating table.

The second outcome under this scenario would seem more likely, because it envisages the conclusion of a relatively moderate in scope FTAA. This agreement would include, mainly, the elimination of agricultural and industrial tariffs, the liberalization of trade in services, investment flows and the opening of government procurement, as well as ambitious intellectual property disciplines. Nevertheless, this outcome would still be considered moderate in scope given that significant progress would not be made on the topics of anti-dumping and domestic subsidies, which would have to be dealt with in the multilateral forum.<sup>51</sup>

Under this outcome, the access that the U.S. would be willing to grant to its market for the rest of the hemisphere would become the strategic element that it would seek to use to break the multilateral impasse. A hemispheric agreement with ambitious tariff liberalization would generate an incentive for countries outside the region to work, through the WTO, to eliminate the discrimination to which they would be subjected on the U.S. market as a result of the FTAA. At the same time, the opening of the Latin American market that the U.S. would secure, especially of Mercosur, would generate incentives for the European Union and Japan, among others, to work to establish equal conditions of access to those markets through a new round at the WTO.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, Mercosur would also have an interest in the new multilateral round making progress, because it would be converted into a vehicle for advancing the FTAA's pending agenda (anti-dumping and domestic farm subsidies). Finally, in the event the U.S. were to achieve, within the FTAA framework, a deepening of the commitments established in the Uruguay Round in such areas as intellectual property and investment, it would surely "export" these new disciplines to the Doha Round.

Diagram 2 shows two outcomes for the scenario where Doha Round ends before the FTAA. The first outcome envisages a round ambitious in scope that would succeed in completely eliminating industrial tariffs, cut farm subsidies significantly, and, in general, make serious progress in most of the disciplines currently being negotiated, including domestic farm subsidies. This outcome would make the subsequent conclusion of a hemispheric agreement difficult, because the interests of access to the most relevant markets in the hemisphere would have already been dealt with in Geneva. Specifically, were the U.S. to grant free access to its textile market and significantly liberalize its agricultural sector within the multilateral framework, the most important incentives in Latin America for concluding the FTAA would disappear.

---

<sup>51</sup> This alternative outcome, as well as other possible scenarios for hemispheric integration, will be examined in detail in a paper we are currently preparing.

<sup>52</sup> Currently the European Union is conducting a bilateral negotiation with Mercosur, nevertheless, the issue of farms subsidies is likely to hamper progress in this negotiation.

The second outcome under this scenario envisages a multilateral negotiation limited in scope that would leave open the possibility for the U.S. to take the lead in the conclusion of the FTAA negotiations. On the hemispheric front the results would be, in the best of cases, relatively moderate, with major advances in the liberalization of the trade in goods, services, and investment flows, but without comprehensive solutions for domestic farm subsidies and probably not for anti-dumping either.

Obviously, the likelihood of one scenario over another will change as political and economic events unfold in the various countries and as the negotiations on the two fronts evolve. Hence, this exercise will have to be updated and revisited in greater depth.

#### **4.4. Coexistence of the FTAA with other regional agreements**

One of the most complex and politically-diplomatically sensitive issues is determining how the hemispheric agreement will coexist with the many sub-regional agreements already in force. The parties have indeed recognized this problem and have even agreed that, in principle, the agreement governing any specific issue will be the one that provides the most expansive or detailed coverage. Still, the specific problems that coexisting agreements might pose will not become apparent until the exact outcome of the hemispheric agreement is known. One can anticipate, however, some of the challenges that will come up and that will have to be resolved before the FTAA can take effect.

Given that the details of the agreement between Chile and the U.S. are still not public, the NAFTA agreement seems to provide the best reference of the kinds of challenges that may arise. For example, the FTAA and NAFTA will likely differ on such topics as investment, unfair trade practices, and on the handling of labor and environmental issues. The prospect that the trilateral disciplines might be supplanted by the FTAA disciplines for the sake of a single, truly hemispheric agreement does not seem very likely, as the United States, Mexico and Canada will not so readily give up what they achieved nine years ago. On the other hand, one cannot discard the possibility that, as part of a package to win the votes needed to get the FTAA passed in the U.S. Congress, an effort might be made to find a way to amend NAFTA provisions that certain U.S. interest groups are unhappy with. The same thing could happen in other legislative bodies in the hemisphere. Then, too, legal considerations might force the legislatures or negotiators to include an appendix specifying, chapter by chapter, which trade agreement shall govern their respective trade relations; also, some countries might decide which obligations and duties would be binding upon everyone and which would be binding only among a subset of countries.

One element that should not be lost sight of is the impact of a successful FTAA conclusion on Mercosur. The effect on the South American trading block of an ambitious tariff elimination within the FTAA framework will depend on the progress that Mercosur makes in its own integration process. In a scenario where this block is maintained as a customs union (with limited exceptions), the elimination of tariffs in the hemispheric free trade area will dilute the presence of Mercosur in the hemisphere. If there are no intra-hemispheric borders, then customs unions are irrelevant for trading within the hemisphere. On the other hand, if Mercosur succeeds in moving toward a common market, with free circulation of the factors of production and with supranational institutions, then FTAA and Mercosur would coexist as the European Union does with the various free trade agreements it has signed with third countries.

The FTAA would also impact trade agreements outside the region. By virtue of the commitments acquired within the framework of the Lomé Convention, the Caribbean, in principle, should extend to the European Union any preference granted to third countries. Consequently, the opening within the FTAA framework would offer the European Union the right to request its Caribbean partners FTAA treatment.

#### **4.5. The U.S. Congress**

The FTAA will surely encounter problems in every legislative body in its participating countries. Winning passage of NAFTA in the U.S. Congress was difficult enough back in 1993. But having said this, it is clear that, in recent years, the U.S. Congress has become more protectionist. The struggle with passage of the TPA in the two chambers of the U.S. Congress is an indication of the kinds of problems that lie ahead for any trade liberalization initiative.

In the U.S. House of Representatives, the TPA bill passed by the slimmest possible margin (215 in favor and 214 against). And in the process, the U.S. Chief Executive had to spend a sizeable portion of his political capital to assure the bill's passage. In the political give-and-take to win TPA passage, trade concessions given under previous initiatives (CBTPA) were taken back and commitments were introduced that would substantially reduce the Chief Executive's maneuvering room in the negotiations. Many of these commitments may mean that the FTAA will not turn out to be as ambitious as<sup>53</sup> NAFTA was in its day. The Senate package containing the TPA introduces a proposal to exclude anti-dumping, countervailing duties and other measures against unfair trade practices from the TPA, one of the issues of greatest interest to the United States' counterparts in the FTAA and in Doha.

Although the new Congress composition could make us think that in the near future the U.S. Executive would face fewer difficulties to promote trade initiatives, one should not underestimate the fact that in the past years the U.S. legislative branch has become more protectionist. It can also be expected, as in other negotiations, that the U.S. Congress will try to accommodate some specific interests, even after the negotiations have been formally concluded and while the agreement is being debated by the relevant legislatures.

---

<sup>53</sup> For a list of the "sensitive" farm products, for example, the TPA legislation establishes a series of requirements that must be met before the U.S. executive will want to include them in the trade negotiations. The most that can be hoped for is that these requirements will tend to slow down the negotiations.

## V. FINAL COMMENTS

The FTAA is likely the most ambitious negotiation of a free trade zone ever undertaken. The sheer number of participants and their diverse sizes and economic structures exponentially increase the number of sensitive issues in the area of trade liberalization. This paper has enabled a review, for each of the various groups into which the negotiations have been organized, of the major hurdles the countries of the hemisphere might have to clear in order to be able to bring this initiative to a successful conclusion.

Tables 13 and 14 summarize these challenges in terms of the offensive and defensive interests that each participant in the negotiation has at stake. Table 15, on the other hand, classifies these interests into three categories: strong, regular and lesser-priority interests. The idea is to identify those areas that constitute each party's priorities, which will likely become the process' most significant challenges.

### **Offensive and defensive interests of the FTAA participants**

As Table 15 shows, the United States would have strong offensive interests in every negotiating group. The only exceptions are farm subsidies and anti-dumping, two areas where the U.S. position would be a highly defensive one. On the market-access table, in addition to important offensive interests, the U.S. would also have some defensive interests, mainly in a small number of very politically sensitive sectors.

Canada, for its part, would have an offensive agenda in every negotiating group. The difference between Canada and the United States is that Canada's position on anti-dumping is much more liberal. On the defensive side, when it comes to market access Canada's sensitivities would, like its neighbor to the south, be focused on only a handful of sectors. Canada's position might be less ambitious when it comes to services, especially telecommunications, education, health, audiovisual services and others associated with the cultural industries.

Mexico would have offensive interests in every negotiating group, especially with those countries with which it has not concluded free trade agreements. Its liberalization agenda with the nations with which it has already trade accords is limited to the sectors not covered by those instruments. Mexico has defensive interests in the area of market access since it applies MFN tariffs among the highest in the region, particularly in agriculture. Some specific sectors in the investment group (i.e. energy) and the services group (i.e. telecommunications) are also very sensitive for Mexico.

Chile would also have a liberalization agenda in almost every FTAA negotiating group. The countries with which it already has agreements, however, would have to be discounted, including the U.S. High on the list of Chile's sensitive areas, before the results of its agreement with the U.S. are known, is government procurement, price bands in agriculture and capital movements. If these topics have been included in the free trade agreement with the U.S., then they would no longer form part of the Chilean defensive agenda. In fact, given that Chile has free trade agreements with the main markets in the hemisphere (U.S., Mercosur, Mexico and Canada), and taking into

account that its economy is one of the most liberalized in the region, the FTAA negotiation would seem to represent only a minor challenge for Chile.

For Mercosur, the offensive agenda would center on market access for agricultural products, farm subsidies and anti-dumping. The offensive interest in the elimination of industrial tariffs is not so strong. This is in part because, next to Central America, Mercosur has the smallest percentage of nonagricultural exports; it is also because its industrial exports, with only a few exceptions, face low tariffs, especially on the Canadian and U.S. markets. The chapters on investment, services, government procurement, intellectual property and competition policy would probably imply changes to Mercosur's current institutional structure. This block of countries would also have significant defensive interests in market access for nonagricultural products, in part explained by the high tariffs that it levies on imports of automotive and electronic products, principally coming from the NAFTA member countries.

In general, Central America, the Andean Community and the Caribbean would share similar agendas: offensive and defensive interests in market access, a strong offensive interest in anti-dumping, and defensive interests in the remaining areas. One key objective for these countries in the FTAA is to rid themselves of the uncertainty associated with the unilateral tariff preferences that the U.S. offers them through the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, the Andean Trade Preferences Act, and the Generalized System of Preferences. In the defensive area, the Central American, Andean and Caribbean agendas in the market access group are complicated by the relatively high tariffs they levy on imports from the region and by the fact that Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and the countries of the Caribbean government budgets rely heavily on foreign trade duties. The disciplines regarding investment, services, government procurement, intellectual property and competition policy would pose major institutional challenges for many of these countries.

Finally, the context in which the FTAA negotiations are being conducted makes it a very complex undertaking. Given the current environment, it is hard to imagine an FTAA that surpasses NAFTA products' and disciplines' coverage. The major factors complicating the FTAA process are: the unprecedented number of participants working to negotiate a free trade zone; their differing levels of development and, by extension, their differing offensive and defensive interests; the U.S. Congress' receptiveness to liberalization of trade; the fact that the FTAA negotiations coincide with the Doha Round and with the negotiations of bilateral agreements between countries of the hemisphere; and, lastly, the FTAA's coexistence with the sub-regional or bilateral agreements already in effect in the region.

The coincidence of the FTAA negotiations and the WTO negotiations is particularly relevant. On the one hand, it forces countries to work on two fronts simultaneously, a complicated situation for the small economies that have little in the way of a negotiating infrastructure. The simultaneity of these two negotiations also means that the positions taken in one forum will become precedents for the other, forcing countries to decide how and where to expend their limited political capital and to make strategic decisions in the two fora.

**TABLE 13  
MATRIX OF OFFENSIVE INTERESTS  
NEGOTIATING TOPIC**

Country/ group of countries	Market access for nonagricultural products	Agriculture	Investment	Services	Public sector procurement	Intellectual property	Subsidies, AD and CVD	Competition policy	Dispute settlement
U.S.	Interest in obtaining access for all products, particularly in the Caribbean, the Andean Community and Mercosur. Special interest in electronics, computer industry and automotive industry. With the exception of certain sensitive products, rules of origin do not pose any real problem.	Strong interest in securing access for cereals, dairy products, some fruits and meat products.	Strong interest in nondiscrimination disciplines and investment protection disciplines. Interest in repatriation of profits.	Strong interest in services: establishment of strict disciplines, nondiscrimination, and elimination of the local presence requirement. An interest in telecommunication and financial services.	Strong interest in accessing the procurements markets in the hemisphere, especially Brazil's, and in achieving transparency and certainty.	Strong interest in protecting intellectual property and in enforcing IP law. Special interest in protecting intellectual property while in the patent pipeline; confidential information disclosed when registering a patent (pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical industries); falsification and pirating of trademarks, software, video cassettes.		Strong interest in having competition policies established in all the countries.	Interest in a rapid, reliable and fair mechanism.
Canada	Interest in obtaining access for all products: Caribbean, Andean Community and Mercosur (automotive sector). With the exception of certain sensitive products, rules of origin do not appear to pose any real problem.	Interest in access for grains, dairy and oleaginous.	Strong interest in nondiscrimination and investment-protection disciplines.	Strong interest in strict disciplines, nondiscrimination and the elimination of the local presence requirement.	Interest in obtaining access to the hemisphere's procurements markets and in transparency and certainty.	Strong interest in protecting intellectual property and enforcing IP law.	Interest in avoiding abuse of antidumping measures, especially on the U.S. market (Canadian timber).	Interest in having competition policies established in all countries.	Interested in a rapid, reliable and fair mechanism.
Mexico	Interest in gaining access to the markets of countries with which it does not have FTAs: the countries of Mercosur, the Caribbean, Belize, Panama, Ecuador and Peru. Special interest in the automotive and electronics industries. In favor of lax rules of origin in the electronics and electric sector.		Strong interest in disciplines of nondiscrimination and investment protection.	Interest in services: establishment of strict disciplines/nondiscrimination, and elimination of the local presence requirement. Interest in mode 4.	Interest in obtaining access to the hemisphere's procurements markets and in transparency and certainty.	Interest in protecting copyright, trademarks and denominations of origin for tequila and mezcal. Patent for new varieties of plants and animals, and protection of plant extracts, traditional knowledge and folklore.	Interest in avoiding abuse of antidumping measures, especially on U.S. market.	Interest in seeing competition policies established in all the countries.	Interest in a rapid, reliable and fair mechanism.



TABLE 13 (continued)

Country/ group of countries	Market access for nonagricultural products	Agriculture	Investment	Services	Public sector procurement	Intellectual property	Subsidies, AD and CVD	Competition policy	Dispute settlement
Chile	Interest in accessing the Caribbean and Andean Community markets. Interest in minerals and mineral derivatives. In favor of lax rules of origin.	Strong interest in gaining access for the agricultural products, fruits in particular.		Interest in services: strict disciplines/nondiscrimination and elimination of the local presence requirement. Interest in mode 4.		Interest in patents for new varieties of plants and animals and protection of plant extracts, traditional knowledge and folklore.	Interest in avoiding abuse of antidumping measures, especially on U.S. market.	Interest in seeking competition policies established in all the countries.	Interest in a rapid, reliable and fair mechanism.
Central America	Interest in eliminating current uncertainty in U.S.' preferences (CBTPA, GSP). Interest in access to the markets in the Caribbean, the Andean Community, Mercosur and Chile. Interest in winning access for the clothing sector. In favor of lax rules of origin, particularly for textile and clothing.	Strong interest in gaining better access for its sugar, cereals, dairy products, meat products, coffee and banana.			Costa Rica and Nicaragua will want other countries to have to conform to the same disciplines to which they must conform under their FTA with Mexico.	Interest in patents for new plant and animal varieties, protection of plant extracts, protection of traditional knowledge and folklore.	Interest in avoiding abuse of antidumping measures, especially on U.S. market.		
Mercosur	Interest in gaining access to markets of U.S., Canada, Caribbean, the Andean Community and Mexico. Interest in the aeronautical, automotive, cellulose, aluminum and footwear industries.	Strong interest in gaining better access for orange juice, cereals, dairy products, meat products, coffee and banana.		Interest in mode 4.	Interests in eliminating restrictions on the U.S. market such as the "Buy American" program.	Interest in having germplasm recognized as the property of the countries that have these natural resources. Interest in the patents for new plant and animal varieties, protection of plant extracts, protection of traditional knowledge and folklore.	Interest in avoiding abuse of antidumping measures, especially on the U.S. market.	Brazil: Interest in competition policies being established in all the countries.	

TABLE 13 (continued)

Country/ group of countries	Market access for nonagricultural products	Agriculture	Investment	Services	Public sector procurement	Intellectual property	Subsidies, AD and CVD	Competition policy	Dispute settlement
Andean Community	Interest in eliminating current uncertainty in U.S.' preferences (ATPA, GSP). Interest in accessing Chilean and Caribbean markets. Interest in textiles, apparel and footwear, mineral and mineral derivatives. In favor of lax rules of origin, particularly for textile and clothing.	Interest in cereals, dairy products, meat products, coffee and banana.			Bolivia will want other countries to have to conform to the same disciplines to which it must conform under its FTA with Mexico.	Interest in having germplasm recognized as the property of the countries that have these natural resources. Interest in the patents for new plant and animal varieties, protection of plant extracts, protection of traditional knowledge and folklore.	Interest in avoiding abuse of antidumping measures, especially on the U.S. market.	Venezuela: Interest in competition policies being established in all the countries.	
Caribbean	Interest in consolidating current U.S.' preferences (CBTPA). Access to markets of the Andean Community, Chile and Mexico. Interest in oil, steel, extractive industry, and apparel. In favor of lax rules of origin for textile and clothing.	Strong interest in securing market access for sugar, cereals, dairy products, meat products, coffee and banana.				Interest in the patents for new plant and animal varieties, protection of plant extracts, traditional knowledge and folklore.	Interest in avoiding abuse of antidumping measures, especially on the U.S. market.		

**TABLE 14  
MATRIX OF DEFENSIVE INTERESTS  
NEGOTIATING TOPIC**

Country/ group of countries	Market access	Agriculture	Investment	Services	Government Procurement	Intellectual property	Subsidies AD and CVD	Competition policy	Dispute Settlement
<b>U.S.</b>	Tariff peaks and quantitative restrictions on textiles and articles of apparel. Sensitive products: ceramics, footwear, and some vehicles. May be in favor of strict rules of origin for the iron and steel industry, textiles, clothing and some types of vehicles.	Tariff peaks on a number of products. Sensitivities on sugar, tobacco, groundnuts and their derivatives, orange juice, and certain garden vegetables: broccoli, asparagus, cucumber, dehydrated onion, garlic; certain fruits (i.e. melon and watermelon).	Possible opposition from U.S. Congress to a chapter as ambitious as the NAFTA (investor-State dispute settlement mechanism).	Resistance to including the maritime transport sector.			Opposition to negotiating any weakening of its regime against unfair trade practices.		
<b>Canada</b>	Defensive interests in footwear and apparel. May be in favor of strict rules of origin for: starches, textiles, clothing, footwear, boats and ships.	A high tariff compared to the rest of its economy. Tariff peaks on various products. Sensitivities: sugar, vegetable oils, poultry products, dairy products.		Sensitive in telecommunications, education, health and audio-visual services.					
<b>Mexico</b>	Defensive interest in steel and capital goods with Mercosur (Brazil). Except for certain specific sectors, Mexico may favor of strict rules of origin.	High tariffs compared to the rest of the region, and tariff peaks on a number of products. Sensitive on: sugar, beef products, vegetable oils, tobacco, poultry products, coffee, corn, dairy products, banana, orange juice, bean, apple, wheat flour, pork sector, cacao.	Protect sectors in accordance with its Constitution (energy).	Sensitive in telecommunications.		Enforcement difficulties.			
<b>Chile</b>	It has no major defensive interests.	Price bands for oilseeds, wheat, wheat flour and beet sugar. Sensitive with regard to sugar, vegetable oils, tobacco, corn, wheat flour and bean (unless included in FTA with U.S.).	Depends on scope of FTA negotiated with U.S.	Telecommunications (local telephony service). FTA with the U.S. will have to be evaluated.	Excluded this chapter with Mexico and Canada. With Central America, it has no ambitious disciplines or coverage. Scope of this issue in FTA negotiated with U.S. will have to be evaluated.				

TABLE 14 (continued)

Country/ group of countries	Market access	Agriculture	Investment	Services	Government Procurement	Intellectual property	Subsidies AD and CVD	Competition policy	Dispute Settlement
<b>Central America</b>	Tariffs significant source of fiscal revenues (automotive sector). Sensitive <i>vis-à-vis</i> products excluded from the FTA with Mexico: plaster, cement, lime, textiles, soap and detergents, vehicles, certain chemicals, automotive parts, certain steel products, petroleum.	Very high tariffs for the entire sector. Tariff peaks on various products. Sensitive with regard to sugar, beef products, vegetable oils, tobacco, poultry products, coffee, banana, grains, pineapple.	Will use the investment chapter as negotiating capital due to U.S.' strong interest.	Sensitive on the insurance and banking services sector.	Will use this chapter as negotiating capital due to U.S.' strong interest. The disciplines and coverage of this chapter in the FTA with Chile are not as ambitious as NAFTA's. A detailed and ambitious regime would be a heavy burden for government.	They have enforcement difficulties.		Adoption of competition policies will pose major legislative and institutional challenges.	
<b>Mercosur</b>	Its tariffs on nonagricultural products are among the highest in the region, particularly on the automotive and electronics industries. It may favor strict rules of origin with high regional value added.	Very high tariffs for the entire sector.	Will use the investment chapter as negotiating capital due to U.S.' strong interest. Mercosur has numerous investment-related exemptions. Brazil face serious difficulties for the approval of investment agreements in its Congress.	Sensitive on the insurance and banking services sector.	Will use this chapter as negotiating capital due to U.S.' strong interest. Brazil does not thus far have international commitments on this subject. A detailed and ambitious regime would be a heavy burden for government.	They have enforcement difficulties.		Adoption of competition policies will pose major legislative and institutional challenges, except for Brazil.	
<b>Andean Community</b>	High tariffs for manufactures, textiles, petroleum oils and the automotive industry. Other defensive interests include: some chemicals, toilet paper, diapers, ceramics, lead, accumulators, and certain products in the electric industry.	Very high tariffs for the entire sector. It is sensitive on beef products, vegetable oils, tobacco, poultry products, coffee, corn, dairy products, banana, pork sector, bean, and onion.	Will use the investment chapter as negotiating capital due to U.S.' strong interest. Peru only has reciprocal investment promotion and protection agreements with limited coverage.	Sensitive on the insurance and banking services sector. Colombia: Sensitive in telecommunications.	Will use this chapter as negotiating capital due to U.S.' strong interest. A detailed and ambitious regime would be a heavy burden for government.	They have difficulties with enforcement.		Adoption of competition policies will pose major legislative and institutional challenges, except for Venezuela.	

TABLE 14 (continued)

Country/ group of countries	Market access	Agriculture	Investment	Services	Government Procurement	Intellectual property	Subsidies AD and CVD	Competition policy	Dispute Settlement
<b>Caribbean</b>	Tariffs are an important source of government revenues. High tariffs and tariff peaks on heavily imported industrial products like automobiles and capital goods.	Tariffs across the sector are kept very high and there are tariff peaks on a number of products.	Will use the topic as negotiating capital. The Dominican Republic has investment promotion and protection agreements with limited coverage. Bahamas, Saint Kitts and Nevis do not have investment agreements.	Sensitive in telecommunications.	Will use this chapter as negotiating capital due to U.S.' strong interest. A detailed, ambitious regime will be a heavy burden for government.	They have enforcement difficulties.		Adoption of competition policies will pose major legislative and institutional challenges.	

**TABLE 15  
MATRIX SUMMARIZING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE INTERESTS  
NEGOTIATING TOPIC**

Country or group of countries	Market Access	Agriculture	Investment	Services	Government procurement	Intellectual property	Subsidies, antidumping and countervailing duties	Competition policy	Dispute settlement
U.S.	OOO D	OOO DDD	OOO	OOO D	OOO	OOO	DDD	OO	OO
Canada	OOO D	O DD	OO	OOO DD	OO	OO	OOO	OO	OO
Mexico	OO DD	O DDD	OO D	O D	OO	OO	OOO	O	OO
Chile	O D	OOO DD	O D	OOO D	DD	O	OOO	OO	OO
Central America	OOO D	OOO DD	D	D	DD	DDD	OO	D	OO
Mercosur	O DDD	OOO D	DD	DD	DD	O DD	OOO	O D	OO
Andean Community	OO DD	OOO D	D	D	DD	DD	OOO	D	OO
Caribbean	OO DD	OOO D	D	D	DD	DD	OO	D	OO

Notes:   OOO Strong offensive interest           DDD Strong defensive interest  
           OO Regular offensive interest           DD Regular defensive interest  
           O Lesser-priority offensive interest   D Lesser-priority defensive interest



**TABLE A1  
TARIFF BY CHAPTER - COUNTRY**

Chapt.	Description	Argentina			Bahamas			Belize			Bolivia			Brazil			Barbados			Canada			Chile		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
01	Live animals	3.6	7.0	14966.0	0.2	0.3	2842.0	22.7	45.0	208.4	9.6	10.0	1977.0	3.6	7.0	35360.0	22.7	45.0	216.1	31.6	238.0	258498.8	9.0	9.0	4504.0
02	Meat and edible meat offal	13.4	27.0	158796.0	0.1	0.4	92518.2	31.3	40.0	987.3	10.0	10.0	1715.0	12.7	15.0	127235.0	14.7	40.0	13840.2	47.7	249.0	767453.0	9.0	9.0	179067.0
03	Fish and crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates	11.8	13.0	26638.0	0.3	0.3	145780.2	30.7	40.0	1882.8	10.0	10.0	1645.0	11.8	13.0	275889.0	28.7	40.0	7604.2	0.5	5.0	1083571.8	9.0	9.0	8408.0
04	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	18.5	27.0	34003.0	0.2	0.3	53812.2	13.6	40.0	10778.0	10.0	10.0	16188.0	18.5	27.0	376960.0	14.5	40.0	15701.9	113.8	313.5	286655.1	9.0	9.0	54900.0
05	Products of animal origin not elsewhere specified or included	8.2	11.0	17291.0	0.3	0.3	4491.2	2.1	2.5	17.0	10.0	10.0	89.0	8.2	11.0	45750.0	2.1	2.5	65.0	0.0	0.0	70810.9	9.0	9.0	14111.0
06	Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers	4.7	13.0	15683.0	0.2	0.3	18655.7	21.7	40.0	621.6	10.0	10.0	447.0	4.7	13.0	6428.0	21.7	40.0	680.8	4.4	16.0	215211.5	9.0	9.0	4505.0
07	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	10.3	13.0	35548.0	0.2	0.5	39657.7	26.0	40.0	3119.4	10.0	10.0	2218.0	10.3	13.0	171963.0	26.0	40.0	9756.0	5.7	22.3	1082250.4	9.0	9.0	16534.0
08	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits or melon	12.9	13.0	164545.0	0.3	2.1	38185.5	33.6	40.0	439.9	10.0	10.0	3664.0	12.9	13.0	191327.0	33.6	40.0	9009.9	3.3	15.6	1432886.6	9.0	9.0	47317.0
09	Coffee, tea, mate and spices	13.0	13.0	72073.0	0.2	0.3	7486.5	22.6	40.0	1687.9	10.0	10.0	820.0	13.0	13.0	20791.0	22.6	40.0	2254.2	1.0	3.0	561831.2	9.0	9.0	43478.0
10	Cereals	8.1	15.0	23081.0	0.2	0.3	13787.7	16.0	40.0	2375.0	10.0	10.0	45701.0	8.1	15.0	1237959.0	14.7	40.0	6998.1	11.7	94.5	293806.7	9.0	9.0	246100.0
11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	13.6	17.0	18909.0	0.3	0.3	14772.8	8.2	40.0	1597.2	10.0	10.0	22559.0	13.6	17.0	209691.0	8.2	40.0	7604.7	17.9	240.5	91430.2	9.0	9.0	10311.0
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit	6.5	13.0	115778.0	0.3	0.3	1817.6	3.7	40.0	277.0	10.0	10.0	24799.0	6.5	13.0	181579.0	3.6	40.0	6640.2	0.9	10.0	351308.2	9.0	9.0	42833.0
13	Lacs; gums, resins, and other vegetable saps and extracts	10.2	17.0	30418.0	0.3	0.3	10.8	2.5	2.5	21.9	10.0	10.0	443.0	10.0	17.0	48123.0	2.5	2.5	963.3	0.0	0.0	61039.2	9.0	9.0	9224.0
14	Vegetable planting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified	9.0	9.0	1308.0	0.2	0.3	205.6	2.5	2.5	17.6	10.0	10.0	237.0	9.0	9.0	1765.0	2.5	2.5	55.5	0.0	0.0	5011.6	9.0	9.0	230.0
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	12.5	15.0	49796.0	0.1	0.4	12583.4	24.7	40.0	4367.8	10.0	10.0	3595.0	12.4	15.0	210397.0	24.7	40.0	4785.0	9.5	218.0	292404.0	9.0	9.0	139986.0
16	Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, mollusks or other aquatic invertebrates	19.8	27.0	90380.0	0.2	0.4	45883.0	16.5	20.0	4750.5	10.0	10.0	2042.0	19.0	19.0	25346.0	16.5	20.0	6853.3	36.1	253.0	470284.7	9.0	9.0	25296.0
17	Sugars and sugar confectionary	20.5	23.0	30694.0	0.2	0.4	26071.0	22.3	45.0	630.7	10.0	10.0	11699.0	19.7	23.0	45916.0	21.5	40.0	10886.7	9.0	64.1	487068.4	9.0	9.0	85237.0
18	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	18.2	23.0	70276.0	0.3	0.4	6749.8	7.8	20.0	982.4	10.0	10.0	6194.0	18.8	23.0	91407.0	7.8	20.0	3332.7	34.2	265.0	436087.3	9.0	9.0	35206.0
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	19.6	21.0	47131.0	0.3	0.4	46185.7	15.9	20.0	4423.8	10.0	10.0	11055.0	19.6	21.0	41447.0	15.9	20.0	14499.7	16.6	267.5	888202.4	9.0	9.0	30708.0
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	17.3	32.0	127620.0	0.3	0.8	36624.8	16.4	40.0	2288.3	10.0	10.0	4111.0	17.2	23.0	125212.0	16.4	40.0	11538.4	5.8	17.0	814333.8	9.0	9.0	33596.0
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	19.2	21.0	135841.0	0.3	0.4	73712.1	17.0	20.0	7501.1	10.0	10.0	24872.0	18.9	21.0	101502.0	17.0	20.0	14939.4	31.8	277.0	663311.4	9.0	9.0	51628.0
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	22.7	23.0	63058.0	0.4	1.0	125535.9	20.0	20.0	4256.7	10.0	10.0	6763.0	22.9	25.0	147755.0	20.0	20.0	22312.8	13.0	256.0	1232713.3	9.0	9.0	41205.0



TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Argentina			Bahamas			Belize			Bolivia			Brazil			Barbados			Canada			Chile		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
23	Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder	9.5	17.0	38605.0	0.3	0.4	22309.2	4.4	20.0	7139.8	10.0	10.0	3382.0	9.5	17.0	60911.0	4.4	20.0	2585.8	9.6	205.5	624408.6	9.0	9.0	150933.0
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	18.3	23.0	13416.0	47.8	260.0	8895.3	2.5	2.5	1259.1	10.0	10.0	2957.0	18.3	23.0	18320.0	2.5	2.5	2864.5	7.1	13.0	55243.6	9.0	9.0	10424.0
25	Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering material, lime and cement	6.8	9.0	59208.0	0.3	0.4	77378.4	3.7	20.0	7006.9	10.0	10.0	12441.0	7.2	19.0	208929.0	3.7	20.0	4662.7	0.5	6.5	478284.3	9.0	9.0	48937.0
26	Ores, slag and ash	5.6	7.0	183909.0	0.3	0.4	454.6	3.4	10.0	0.3	10.0	10.0	103.0	5.6	7.0	357640.0	3.4	10.0	185.7	0.0	0.0	1246817.4	9.0	9.0	23864.0
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	0.7	9.0	927694.0	0.3	1.0	324193.2	7.4	30.0	56294.0	10.0	10.0	65185.0	2.3	11.0	8303255.0	7.7	30.0	71112.6	2.2	12.5	12475277.8	9.0	9.0	3018363.0
28	Inorganic chemicals: organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	8.9	13.0	325957.0	0.4	0.5	23610.4	3.0	15.0	1248.9	10.0	10.0	25069.0	8.9	15.0	564610.0	3.0	15.0	5900.9	1.7	8.0	1975253.9	9.0	9.0	192234.0
29	Organic chemicals	8.9	17.0	1427615.0	0.3	0.4	89846.2	2.6	15.0	471.8	10.0	10.0	15391.0	9.0	18.0	3272499.0	2.6	15.0	8960.1	3.0	8.5	3357435.8	9.0	9.0	267951.0
30	Pharmaceutical products	11.5	17.0	646895.0	0.1	0.4	39211.9	7.5	15.0	6148.6	10.0	10.0	28396.0	11.4	17.0	1404765.0	7.5	15.0	35135.6	0.0	0.0	3442214.1	9.0	9.0	242466.0
31	Fertilizers	5.4	9.0	246019.0	0.3	0.4	9936.2	0.4	10.0	3946.6	10.0	10.0	7675.0	5.3	9.0	1273291.0	0.4	10.0	2235.1	0.0	0.0	376443.0	9.0	9.0	155715.0
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	13.9	17.0	261112.0	0.3	0.4	38963.4	8.7	15.0	4029.2	10.0	10.0	17659.0	13.9	17.0	502558.0	8.7	15.0	5978.5	3.4	8.5	1390059.8	9.0	9.0	199663.0
33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	16.5	21.0	161296.0	0.3	0.4	97853.7	12.6	20.0	5331.8	10.0	10.0	24741.0	16.6	21.0	216880.0	12.6	20.0	17059.3	5.7	34.3	1172785.2	9.0	9.0	143184.0
34	Soap, organic surgace, active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepared waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, dental waxes and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	16.7	21.0	172544.0	0.3	0.4	31898.1	14.4	20.0	3516.5	10.0	10.0	16810.0	16.3	21.0	153439.0	14.4	20.0	9458.4	5.6	11.5	853552.3	9.0	9.0	81201.0
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	16.1	19.0	68344.0	0.3	0.4	3945.9	5.3	15.0	450.1	10.0	10.0	4956.0	16.1	19.0	120200.0	5.3	15.0	1628.2	14.9	248.7	414007.9	9.0	9.0	39289.0
36	Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations	15.2	17.0	17670.0	0.3	0.4	3243.6	10.2	20.0	231.2	10.0	10.0	5319.0	15.2	17.0	3998.0	10.2	20.0	710.6	7.9	8.5	110426.2	9.0	9.0	4543.0
37	Photographic or cinematographic goods	11.9	17.0	147886.0	0.2	0.4	5780.0	10.2	20.0	705.3	10.0	10.0	4533.0	11.1	17.0	295867.0	10.2	20.0	3207.8	5.5	8.5	684475.3	9.0	9.0	68088.0
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	13.1	17.0	457962.0	0.3	0.4	31245.8	4.0	20.0	7316.2	10.0	10.0	45749.0	13.1	18.0	775114.0	4.0	20.0	12666.5	3.8	8.5	2241240.8	9.0	9.0	265466.0
39	Plastics and articles thereof	15.1	22.0	1218501.0	0.3	0.6	246450.7	8.3	20.0	10491.4	10.0	10.0	72155.0	15.0	23.0	1952382.0	8.6	25.0	41894.5	4.8	13.5	7814249.6	9.0	9.0	690756.0
40	Rubber and articles thereof	14.9	21.0	459330.0	0.4	0.5	25941.3	6.4	30.0	5047.7	10.0	10.0	18007.0	14.8	19.0	855967.0	6.4	30.0	9397.1	4.2	15.5	3518573.0	9.0	9.0	253976.0
41	Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather	9.6	13.0	36223.0	0.3	0.4	225.1	2.5	2.5	16.0	10.0	10.0	80.0	9.0	13.0	185604.0	2.5	2.5	152.3	1.5	5.0	314096.8	9.0	9.0	18058.0

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Argentina			Bahamas			Belize			Bolivia			Brazil			Barbados			Canada			Chile		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silk worm)	23.0	23.0	57744.0	0.2	0.4	12734.4	18.3	20.0	497.8	10.0	10.0	1539.0	23.0	23.0	45877.0	18.3	20.0	2871.2	7.7	15.5	566920.4	9.0	9.0	70820.0
43	Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof	16.1	23.0	4682.0	0.3	0.4	12.3	5.1	20.0	0.2	10.0	10.0	3.0	16.1	23.0	322.0	5.1	20.0	2.4	3.9	15.5	78074.2	9.0	9.0	1555.0
44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	10.7	18.0	123876.0	0.2	0.4	153839.4	8.7	20.0	4971.3	10.0	10.0	5017.0	10.6	17.0	69805.0	8.7	20.0	42785.1	2.3	9.5	2084921.4	9.0	9.0	56198.0
45	Cork and articles of cork	9.9	13.0	27192.0	0.3	0.4	740.4	5.6	20.0	7.5	10.0	10.0	104.0	9.9	13.0	5828.0	5.6	20.0	118.0	0.0	0.0	20111.9	9.0	9.0	29270.0
46	Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork	15.0	15.0	2674.0	0.3	0.4	924.1	13.4	20.0	42.7	10.0	10.0	16.0	15.0	15.0	2044.0	13.4	20.0	200.8	5.1	11.0	26475.3	9.0	9.0	1552.0
47	Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; waste and scrap of paper or paperboard	6.6	7.0	73610.0	0.3	0.4	14.3	2.5	2.5	0.2	10.0	10.0	1350.0	6.6	7.0	236927.0	2.5	2.5	707.9	0.0	0.0	488413.5	9.0	9.0	17718.0
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	16.0	21.0	809985.0	0.3	0.5	79275.5	7.4	20.0	11965.3	10.0	10.0	51348.0	15.8	19.0	734684.0	7.4	20.0	30682.4	1.3	7.0	4088636.4	9.0	9.0	411428.0
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	9.5	21.0	228160.0	0.2	0.5	29536.0	6.6	20.0	3924.5	8.3	10.0	14811.0	9.2	19.0	219546.0	6.6	20.0	11923.8	2.2	11.0	2197025.1	7.7	9.0	65509.0
50	Silk	15.5	21.0	1747.0	0.3	0.4	80.4	2.5	2.5	0.4	10.0	10.0	7.0	15.5	21.0	4308.0	2.5	2.5	13.7	0.0	0.0	23479.4	9.0	9.0	1125.0
51	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and woven fabric	16.1	21.0	14003.0	0.3	0.4	137.6	2.5	2.5	0.0	10.0	10.0	1623.0	15.8	21.0	21487.0	2.5	2.5	34.6	8.3	16.0	173756.3	9.0	9.0	14652.0
52	Cotton	18.8	21.0	84818.0	0.3	0.4	4222.8	2.5	2.5	558.5	10.0	10.0	11370.0	18.8	21.0	367574.0	2.5	2.5	2872.0	7.3	16.0	639519.5	9.0	9.0	81790.0
53	Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper	13.2	21.0	6482.0	0.3	0.4	94.8	2.5	2.5	0.3	10.0	10.0	42.0	12.8	21.0	10918.0	2.5	2.5	51.3	3.3	16.0	16492.6	9.0	9.0	3570.0
54	Man-made filaments	18.7	21.0	131143.0	0.3	0.4	491.9	2.5	2.5	87.8	10.0	10.0	5596.0	18.6	21.0	560645.0	2.5	2.5	962.4	6.4	16.0	723471.1	9.0	9.0	63707.0
55	Man-made staple fibres	19.1	21.0	147396.0	0.3	0.4	2677.2	2.5	2.5	1077.2	10.0	10.0	16425.0	19.1	21.0	169302.0	2.5	2.5	6624.1	9.3	16.0	545301.1	9.0	9.0	111561.0
56	Wadding, felt and non-wovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	19.0	21.0	45223.0	0.3	0.4	1682.2	7.3	20.0	872.9	10.0	10.0	1677.0	19.0	21.0	78780.0	7.3	20.0	1718.4	7.8	19.0	338465.7	9.0	9.0	59112.0
57	Carpets and other textile floor coverings	23.0	23.0	23291.0	0.4	0.5	13655.3	20.0	20.0	322.5	10.0	10.0	1623.0	23.0	23.0	23650.0	20.0	20.0	1784.2	13.4	17.0	511485.8	9.0	9.0	32651.0
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	21.0	21.0	23953.0	0.3	0.4	2197.1	3.1	15.0	330.3	10.0	10.0	679.0	21.0	21.0	30529.0	3.1	15.0	1400.0	11.1	18.0	124489.9	9.0	9.0	15984.0
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	18.8	19.0	50939.0	0.3	0.4	1615.8	4.6	20.0	140.9	10.0	10.0	1439.0	18.9	19.0	108568.0	4.6	20.0	627.6	7.8	20.5	398220.5	9.0	9.0	47743.0
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	21.0	21.0	52950.0	0.3	0.4	269.9	2.5	2.5	71.2	10.0	10.0	696.0	21.0	21.0	62895.0	2.5	2.5	209.4	9.7	16.0	349221.1	9.0	9.0	12344.0
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	23.0	23.0	127809.0	0.2	0.4	38013.9	19.9	20.0	514.5	10.0	10.0	6261.0	23.0	23.0	48220.0	19.9	20.0	5270.5	19.2	20.5	1438584.6	9.0	9.0	212187.0
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	23.0	23.0	168454.0	0.2	0.4	36377.5	19.8	20.0	12076.4	10.0	10.0	6654.0	23.0	23.0	92436.0	19.8	20.0	12073.2	17.8	22.5	1791113.1	9.0	9.0	236200.0

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Argentina			Bahamas			Belize			Bolivia			Brazil			Barbados			Canada			Chile		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	22.3	23.0	110650.0	0.2	0.4	37395.2	16.6	20.0	1709.1	10.0	10.0	4459.0	22.3	23.0	28415.0	16.6	20.0	3862.7	17.0	20.5	558913.4	9.0	9.0	68129.0
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	30.8	33.0	201565.0	0.2	0.4	27414.2	16.6	20.0	2177.4	10.0	10.0	12239.0	24.1	27.0	46563.0	16.6	20.0	9792.5	14.6	20.0	1001165.4	9.0	9.0	180812.0
65	Headgear and parts thereof	22.4	23.0	8030.0	0.3	0.4	2987.9	15.0	20.0	111.8	10.0	10.0	531.0	22.4	23.0	4916.0	15.0	20.0	931.4	6.6	15.5	130641.4	9.0	9.0	7752.0
66	Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof	22.3	23.0	6712.0	0.3	0.4	1058.5	12.5	20.0	56.6	10.0	10.0	337.0	22.3	23.0	6713.0	12.5	20.0	488.8	3.6	7.5	29038.1	9.0	9.0	3049.0
67	Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flows; articles of human hair	19.0	19.0	4443.0	0.4	0.5	1857.1	16.3	20.0	73.5	10.0	10.0	147.0	19.0	19.0	6004.0	16.3	20.0	1323.0	8.3	15.5	43706.8	9.0	9.0	3766.0
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	11.9	17.0	65409.0	0.3	0.4	60815.1	9.9	20.0	1376.2	10.0	10.0	4099.0	12.1	23.0	115356.0	9.9	20.0	4669.6	3.8	15.5	549320.4	9.0	9.0	41041.0
69	Ceramic products	14.4	23.0	90183.0	0.3	0.4	41078.5	13.0	25.0	1811.4	10.0	10.0	14643.0	14.5	23.0	64182.0	13.0	25.0	10750.9	4.2	8.0	594776.4	9.0	9.0	97763.0
70	Glass and glass ware	15.2	21.0	132492.0	0.3	0.4	43616.4	5.9	25.0	1998.1	10.0	10.0	10799.0	15.2	21.0	197033.0	5.9	25.0	10154.0	2.4	15.5	1680961.6	9.0	9.0	83482.0
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewelry; coin	12.8	21.0	27410.0	0.3	0.4	26335.0	29.3	60.0	764.1	10.0	10.0	25623.0	12.8	21.0	206563.0	29.3	60.0	22561.8	2.3	8.5	1537453.6	9.0	9.0	20406.0
72	Iron and steel	13.8	17.0	348902.0	0.3	0.4	12915.6	3.7	15.0	4784.2	10.0	10.0	46158.0	13.7	17.0	462912.0	3.7	15.0	14814.4	2.0	6.5	3988743.0	9.0	9.0	305177.0
73	Articles of iron or steel	18.6	25.0	421195.0	0.3	0.4	158952.6	8.4	20.0	8928.6	9.6	10.0	101911.0	18.1	23.0	524464.0	9.0	32.5	29535.6	3.6	8.0	4729560.8	9.0	9.0	253694.0
74	Copper and articles thereof	14.4	19.0	123829.0	0.3	0.4	5857.9	3.7	20.0	284.1	10.0	10.0	2431.0	14.3	19.0	404722.0	3.7	20.0	2842.8	1.6	9.5	1693219.6	9.0	9.0	15633.0
75	Nickel and articles thereof	13.3	19.0	7676.0	0.3	0.4	140.7	2.5	2.5	0.5	10.0	10.0	36.0	13.3	19.0	130946.0	2.5	2.5	54.7	0.2	3.0	192796.7	9.0	9.0	3228.0
76	Aluminum and articles thereof	14.8	21.0	190878.0	0.3	0.4	63522.6	6.5	20.0	2328.6	10.0	10.0	11480.0	14.3	19.0	375755.0	6.5	20.0	9287.8	3.3	6.5	2492053.1	9.0	9.0	156146.0
78	Lead and articles thereof	12.7	19.0	2284.0	0.3	0.4	228.6	2.5	2.5	50.6	10.0	10.0	94.0	12.3	19.0	37221.0	2.5	2.5	38.2	1.9	3.0	47065.0	9.0	9.0	4290.0
79	Zinc and articles thereof	11.7	19.0	9724.0	0.3	0.4	736.1	2.5	2.5	68.1	10.0	10.0	336.0	11.7	19.0	32939.0	2.5	2.5	8.3	0.8	3.0	66472.2	9.0	9.0	14910.0
80	Tin and articles thereof	12.6	19.0	6726.0	0.3	0.4	260.0	2.5	2.5	4.4	10.0	10.0	3.0	12.6	19.0	5766.0	2.5	2.5	54.7	1.3	3.0	47372.0	9.0	9.0	4546.0
81	Other base metals, cermet; articles thereof	6.7	11.0	13869.0	0.3	0.4	339.3	2.5	2.5	0.9	10.0	10.0	14.0	6.7	11.0	68170.0	2.5	2.5	394.4	1.3	3.0	253100.2	9.0	9.0	3543.0
82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	20.7	21.0	210358.0	0.3	0.4	25051.3	6.9	20.0	1669.9	10.0	10.0	21582.0	20.8	21.0	203809.0	6.9	20.0	4458.3	4.4	11.0	1463514.6	9.0	9.0	113670.0
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	18.6	19.0	116500.0	0.3	0.5	24719.1	7.3	20.0	1649.1	10.0	10.0	5653.0	18.6	19.0	139976.0	7.3	20.0	6684.3	4.1	9.5	1839283.3	9.0	9.0	58325.0
84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	12.2	25.0	4158680.0	0.3	0.8	389397.5	3.8	45.0	43227.0	5.0	10.0	323925.0	16.4	30.0	8842972.0	4.2	32.5	135866.8	1.7	9.5	43905272.0	9.0	9.0	2601672.0
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and arts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	14.2	25.0	3962028.0	0.3	0.8	300289.9	9.4	45.0	23487.5	8.6	10.0	230499.0	16.8	30.0	9017265.0	9.6	45.0	93884.8	2.4	11.0	31955957.7	9.0	9.0	1726325.0

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Argentina			Bahamas			Belize			Bolivia			Brazil			Barbados			Canada			Chile		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
86	Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signalling equipment of all kinds	14.0	15.0	24540.0	0.3	0.4	10319.2	2.5	2.5	22.8	6.2	10.0	3939.0	17.6	18.0	123014.0	2.5	2.5	945.9	5.8	11.0	768059.0	9.0	9.0	23021.0
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock and parts and accessories thereof	19.1	33.0	2716533.0	0.5	0.8	484091.8	11.5	45.0	32881.4	8.5	10.0	262529.0	24.2	35.0	3482885.0	11.5	45.0	104815.8	3.7	13.0	41549836.7	8.9	9.0	1577417.0
88	Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof	2.5	23.0	343001.0	0.2	0.4	14961.3	4.8	20.0	1482.3	6.2	10.0	1327.0	5.2	23.0	1075823.0	4.8	20.0	1073.8	1.9	15.5	4217247.5	5.4	9.0	19649.0
89	Ships, boats and floating structures	15.5	23.0	35050.0	0.1	0.4	112574.5	4.3	20.0	949.6	10.0	10.0	102.0	18.4	23.0	9747.0	4.3	20.0	5179.7	14.5	25.0	621477.4	6.5	9.0	34008.0
90	Optica, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	13.2	23.0	679281.0	0.3	0.5	35512.0	7.1	25.0	4698.7	9.7	10.0	32614.0	15.0	26.0	1782095.0	7.1	25.0	17366.0	1.3	8.5	8345067.3	9.0	9.0	295552.0
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	21.9	25.0	42007.0	0.3	0.4	27266.4	29.7	60.0	1322.9	10.0	10.0	793.0	21.9	23.0	87866.0	29.2	60.0	7077.3	3.4	14.0	244249.4	9.0	9.0	29979.0
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories thereof	19.7	21.0	15662.0	0.3	0.4	1833.7	10.4	20.0	46.6	10.0	10.0	194.0	19.7	21.0	35843.0	10.4	20.0	624.4	2.9	7.0	134708.1	9.0	9.0	9351.0
93	Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof	23.0	23.0	13005.0	70.7	100.0	453.3	41.4	70.0	89.4	10.0	10.0	8511.0	23.0	23.0	77289.0	41.4	70.0	252.4	3.9	7.5	163717.4	9.0	9.0	4794.0
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated name-plates and the like; prefabricated buildings	20.7	23.0	245481.0	0.3	0.5	132435.5	17.0	20.0	5207.8	10.0	10.0	15408.0	20.7	21.0	186563.0	17.0	20.0	21202.2	5.7	15.5	3885678.1	9.0	9.0	120115.0
95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	23.2	24.0	187451.0	2.4	100.0	26410.8	14.2	20.0	1286.9	10.0	10.0	9732.0	23.0	23.0	102914.0	14.2	20.0	4912.6	3.6	18.0	2162977.1	9.0	9.0	146064.0
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	20.9	23.0	86568.0	0.3	0.4	10619.7	14.0	20.0	2025.0	10.0	10.0	3941.0	20.9	21.0	89434.0	14.0	20.0	3694.7	6.4	15.5	481735.6	9.0	9.0	58878.0
97	Works of art, collectors pieces and antiques	4.7	7.0	1863.0	0.0	0.0	60903.9	20.0	20.0	12.9	10.0	10.0	367.0	7.0	7.0	1838.0	20.0	20.0	775.2	1.4	7.0	100883.7	9.0	9.0	2710.0

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Colombia			Costa Rica			Dominica			Dominican Rep.			Ecuador			Grenada			Guatemala			Honduras		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
01	Live animals	8.2	10.0	7014.0	5.6	9.0	3470.0	21.9	40.0	70.0	9.2	25.0	5072.0	8.1	10.0	1259.1	21.9	40.0	226.2	6.0	10.0	4183.0	6.4	10.0	8440.0
02	Meat and edible meat offal	20.0	20.0	27857.0	28.7	162.0	6424.0	8.9	40.0	3996.0	25.8	35.0	13435.0	20.0	20.0	2249.7	23.8	40.0	6637.3	17.7	30.0	28077.0	19.9	50.0	16862.0
03	Fish and crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates	18.8	20.0	14064.0	8.9	14.0	16504.0	28.4	40.0	1145.0	28.3	30.0	44246.0	18.7	20.0	2730.6	28.2	40.0	1855.1	9.8	15.0	2379.0	10.0	18.0	12449.0
04	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	19.0	20.0	35778.0	52.6	88.0	17307.0	14.7	40.0	3852.0	27.6	35.0	123099.0	18.5	20.0	3452.1	14.8	40.0	5300.9	12.4	15.0	63649.0	14.1	20.0	53959.0
05	Products of animal origin not elsewhere specified or included	8.7	10.0	7413.0	4.0	5.0	738.0	2.1	2.5	30.0	9.7	10.0	937.0	8.1	10.0	987.7	2.1	2.5	4.5	3.6	5.0	808.0	4.0	5.0	572.0
06	Live trees and other plants, bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers	5.9	10.0	19334.0	9.8	14.0	5474.0	21.7	40.0	25.0	13.4	30.0	1363.0	6.3	10.0	1179.9	21.7	40.0	58.3	11.5	15.0	2842.0	13.6	18.0	238.0
07	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	13.5	15.0	92256.0	15.3	49.0	22837.0	25.4	40.0	821.0	26.6	35.0	28362.0	13.5	15.0	11958.1	25.4	40.0	1287.2	13.7	20.0	11818.0	14.0	20.0	7332.0
08	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits or melon	15.0	15.0	80911.0	12.2	14.0	21183.0	33.6	40.0	170.0	32.7	35.0	12067.0	15.0	15.0	13748.0	33.6	40.0	251.9	13.3	15.0	21019.0	16.6	20.0	7608.0
09	Coffee, tea, mate and spices	12.9	20.0	11218.0	10.3	14.0	3726.0	22.6	40.0	251.0	25.4	30.0	2846.0	12.9	20.0	2260.2	22.6	40.0	157.6	11.3	15.0	5652.0	12.2	18.0	1589.0
10	Cereals	12.5	20.0	418635.0	10.0	35.0	105914.0	14.7	40.0	710.0	10.9	20.0	152720.0	11.6	20.0	37876.2	14.7	40.0	3722.7	8.9	20.0	91279.0	14.0	45.0	71292.0
11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	19.7	20.0	11722.0	6.4	9.0	13203.0	8.2	40.0	2574.0	15.3	30.0	6660.0	19.6	20.0	15134.7	8.2	40.0	901.9	8.2	15.0	14032.0	9.0	15.0	17407.0
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit	9.0	15.0	104900.0	2.5	9.0	59734.0	3.5	40.0	128.0	6.7	15.0	69551.0	7.5	15.0	5096.4	3.6	40.0	143.3	2.5	10.0	14765.0	3.1	10.0	5513.0
13	Lacs; gums, resins, and other vegetable saps and extracts	10.0	15.0	10884.0	0.0	0.0	2339.0	3.4	15.0	237.0	10.0	10.0	2189.0	8.8	15.0	935.8	2.5	2.5	9.3	0.0	0.0	4065.0	1.0	1.0	1660.0
14	Vegetable planting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified	10.0	10.0	615.0	3.4	14.0	203.0	2.5	2.5	3.0	11.0	15.0	1234.0	10.0	10.0	82.8	2.5	2.5	4.6	3.1	15.0	33.0	3.9	15.0	492.0
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	17.1	20.0	128559.0	8.3	30.0	10645.0	24.9	40.0	3273.0	20.2	30.0	63354.0	16.5	20.0	31657.2	24.7	40.0	1945.0	7.2	15.0	63717.0	8.5	18.0	18353.0
16	Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, mollusks or other aquatic invertebrates	20.0	20.0	55991.0	28.8	162.0	4984.0	18.4	22.5	1794.0	34.0	35.0	21050.0	20.0	20.0	472.3	16.5	20.0	2494.8	14.5	15.0	15480.0	17.2	18.0	9666.0
17	Sugars and sugar confectionary	17.2	20.0	18871.0	17.7	49.0	14966.0	20.8	40.0	1640.0	19.8	35.0	18470.0	15.0	20.0	18060.6	21.3	40.0	2608.3	10.0	20.0	16580.0	11.0	40.0	10891.0
18	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	16.7	20.0	15910.0	9.8	14.0	8344.0	8.5	22.5	366.0	26.2	35.0	4198.0	16.7	20.0	2191.1	7.8	20.0	436.7	11.4	15.0	8388.0	12.7	18.0	3902.0
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	19.7	20.0	44465.0	12.5	14.0	33902.0	17.8	22.5	2500.0	28.8	35.0	33775.0	19.2	20.0	6975.1	15.9	20.0	3271.0	12.4	15.0	48848.0	15.2	18.0	50444.0
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	19.8	20.0	26043.0	13.5	40.0	33531.0	17.6	40.0	1070.0	35.0	35.0	20565.0	19.8	20.0	6688.5	16.4	40.0	2118.6	12.8	15.0	33325.0	16.2	30.0	25691.0
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	17.6	20.0	73119.0	13.5	88.0	39038.0	19.1	30.0	2010.0	29.8	35.0	24381.0	17.7	20.0	28398.7	17.6	35.0	3177.3	10.6	15.0	93838.0	12.4	18.0	83999.0
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	18.7	20.0	46546.0	13.5	14.0	22252.0	32.8	45.0	4000.0	29.5	30.0	51671.0	19.2	20.0	5429.3	30.3	35.0	3333.6	15.0	15.0	27970.0	18.3	20.0	14359.0

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Colombia			Costa Rica			Dominica			Dominican Rep.			Ecuador			Grenada			Guatemala			Honduras		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
23	Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder	14.7	20.0	173594.0	7.3	14.0	11121.0	4.6	22.5	898.0	9.5	30.0	16448.0	14.5	20.0	21529.3	4.4	20.0	334.6	6.5	15.0	33853.0	6.6	18.0	34777.0
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	16.7	20.0	42811.0	10.2	40.0	6461.0	32.3	45.0	83.0	26.0	30.0	8759.0	16.7	20.0	750.4	25.3	35.0	470.3	6.8	20.0	3360.0	9.5	55.0	30453.0
25	Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering material, lime and cement	5.2	10.0	39505.0	4.6	49.0	12541.0	3.7	22.5	2128.0	6.2	15.0	74771.0	5.1	10.0	6191.7	3.7	20.0	4293.1	2.8	15.0	22190.0	3.5	18.0	10443.0
26	Ores, slag and ash	5.0	5.0	14255.0	0.4	5.0	536.0	3.4	10.0	27.0	5.0	5.0	1000.0	5.0	5.0	1285.6	3.4	10.0	26.2	0.4	5.0	280.0	1.3	5.0	66.0
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	7.5	15.0	241285.0	5.2	14.0	499164.0	7.1	25.0	14104.0	8.4	25.0	1507617.0	27.2	99.0	82906.6	8.0	25.0	18590.2	6.8	10.0	682588.0	7.8	20.0	382765.0
28	Inorganic chemicals: organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	6.7	10.0	153655.0	0.2	9.0	42123.0	2.9	15.0	1978.0	10.0	10.0	41043.0	5.6	10.0	19693.6	3.0	15.0	382.2	0.3	10.0	45030.0	1.2	10.0	25220.0
29	Organic chemicals	5.0	15.0	930936.0	0.1	14.0	74056.0	2.6	15.0	768.0	3.9	10.0	53324.0	5.3	15.0	44817.3	2.6	15.0	179.0	0.2	10.0	94058.0	1.1	10.0	19381.0
30	Pharmaceutical products	7.9	15.0	385832.0	1.3	5.0	228832.0	7.5	15.0	1713.0	6.6	10.0	128451.0	6.2	15.0	87008.0	7.5	15.0	3369.4	3.1	5.0	166461.0	1.3	5.0	122638.0
31	Fertilizers	5.3	10.0	191564.0	0.0	0.0	52868.0	0.4	10.0	1018.0	3.9	5.0	32791.0	2.6	5.0	16949.4	0.4	10.0	212.2	0.4	5.0	48442.0	1.0	1.0	39781.0
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	9.6	15.0	146685.0	2.9	14.0	38112.0	8.7	15.0	1468.0	18.6	30.0	23981.0	9.5	15.0	21009.5	8.7	15.0	1959.1	3.1	15.0	63798.0	3.8	15.0	24034.0
33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	13.2	20.0	129361.0	7.3	14.0	54914.0	14.3	22.5	3253.0	24.7	30.0	38584.0	14.5	20.0	15789.5	12.6	20.0	1551.3	7.7	15.0	66168.0	9.6	18.0	39448.0
34	Soap, organic surgace, active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepared waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, dental waxes and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	14.9	20.0	55050.0	7.2	14.0	45359.0	16.1	22.5	1152.0	23.9	30.0	10696.0	14.2	20.0	14411.4	14.4	20.0	2286.6	7.0	15.0	49281.0	8.7	18.0	29895.0
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	9.3	20.0	30848.0	4.1	14.0	14132.0	5.3	15.0	259.0	18.3	25.0	11625.0	8.9	20.0	4503.2	5.3	15.0	353.9	4.2	15.0	11395.0	4.7	15.0	5586.0
36	Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations	10.6	20.0	7828.0	9.8	14.0	963.0	11.3	22.5	69.0	23.8	30.0	2373.0	10.9	20.0	685.6	10.2	20.0	176.9	11.5	15.0	2264.0	13.0	18.0	2642.0
37	Photographic or cinematographic goods	5.5	10.0	77238.0	7.4	9.0	12117.0	11.3	22.5	328.0	26.8	30.0	6001.0	9.5	10.0	2950.7	9.7	20.0	401.8	8.2	10.0	18778.0	8.3	10.0	7487.0
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	8.1	15.0	254496.0	3.0	14.0	122780.0	4.2	22.5	2658.0	13.7	25.0	63615.0	7.1	15.0	72773.0	4.0	20.0	1410.8	2.5	15.0	73588.0	3.1	18.0	50029.0
39	Plastics and articles thereof	14.5	20.0	531142.0	5.3	14.0	366630.0	8.5	22.5	7531.0	16.3	30.0	185683.0	12.5	20.0	133475.5	8.3	20.0	9719.7	4.4	15.0	245563.0	4.9	18.0	125517.0
40	Rubber and articles thereof	10.9	20.0	281989.0	4.4	14.0	70857.0	6.4	25.0	1858.0	18.6	30.0	63268.0	10.3	20.0	37472.8	6.2	25.0	2739.6	4.9	17.0	63058.0	5.3	20.0	41792.0
41	Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather	7.4	15.0	8516.0	3.8	9.0	18959.0	2.5	2.5	49.0	21.4	25.0	4628.0	7.5	15.0	1960.3	2.5	2.5	9.4	3.9	10.0	7756.0	4.2	10.0	572.0
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silk worm)	17.6	20.0	20166.0	12.2	14.0	6604.0	20.3	22.5	207.0	31.7	35.0	6339.0	18.8	20.0	3358.8	18.3	20.0	406.8	12.4	15.0	5901.0	14.7	18.0	5239.0

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Colombia			Costa Rica			Dominica			Dominican Rep.			Ecuador			Grenada			Guatemala			Honduras		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
43	Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof	9.2	20.0	40.0	14.0	14.0	35.0	5.5	22.5	0.0	20.0	35.0	6.0	9.2	20.0	10.2	5.1	20.0	15.0	15.0	37.0	18.0	18.0	12.0	
44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	12.2	20.0	20600.0	8.4	14.0	23388.0	8.9	22.5	5090.0	19.5	35.0	89156.0	12.5	20.0	4837.6	8.7	20.0	8877.7	7.9	15.0	11201.0	8.7	18.0	18033.0
45	Cork and articles of cork	8.5	10.0	489.0	0.0	0.0	120.0	5.8	22.5	7.0	20.5	25.0	77.0	8.5	10.0	42.6	5.6	20.0	1.5	0.0	0.0	82.0	1.0	1.0	62.0
46	Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork	19.2	20.0	176.0	14.0	14.0	295.0	15.0	22.5	9.0	25.0	30.0	307.0	19.2	20.0	18.1	13.4	20.0	7.6	15.0	15.0	90.0	18.0	18.0	100.0
47	Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; waste and scrap of paper or paperboard	7.0	10.0	89203.0	0.7	14.0	7219.0	2.5	2.5	8.9	10.0	361.0	5.5	10.0	6563.8	2.5	2.5	0.0	0.0	6110.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	827.0
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	13.4	20.0	326056.0	4.8	14.0	286540.0	7.9	22.5	6604.0	19.1	30.0	191782.0	13.0	20.0	88765.3	7.4	20.0	5225.0	5.1	15.0	232109.0	5.8	20.0	128441.0
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	11.0	20.0	62454.0	6.0	14.0	36019.0	7.3	22.5	2297.0	16.5	30.0	25842.0	10.2	20.0	16292.8	6.6	20.0	3315.6	5.9	15.0	36207.0	7.0	18.0	16444.0
50	Silk	11.5	20.0	1213.0	4.2	9.0	6252.0	2.5	2.5	0.0	14.0	25.0	40.0	11.0	20.0	1.9	2.5	2.5	0.0	10.2	20.0	43.0	8.4	20.0	45.0
51	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and woven fabric	16.6	20.0	34950.0	4.0	9.0	145.0	2.5	2.5	0.0	14.3	25.0	246.0	16.3	20.0	1076.0	2.5	2.5	10.2	21.0	242.0	8.2	20.0	90.0	
52	Cotton	17.6	20.0	227079.0	7.1	9.0	42058.0	2.5	2.5	192.0	20.7	25.0	41439.0	17.6	20.0	21090.3	2.5	2.5	678.3	17.2	21.0	33639.0	13.6	20.0	11525.0
53	Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper	12.9	20.0	1703.0	5.4	49.0	548.0	2.5	2.5	17.0	11.0	25.0	1985.0	11.2	20.0	6.5	2.5	2.5	0.7	7.8	20.0	304.0	5.8	20.0	256.0
54	Man-made filaments	16.8	20.0	188003.0	6.8	9.0	19713.0	2.5	2.5	90.0	19.9	25.0	4622.0	16.6	20.0	18203.2	2.5	2.5	95.2	13.1	21.0	14369.0	11.1	20.0	7798.0
55	Man-made staple fibres	17.6	20.0	95907.0	6.9	9.0	27146.0	2.5	2.5	512.0	20.8	25.0	52404.0	16.6	20.0	17677.9	2.5	2.5	840.8	14.4	21.0	22725.0	13.0	20.0	19104.0
56	Wadding, felt and non-wovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	14.7	15.0	44426.0	6.1	14.0	13701.0	7.6	22.5	117.0	25.0	30.0	6692.0	14.6	15.0	7575.6	7.3	20.0	151.0	10.4	24.0	4730.0	10.3	20.0	3086.0
57	Carpets and other textile floor coverings	20.0	20.0	5303.0	14.0	14.0	3100.0	22.5	22.5	98.0	30.0	30.0	2150.0	20.0	20.0	1460.0	20.0	20.0	442.6	24.0	24.0	2128.0	20.0	20.0	847.0
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	19.3	20.0	21810.0	8.5	14.0	31477.0	3.1	15.0	27.0	25.1	30.0	5208.0	20.0	20.0	1329.2	3.1	15.0	97.7	18.5	24.0	2652.0	14.8	20.0	3434.0
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	15.3	20.0	20999.0	4.6	9.0	13124.0	4.9	22.5	12.0	23.6	30.0	2438.0	15.2	20.0	3258.4	4.6	20.0	156.9	9.8	24.0	7259.0	8.7	20.0	2173.0
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	20.0	20.0	17820.0	8.5	9.0	4544.0	2.5	2.5	7.0	25.0	25.0	3469.0	20.0	20.0	8820.0	2.5	2.5	308.6	18.9	20.0	1759.0	18.5	20.0	3903.0
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	20.0	20.0	30196.0	13.8	14.0	204342.0	22.4	22.5	665.0	34.6	35.0	19977.0	20.0	20.0	7248.8	19.9	20.0	865.4	23.6	24.0	13731.0	19.7	20.0	35731.0
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	20.0	20.0	37244.0	13.9	14.0	377224.0	22.3	22.5	893.0	35.0	35.0	34177.0	20.0	20.0	6640.3	19.8	20.0	2098.0	24.0	24.0	15564.0	20.0	20.0	39607.0
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	20.0	20.0	20930.0	13.5	49.0	24821.0	18.5	22.5	222.0	34.4	35.0	20048.0	20.0	20.0	1523.8	16.6	20.0	728.7	22.5	24.0	24170.0	18.8	30.0	16429.0
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	19.2	20.0	63704.0	10.5	14.0	38441.0	18.4	22.5	810.0	33.8	35.0	25512.0	19.2	20.0	8483.0	16.6	20.0	1420.4	22.3	27.0	17834.0	16.1	20.0	17189.0

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Colombia			Costa Rica			Dominica			Dominican Rep.			Ecuador			Grenada			Guatemala			Honduras		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
65	Headgear and parts thereof	18.3	20.0	3619.0	12.4	14.0	1436.0	16.7	22.5	54.0	27.7	30.0	1353.0	18.3	20.0	231.7	15.0	20.0	145.9	12.5	15.0	1807.0	14.8	18.0	548.0
66	Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof	17.9	20.0	1277.0	10.4	14.0	1073.0	13.9	22.5	27.0	27.9	30.0	1195.0	17.9	20.0	373.4	12.5	20.0	57.6	10.7	15.0	1538.0	12.4	18.0	660.0
67	Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flows; articles of human hair	18.8	20.0	2116.0	13.2	14.0	805.0	17.9	22.5	71.0	27.5	30.0	188.0	18.8	20.0	223.3	16.3	20.0	107.6	13.9	15.0	1211.0	16.6	18.0	618.0
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	14.4	15.0	23120.0	8.0	14.0	14542.0	10.3	22.5	721.0	19.8	25.0	14713.0	14.1	15.0	7969.6	9.9	20.0	892.7	7.5	15.0	11279.0	9.0	18.0	10123.0
69	Ceramic products	15.2	20.0	30780.0	10.1	14.0	35552.0	12.1	22.5	966.0	20.0	30.0	43022.0	13.2	20.0	5697.3	11.6	20.0	1772.5	9.7	15.0	19966.0	11.9	18.0	12490.0
70	Glass and glass ware	13.0	20.0	54666.0	4.4	14.0	28009.0	6.2	25.0	863.0	21.6	30.0	42081.0	12.0	20.0	17602.5	5.9	25.0	1579.8	4.4	15.0	34531.0	5.5	18.0	21865.0
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewelry; coin	11.2	20.0	9004.0	7.4	14.0	29787.0	19.4	35.0	158.0	23.0	30.0	1582.0	12.2	20.0	355.6	19.3	35.0	383.0	8.2	20.0	7627.0	9.2	20.0	1422.0
72	Iron and steel	7.5	15.0	390585.0	2.5	14.0	157585.0	3.7	15.0	2506.0	12.6	20.0	154837.0	5.9	15.0	50824.2	3.7	15.0	2835.1	2.5	15.0	164497.0	3.2	15.0	70400.0
73	Articles of iron or steel	14.3	20.0	150989.0	4.7	14.0	102883.0	9.6	32.5	4000.0	24.0	30.0	347683.0	14.5	20.0	35274.4	9.0	32.5	6859.1	5.2	15.0	88733.0	5.8	18.0	51758.0
74	Copper and articles thereof	10.6	20.0	70103.0	1.7	14.0	37986.0	3.9	22.5	96.0	16.3	30.0	10424.0	8.5	20.0	3563.4	3.7	20.0	208.1	1.5	15.0	3585.0	2.6	18.0	1542.0
75	Nickel and articles thereof	5.0	5.0	3760.0	0.0	0.0	617.0	2.5	2.5	0.0	13.2	25.0	16.0	5.0	5.0	82.1	2.5	2.5	28.4	0.0	0.0	162.0	1.0	1.0	22.0
76	Aluminum and articles thereof	12.6	20.0	133916.0	5.8	14.0	53558.0	6.8	22.5	1976.0	18.8	30.0	36516.0	11.0	20.0	16187.0	6.5	20.0	2156.4	4.8	15.0	56742.0	5.5	18.0	39593.0
78	Lead and articles thereof	7.7	15.0	4657.0	1.8	5.0	140.0	2.5	2.5	2.0	10.5	25.0	696.0	7.3	15.0	122.2	2.5	2.5	1.7	1.5	5.0	74.0	2.2	5.0	130.0
79	Zinc and articles thereof	6.4	15.0	28412.0	0.0	0.0	13002.0	2.5	2.5	11.0	11.4	25.0	4783.0	8.6	15.0	44.8	2.5	2.5	90.3	0.0	0.0	15888.0	1.0	1.0	2319.0
80	Tin and articles thereof	7.8	15.0	1623.0	0.0	0.0	469.0	2.5	2.5	0.0	15.0	30.0	75.0	7.2	15.0	99.2	2.5	2.5	0.3	0.0	0.0	154.0	1.0	1.0	103.0
81	Other base metals, cermet; articles thereof	5.0	5.0	1973.0	0.2	5.0	112.0	2.5	2.5	0.0	10.1	15.0	2141.0	5.9	10.0	39.1	2.5	2.5		0.1	5.0	185.0	1.1	5.0	149.0
82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	13.8	20.0	64967.0	3.3	14.0	29170.0	7.6	22.5	581.0	14.6	30.0	19313.0	11.4	20.0	10232.0	6.9	20.0	966.2	3.4	15.0	28424.0	4.0	18.0	15494.0
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	15.6	20.0	42640.0	5.3	14.0	32476.0	7.6	22.5	531.0	25.1	30.0	16829.0	14.9	20.0	11119.3	7.3	20.0	1029.1	5.1	15.0	28712.0	6.0	18.0	17338.0
84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	9.0	20.0	1521133.0	1.6	14.0	705678.0	4.3	32.5	13661.0	10.0	30.0	541767.5	7.4	20.0	166372.0	4.2	35.0	17632.4	1.3	15.0	489424.0	2.3	18.0	333472.0
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and arts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	10.2	20.0	1145034.0	3.1	14.0	1230368.0	10.2	35.0	11814.0	18.8	30.0	545949.0				10.0	35.0	25326.9	4.4	15.0	596510.0	5.5	20.0	174675.0
86	Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signalling equipment of all kinds	9.4	20.0	17827.0	0.0	0.0	1347.0	2.5	2.5	74.0	10.0	10.0	1426.0				2.5	2.5	24.3	0.0	0.0	1069.0	1.0	1.0	554.0
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock and parts and accessories thereof	15.9	35.0	611247.0	5.1	14.0	363187.0	11.2	40.0	12205.0	20.3	30.0	767940.0				10.5	35.0	15277.1	10.4	20.0	507941.0	10.9	35.0	306192.0



TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Colombia			Costa Rica			Dominica			Dominican Rep.			Ecuador			Grenada			Guatemala			Honduras		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
88	Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof	5.0	10.0	360223.0	2.8	5.0	9025.0	5.2	22.5	23.0	12.4	30.0	2329.0			4.8	20.0	125.6	2.3	5.0	3563.0	2.9	5.0	2818.0	
89	Ships, boats and floating structures	8.0	20.0	20133.0	5.7	14.0	2918.0	4.6	22.5	209.0	15.2	30.0	2867.0			4.3	20.0	258.5	4.8	15.0	1677.0	6.0	18.0	677.0	
90	Optica, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	6.7	20.0	306476.0	1.2	14.0	125910.0	7.5	25.0	1662.0	12.7	30.0	101406.0			7.1	25.0	2374.3	1.5	15.0	64890.0	2.8	18.0	42628.0	
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	8.5	20.0	15313.0	8.4	14.0	3310.0	19.3	30.0	81.0	22.9	30.0	1696.0			19.3	30.0	143.4	9.6	20.0	5357.0	10.7	20.0	1675.0	
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories thereof	5.7	10.0	4867.0	7.9	14.0	2484.0	10.5	22.5	101.0	30.0	30.0	861.0			10.4	20.0	397.6	8.5	15.0	3343.0	8.7	18.0	1337.0	
93	Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof	18.0	20.0	23401.0	9.6	14.0	705.0	29.6	45.0	14.0	28.6	30.0	4241.0			23.9	35.0	34.6	20.0	20.0	3756.0	18.2	20.0	4013.0	
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated name-plates and the like; prefabricated buildings	17.6	20.0	43678.0	11.9	14.0	45433.0	19.1	22.5	2391.0	28.6	35.0	67536.0			17.0	20.0	4865.9	12.6	15.0	37514.0	14.7	18.0	26767.0	
95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	18.5	20.0	66688.0	11.3	14.0	31741.0	15.4	22.5	612.0	25.6	30.0	20335.0			14.2	20.0	647.7	11.7	15.0	21742.0	13.7	18.0	14224.0	
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	17.5	20.0	46388.0	9.3	14.0	23644.0	15.1	22.5	536.0	27.2	30.0	12837.0			14.0	20.0	603.1	9.0	20.0	19583.0	10.9	20.0	10790.0	
97	Works of art, collectors pieces and antiques	20.0	20.0	775.0	4.0	9.0	862.0	22.5	22.5	2.0	30.0	30.0	2557.0			20.0	20.0	6.5	11.1	20.0	251.0	16.4	20.0	226.0	

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Jamaica			S. Kitts and Nevis			Saint Lucia			Mexico			Nicaragua			Panama			Peru			Paraguay		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
01	Live animals	22.5	40.0	2648.0	21.9	40.0	17.2	21.9	40.0	230.0	14.0	48.0	229993.2	5.8	10.0	6030.0	9.1	15.0	4191.0	12.0	12.0	6263.0	3.6	7.0	2285.0
02	Meat and edible meat offal	25.3	40.0	42002.0	10.0	40.0	5.0	7.7	40.0	13950.0	82.1	260.0	1576388.9	15.9	180.0	3563.0	25.5	300.0	15932.0	26.9	30.0	20315.0	12.7	15.0	924.0
03	Fish and crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates	28.4	40.0	38564.0	28.8	40.0	87.6	28.2	40.0	2872.0	29.2	30.0	71279.6	8.3	10.0	3317.0	13.6	15.0	3707.0	12.0	12.0	12227.0	12.0	13.0	222.0
04	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	21.5	40.0	46726.0	15.4	40.0	36.1	13.6	40.0	9107.0	39.7	128.0	590950.1	10.8	20.0	25641.0	39.8	167.0	21304.0	22.7	25.0	69113.0	16.6	19.0	10405.0
05	Products of animal origin not elsewhere specified or included	2.1	2.5	1031.0	2.1	2.5	1.9	2.1	2.5	31.0	12.4	30.0	116052.4	3.8	5.0	186.0	11.8	15.0	466.0	12.0	12.0	7011.0	8.2	11.0	934.0
06	Live trees and other plants, bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers	21.7	40.0	705.0	22.5	40.0	1.5	21.7	40.0	159.0	13.9	30.0	43876.2	7.3	10.0	761.0	5.7	15.0	2235.0	12.0	12.0	1477.0	4.7	13.0	348.0
07	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	26.3	40.0	17062.0	25.3	40.0	27.0	25.9	40.0	4079.0	19.2	251.0	178741.4	10.1	15.0	17332.0	14.0	87.0	12884.0	19.4	25.0	18165.0	10.3	13.0	7976.0
08	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits or melon	33.6	40.0	3919.0	34.7	40.0	8.0	33.6	40.0	1434.0	23.4	53.6	463886.7	9.0	10.0	4027.0	10.8	15.0	17360.0	25.0	25.0	20138.0	12.9	13.0	4556.0
09	Coffee, tea, mate and spices	22.6	40.0	4512.0	22.6	40.0	0.1	22.6	40.0	688.0	25.9	72.0	70204.1	7.8	10.0	2995.0	10.0	15.0	4879.0	15.3	25.0	6626.0	12.8	13.0	971.0
10	Cereals	14.7	40.0	74324.0	16.1	40.0	1.4	14.7	40.0	2070.0	36.7	198.0	1510945.1	19.8	55.0	36260.0	31.4	130.0	51637.0	16.0	25.0	305495.0	8.1	15.0	22289.0
11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	8.2	40.0	16574.0	8.2	40.0	4.2	8.2	40.0	6572.0	20.9	161.0	128160.8	4.0	5.0	15130.0	10.5	15.0	8712.0	16.4	25.0	20823.0	13.6	17.0	10627.0
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit	3.5	40.0	2443.0	3.8	40.0	1.8	4.0	40.0	408.0	6.6	45.0	1286762.3	2.1	10.0	2395.0	7.1	15.0	4347.0	12.0	12.0	18382.0	6.2	13.0	6656.0
13	Lacs; gums, resins, and other vegetable saps and extracts	2.5	2.5	461.0	3.8	20.0	0.0	2.5	2.5	43.0	13.5	18.0	66495.9	0.0	0.0	495.0	4.8	15.0	1315.0	12.0	12.0	4946.0	9.7	17.0	356.0
14	Vegetable planting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified	2.5	2.5	66.0	2.5	2.5	6.0	2.5	2.5	0.0	13.0	13.0	32114.6	2.3	5.0	12.0	9.2	15.0	984.0	12.0	12.0	373.0	9.0	9.0	49.0
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	24.7	40.0	24837.0	25.1	40.0	499.5	24.7	40.0	1509.0	21.1	260.0	454436.0	6.5	10.0	40159.0	12.4	30.0	21019.0	12.0	12.0	64601.0	12.5	15.0	8638.0
16	Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, mollusks or other aquatic invertebrates	16.5	20.0	25346.0	22.3	27.5	44.0	16.5	20.0	3727.0	22.8	23.0	129199.3	9.7	10.0	5041.0	15.9	83.0	24306.0	18.0	30.0	6232.0	18.3	19.0	2771.0
17	Sugars and sugar confectionary	22.0	40.0	36801.0	22.9	40.0	21816.1	21.3	40.0	3988.0	61.9	260.0	169026.7	18.6	55.0	8144.0	20.0	154.0	9472.0	15.1	25.0	60655.0	20.4	30.0	9135.0
18	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	7.8	20.0	3970.0	10.0	27.5	0.1	7.8	20.0	905.0	26.4	43.9	143231.8	7.1	10.0	3318.0	9.2	15.0	9471.0	16.3	25.0	7911.0	17.3	23.0	3745.0
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	15.9	20.0	35962.0	21.7	27.5	250.9	15.9	20.0	7445.0	17.6	51.8	295302.6	8.2	10.0	27186.0	12.0	15.0	44441.0	20.0	25.0	12323.0	19.0	21.0	14766.0
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	16.4	40.0	37824.0	20.4	40.0	9.7	16.4	40.0	5102.0	24.8	55.4	262107.2	8.6	10.0	11919.0	14.0	87.0	31254.0	25.0	25.0	12353.0	16.6	17.0	7661.0
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	17.1	20.0	28732.0	23.2	30.0	57.0	17.4	30.0	5296.0	32.7	141.0	501050.2	7.3	10.0	30491.0	12.6	70.0	48635.0	12.6	25.0	46223.0	18.2	21.0	26892.0
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	25.4	30.0	24571.0	27.2	30.0	733.7	31.1	45.0	10609.0	33.9	118.0	239005.2	10.0	14.0	7267.0	14.3	15.0	20828.0	15.4	17.0	27196.0	20.7	23.0	70930.0
23	Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder	4.4	20.0	25272.0	5.9	27.5	0.1	4.4	20.0	2012.0	14.1	23.0	318336.1	5.1	10.0	13531.0	12.1	15.0	38909.0	12.0	12.0	111671.0	9.1	17.0	5317.0

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Jamaica			S. Kitts and Nevis			Saint Lucia			Mexico			Nicaragua			Panama			Peru			Paraguay		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	21.8	30.0	4918.0	2.5	2.5		32.3	45.0	1464.0	51.3	67.0	49505.3	4.8	10.0	9795.0	13.3	15.0	4820.0	12.0	12.0	8893.0	15.4	23.0	134871.0
25	Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering material, lime and cement	3.7	20.0	16716.0	4.2	27.5	4.3	3.7	20.0	6137.0	12.0	23.0	307319.9	2.1	10.0	18677.0	8.9	87.0	14476.0	12.0	12.0	18234.0	6.8	9.0	4638.0
26	Ores, slag and ash	3.4	10.0	50.0	3.9	15.0		3.4	10.0	7.0	11.9	13.0	322398.2	0.4	5.0	0.0	9.8	15.0	384.0	12.0	12.0	2899.0	5.6	7.0	1655.0
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	7.8	25.0	583531.0	8.2	27.5	2.5	7.1	25.0	29542.0	10.9	18.0	5234792.4	6.7	10.0	306543.0	6.2	40.0	627544.0	12.0	12.0	1156397.0	0.5	6.0	315723.0
28	Inorganic chemicals: organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	2.9	15.0	43160.0	3.2	20.0	23.0	3.0	15.0	962.0	11.8	13.0	803118.6	0.3	10.0	8355.0	5.5	15.0	9987.0	12.0	12.0	64093.0	8.6	13.0	4304.0
29	Organic chemicals	2.6	15.0	24628.0	2.6	20.0	3.3	2.6	15.0	474.0	9.6	40.6	3726026.3	0.1	5.0	7777.0	2.4	15.0	18924.0	12.0	12.0	130847.0	8.3	17.0	20586.0
30	Pharmaceutical products	7.5	15.0	80727.0	7.5	15.0	11.7	7.5	15.0	4265.0	10.7	20.0	986958.4	0.1	5.0	96479.0	3.5	15.0	126273.0	12.0	12.0	178258.0	10.8	17.0	49327.0
31	Fertilizers	0.4	10.0	7505.0	0.5	15.0	1.5	0.4	10.0	1590.0	3.3	13.0	371818.3	0.0	0.0	15389.0	1.0	15.0	15117.0	12.0	12.0	98838.0	5.1	9.0	39228.0
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	8.8	20.0	14492.0	11.3	20.0	2.1	8.9	25.0	4090.0	13.6	25.0	1005743.7	2.9	10.0	12385.0	7.5	15.0	30585.0	12.0	12.0	85627.0	12.7	17.0	9941.0
33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	12.6	20.0	25822.0	17.4	27.5	28.2	12.6	20.0	3938.0	19.5	30.0	529269.4	5.6	10.0	21064.0	8.9	15.0	40831.0	12.1	17.0	82744.0	14.6	21.0	32378.0
34	Soap, organic surgace, active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepared waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, dental waxes and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	14.4	20.0	33772.0	19.5	27.5	4.6	14.4	20.0	3660.0	17.6	30.0	333523.5	5.5	10.0	29670.0	10.2	15.0	30141.0	12.0	12.0	34555.0	15.3	21.0	13972.0
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	5.3	15.0	1879.0	6.4	20.0		5.3	15.0	368.0	14.8	23.0	339274.8	2.3	5.0	2525.0	5.9	15.0	7603.0	12.2	17.0	19690.0	15.3	19.0	3729.0
36	Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations	10.2	20.0	738.0	13.3	27.5		10.2	20.0	442.0	21.7	30.0	76134.5	7.7	10.0	1943.0	14.4	15.0	755.0	12.0	12.0	5041.0	15.0	17.0	2269.0
37	Photographic or cinematographic goods	9.9	20.0	6531.0	11.7	25.0	1.2	9.7	20.0	959.0	16.6	23.0	627280.9	4.4	5.0	4865.0	7.4	15.0	11262.0	12.0	12.0	43517.0	9.6	17.0	11233.0
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	4.0	20.0	48816.0	4.7	27.5	14.5	4.0	20.0	4647.0	14.3	30.0	1586733.4	2.3	10.0	31347.0	6.5	15.0	58516.0	12.0	12.0	122271.0	11.7	17.0	73977.0
39	Plastics and articles thereof	8.6	20.0	105675.0	10.6	27.5	30.8	8.2	20.0	12664.0	15.8	30.0	10432807.9	3.3	10.0	54012.0	6.0	15.0	105487.0	12.0	12.0	383221.0	14.5	21.0	53623.0
40	Rubber and articles thereof	6.2	30.0	40656.0	7.7	35.0	0.2	6.6	25.0	3619.0	16.5	30.0	2500641.7	3.6	10.0	35558.0	7.2	15.0	35743.0	12.0	12.0	148156.0	12.2	19.0	41687.0
41	Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather	2.5	2.5	139.0	2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5	0.0	10.3	13.0	818864.3	2.8	5.0	457.0	13.7	15.0	255.0	12.0	12.0	1945.0	9.6	13.0	308.0
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silk worm)	18.3	20.0	4566.0	23.3	27.5	0.2	18.3	20.0	595.0	29.9	35.0	400222.8	7.9	10.0	3718.0	12.1	15.0	9967.0	12.0	12.0	8413.0	21.3	23.0	8393.0
43	Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof	5.1	20.0	4.0	5.9	25.0		5.1	20.0	0.0	16.3	35.0	4895.1	10.0	10.0	2.0	11.7	15.0	2.0	12.0	12.0	5.0	16.1	23.0	10.0

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Jamaica			S. Kitts and Nevis			Saint Lucia			Mexico			Nicaragua			Panama			Peru			Paraguay		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	8.7	20.0	65372.0	11.4	27.5	64.8	8.7	20.0	14486.0	18.8	30.0	824873.9	4.5	10.0	4305.0	7.8	15.0	17565.0	12.0	12.0	31285.0	10.6	17.0	1507.0
45	Cork and articles of cork	5.6	20.0	56.0	6.7	25.0		5.6	20.0	16.0	15.2	23.0	11741.4	0.0	0.0	32.0	11.1	15.0	47.0	12.0	12.0	572.0	9.9	13.0	98.0
46	Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork	13.4	20.0	111.0	18.1	27.5	0.7	13.4	20.0	20.0	29.0	30.0	3221.1	10.0	10.0	31.0	13.8	15.0	225.0	12.0	12.0	196.0	15.0	15.0	47.0
47	Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; waste and scrap of paper or paperboard	2.5	2.5	26.0	2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5	0.0	4.8	13.0	576555.0	0.0	0.0	155.0	7.1	10.0	3645.0	12.0	12.0	22593.0	6.6	7.0	263.0
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	7.5	20.0	95588.0	9.2	27.5	8.4	7.5	25.0	11721.0	13.9	23.0	3597810.3	3.0	10.0	53084.0	8.1	15.0	105486.0	12.0	12.0	227798.0	13.5	19.0	63751.0
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	6.6	20.0	31525.0	8.9	27.5	366.5	6.6	20.0	4955.0	13.9	30.0	720440.7	3.0	10.0	11492.0	8.3	15.0	33349.0	12.0	12.0	51824.0	8.5	19.0	9818.0
50	Silk	2.5	2.5	80.0	2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5	11.0	16.0	18.0	13085.7	3.0	5.0		6.8	10.0	27.0	14.4	20.0	507.0	15.5	21.0	143.0
51	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and woven fabric	2.5	2.5	148.0	2.5	2.5	0.9	2.5	2.5	0.0	13.4	18.0	142768.1	2.8	5.0	69.0	8.6	15.0	152.0	17.0	20.0	6087.0	16.1	21.0	48.0
52	Cotton	2.5	2.5	4304.0	2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5	514.0	18.1	28.0	1734532.2	4.8	5.0	2673.0	2.0	2.0	5645.0	16.8	20.0	55171.0	18.6	21.0	8644.0
53	Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper	2.5	2.5	428.0	2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5	74.0	13.0	18.0	14182.7	2.4	5.0	45.0	8.2	15.0	516.0	13.8	20.0	576.0	12.8	21.0	113.0
54	Man-made filaments	2.5	2.5	7666.0	2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5	993.0	17.2	28.0	1319917.2	4.3	5.0	3476.0	3.0	15.0	19221.0	16.3	20.0	55347.0	18.1	21.0	7308.0
55	Man-made staple fibres	2.5	2.5	11664.0	2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5	1066.0	17.3	28.0	697779.5	4.2	5.0	3037.0	2.9	15.0	8883.0	16.9	20.0	37635.0	18.7	21.0	10302.0
56	Wadding, felt and non-wovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	7.3	20.0	2428.0	8.8	27.5	0.1	7.3	20.0	1278.0	16.9	23.0	407102.9	3.9	10.0	828.0	9.1	15.0	4776.0	12.0	12.0	15910.0	18.2	21.0	9044.0
57	Carpets and other textile floor coverings	20.0	20.0	4272.0	27.5	27.5	2.5	20.0	20.0	689.0	30.0	30.0	182853.2	10.0	10.0	1872.0	12.0	15.0	2240.0	12.0	12.0	6752.0	21.8	23.0	770.0
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	3.1	15.0	5738.0	3.4	20.0		3.1	15.0	531.0	21.4	35.0	674645.1	4.9	10.0	538.0	4.6	15.0	3188.0	19.8	20.0	6600.0	20.9	21.0	861.0
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	4.6	20.0	4509.0	5.2	25.0	0.1	4.6	20.0	231.0	18.0	25.0	537375.9	4.0	10.0	1231.0	5.5	15.0	1445.0	15.4	20.0	21802.0	18.6	19.0	1286.0
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	2.5	2.5	3229.0	2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5	623.0	23.0	23.0	616444.8	4.8	5.0	219.0	2.0	2.0	4474.0	20.0	20.0	8776.0	19.9	21.0	4328.0
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	19.9	20.0	89073.0	27.3	27.5	3.1	19.9	20.0	1654.0	35.0	35.0	1894061.9	9.8	10.0	8325.0	12.1	15.0	24868.0	20.0	20.0	23219.0	22.7	23.0	15724.0
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	19.8	20.0	68695.0	27.2	27.5	373.7	19.8	20.0	3643.0	35.0	35.0	1574554.3	10.0	15.0	17167.0	12.7	15.0	67448.0	19.9	20.0	27322.0	23.0	23.0	10616.0
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	16.6	20.0	15261.0	21.9	27.5	12.1	16.6	20.0	2198.0	32.1	35.0	223959.2	8.7	10.0	9578.0	13.1	15.0	11745.0	19.9	20.0	13961.0	22.1	23.0	4333.0
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	16.6	20.0	20489.0	20.5	27.5	1.0	16.6	20.0	3564.0	34.1	35.0	190636.2	8.4	10.0	13113.0	11.3	15.0	49652.0	20.0	20.0	30452.0	22.3	23.0	16211.0
65	Headgear and parts thereof	15.0	20.0	1144.0	20.0	27.5		15.0	20.0	271.0	26.3	30.0	33324.2	8.8	10.0	644.0	14.4	15.0	1683.0	12.0	12.0	960.0	21.9	23.0	532.0

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Jamaica			S. Kitts and Nevis			Saint Lucia			Mexico			Nicaragua			Panama			Peru			Paraguay			
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	
66	Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof	12.5	20.0	516.0	16.8	27.5		12.5	20.0	166.0	25.3	30.0	10065.7	7.9	10.0	367.0	11.8	15.0	720.0	12.0	12.0	580.0	20.9	23.0	4140.0	
67	Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flows; articles of human hair	16.3	20.0	694.0	21.0	27.5		16.3	20.0	200.0	28.6	30.0	22969.6	8.9	10.0	202.0	13.8	15.0	1439.0	12.0	12.0	1163.0	18.3	19.0	711.0	
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	9.9	20.0	6694.0	13.0	27.5		57.4	10.0	20.0	1164.0	18.3	23.0	265441.0	3.2	5.0	9724.0	10.3	15.0	19964.0	12.0	12.0	11969.0	11.4	17.0	4108.0
69	Ceramic products	11.8	20.0	23530.0	13.8	27.5		10.7	11.6	20.0	2932.0	19.8	30.0	356577.3	5.2	10.0	8340.0	10.2	15.0	28369.0	12.0	12.0	24256.0	13.8	23.0	9854.0
70	Glass and glassware	5.9	25.0	22826.0	7.5	27.5		7.3	6.3	25.0	3796.0	18.6	30.0	910588.6	3.1	10.0	15250.0	9.5	15.0	15425.0	12.0	12.0	49501.0	14.4	21.0	7828.0
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewelry; coin	16.8	30.0	46583.0	16.6	30.0		16.8	30.0	246.0	12.4	30.0	905792.4	5.1	10.0	276.0	7.3	15.0	9716.0	12.0	12.0	5450.0	12.4	21.0	551.0	
72	Iron and steel	3.7	15.0	38597.0	4.3	20.0		3.7	15.0	4640.0	11.7	18.0	3534542.4	1.2	10.0	58307.0	4.8	15.0	65309.0	12.0	12.0	154870.0	12.4	17.0	22894.0	
73	Articles of iron or steel	9.0	32.5	69423.0	11.5	33.5	168.4	9.1	32.5	9143.0	17.2	30.0	5021109.7	3.5	10.0	40466.0	9.2	15.0	59408.0	12.0	12.0	200057.0	16.8	23.0	28523.0	
74	Copper and articles thereof	3.7	20.0	3233.0	4.0	25.0	32.4	3.7	20.0	372.0	15.5	30.0	1586503.4	1.1	10.0	996.0	10.5	15.0	3614.0	12.0	12.0	6146.0	13.4	19.0	2056.0	
75	Nickel and articles thereof	2.5	2.5	70.0	2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5	5.0	10.9	20.0	89593.7	0.0	0.0	8.0	12.0	15.0	40.0	12.0	12.0	926.0	13.3	19.0	38.0	
76	Aluminum and articles thereof	6.5	20.0	17304.0	8.0	27.5	5.7	6.5	20.0	3302.0	16.8	30.0	2052145.5	3.1	10.0	12638.0	9.2	15.0	28305.0	12.0	12.0	39026.0	14.0	19.0	13988.0	
78	Lead and articles thereof	2.5	2.5	42.0	2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5	2.0	13.5	18.0	97869.8	1.5	5.0	30.0	13.1	15.0	199.0	12.0	12.0	752.0	12.3	19.0	44.0	
79	Zinc and articles thereof	2.5	2.5	327.0	2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5	8.0	13.5	18.0	111721.6	0.0	0.0	682.0	11.2	15.0	176.0	12.0	12.0	1172.0	11.7	19.0	17.0	
80	Tin and articles thereof	2.5	2.5	2977.0	2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5	5.0	14.3	23.0	44472.4	0.0	0.0	46.0	12.0	15.0	63.0	12.0	12.0	138.0	12.6	19.0	108.0	
81	Other base metals, cermets; articles thereof	2.5	2.5	19.0	2.5	2.5		2.5	2.5	0.0	12.9	18.0	410838.3	0.0	0.0	5.0	13.4	15.0	14.0	12.0	12.0	813.0	6.7	11.0	31.0	
82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	6.9	20.0	8959.0	8.3	27.5	135.5	6.9	20.0	1433.0	19.1	30.0	801010.2	2.4	10.0	9813.0	8.6	15.0	15831.0	12.0	12.0	51744.0	18.6	21.0	12235.0	
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	7.3	20.0	16415.0	9.5	27.5	49.2	7.6	20.0	2337.0	20.9	30.0	1541903.0	3.4	10.0	8764.0	6.3	15.0	22366.0	12.0	12.0	20012.0	16.0	19.0	5019.0	
84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	4.1	32.5	253865.0	4.9	33.5	276.4	4.3	32.5	31822.0	12.9	30.0	25242185.0	0.8	10.0	139005.0	4.8	15.0	370557.0	12.5	20.0	1140237.0	7.0	23.0	264227.0	
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and arts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	9.4	32.5	202391.0	12.0	33.5	13023.5	9.8	32.5	32839.0	16.2	30.0	46240536.3	2.9	10.0	108306.0	8.2	15.0	283426.0	12.0	12.0	742282.0	10.9	23.0	178717.0	
86	Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signalling equipment of all kinds	2.5	2.5	1804.0	2.5	2.5	70.1	2.5	2.5	120.0	13.3	23.0	396988.3	0.0	0.0	102.0	14.7	15.0	1085.0	12.0	12.0	7576.0	5.8	6.0	105.0	
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock and parts and accessories thereof	9.6	30.0	276432.0	15.4	45.0	1921.1	12.7	35.0	19638.0	18.0	30.0	17136492.0	5.9	10.0	173823.0	11.0	20.0	343420.0	12.0	12.0	526901.0	12.6	28.0	151152.0	
88	Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof	4.8	20.0	1488.0	5.5	25.0	7.0	4.8	20.0	380.0	13.3	23.0	274673.8	2.5	5.0	158.0	14.3	15.0	5721.0	12.0	12.0	390.0	2.6	23.0	482.0	

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	Jamaica			S. Kitts and Nevis			Saint Lucia			Mexico			Nicaragua			Panama			Peru			Paraguay		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
89	Ships, boats and floating structures	4.3	20.0	1864.0	5.0	25.0	3.8	4.3	20.0	1442.0	16.2	23.0	64275.6	4.8	15.0	5607.0	13.2	15.0	3162.0	12.0	12.0	6249.0	10.1	23.0	2706.0
90	Optica, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	7.1	25.0	41903.0	7.9	25.0	36.4	7.1	25.0	5530.0	14.0	30.0	4526100.1	0.9	10.0	23804.0	9.1	15.0	72180.0	12.0	12.0	138028.0	9.4	21.0	30208.0
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	18.5	30.0	18225.0	17.5	30.0	44.0	16.7	30.0	291.0	19.4	30.0	165550.3	6.5	10.0	1001.0	12.1	15.0	8321.0	12.0	12.0	7419.0	20.7	23.0	7540.0
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories thereof	10.4	20.0	1164.0	10.7	27.5	113.9	10.4	20.0	107.0	16.6	30.0	52391.1	8.3	10.0	491.0	10.7	15.0	1509.0	12.0	12.0	3058.0	18.5	21.0	1353.0
93	Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof	21.4	30.0	1520.0	42.9	70.0		41.4	70.0	81.0	20.5	30.0	37514.7	9.4	10.0	1103.0	14.5	15.0	816.0	12.0	12.0	1906.0	23.0	23.0	1421.0
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated name-plates and the like; prefabricated buildings	17.0	20.0	40979.0	22.4	27.5	70.7	17.0	20.0	11723.0	22.2	30.0	1378052.6	8.1	10.0	22269.0	13.4	15.0	58813.0	12.0	12.0	47496.0	19.1	21.0	9809.0
95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	14.2	20.0	7039.0	16.7	27.5	11.3	14.2	20.0	1946.0	24.2	30.0	651931.8	8.7	10.0	8102.0	10.0	15.0	30775.0	12.0	12.0	50715.0	18.3	23.0	70082.0
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	14.0	20.0	6708.0	17.3	27.5	188.8	14.0	20.0	1152.0	23.7	30.0	526532.2	4.9	10.0	9594.0	10.7	15.0	13150.0	12.0	12.0	32985.0	19.1	21.0	13686.0
97	Works of art, collectors pieces and antiques	20.0	20.0	358.0	25.0	25.0	13.0	20.0	20.0	98.0	3.0	3.0	10194.2	5.0	5.0	265.0	7.8	15.0	799.0	12.0	12.0	102.0	7.0	7.0	15.0

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	El Salvador			Trinidad and Tobago			Uruguay			United States			Saint Vicent			Venezuela		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
01	Live animals	6.0	10.0	15087.0	22.1	40.0	514.0	4.1	7.0	413.0	1.0	6.8	1928869.0	21.9	40.0	114.0	8.2	10.0	11703.0
02	Meat and edible meat offal	15.9	20.0	31536.0	23.4	40.0	18290.0	13.1	15.0	12248.0	4.9	28.5	3371637.0	9.0	40.0	6400.0	20.0	20.0	10651.0
03	Fish and crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates	10.1	15.0	2035.0	28.7	40.0	3226.0	12.5	13.0	7049.0	0.9	15.0	8151579.0	28.2	40.0	822.0	18.8	20.0	19253.0
04	Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified or included	22.7	40.0	69507.0	20.4	40.0	47399.0	16.7	21.0	3649.0	21.3	116.6	1035394.0	15.1	40.0	3774.0	19.0	20.0	188887.0
05	Products of animal origin not elsewhere specified or included	3.8	5.0	509.0	2.1	2.5	173.0	8.3	11.0	1808.0	0.6	5.1	539679.0	2.1	2.5	10.0	8.7	10.0	1609.0
06	Live trees and other plants, bulbs, roots and the like; cut flowers	11.5	15.0	1097.0	21.7	40.0	513.0	5.2	13.0	3393.0	2.2	7.0	1159810.0	21.7	40.0	178.0	7.7	10.0	3261.0
07	Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers	13.7	20.0	36028.0	25.1	40.0	19866.0	10.6	13.0	16981.0	6.0	29.8	2647186.0	26.1	40.0	1071.0	13.4	15.0	92072.0
08	Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits or melon	13.4	15.0	41242.0	33.6	40.0	8651.0	12.9	13.0	18497.0	4.0	29.8	3917282.0	33.6	40.0	141.0	15.0	15.0	87191.0
09	Coffee, tea, mate and spices	11.3	15.0	3218.0	22.6	40.0	3354.0	13.0	13.0	31628.0	0.8	6.4	3199325.0	22.6	40.0	242.0	12.9	20.0	6974.0
10	Cereals	10.1	40.0	96058.0	14.7	40.0	16191.0	8.6	15.0	38367.0	1.9	11.2	805821.0	16.0	40.0	9984.0	12.3	20.0	335583.0
11	Products of the milling industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten	9.0	15.0	9641.0	8.2	40.0	8843.0	13.9	17.0	4372.0	2.7	12.8	310254.0	8.2	40.0	690.0	19.7	20.0	80274.0
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit	2.4	10.0	4259.0	3.5	40.0	5605.0	6.5	13.0	11008.0	6.4	163.8	822860.0	3.6	40.0	344.0	9.0	15.0	63266.0
13	Lacs; gums, resins, and other vegetable saps and extracts	0.0	0.0	1263.0	2.5	2.5	1272.0	10.1	17.0	1825.0	2.5	27.8	493448.0	2.5	2.5	0.0	10.0	15.0	16667.0
14	Vegetable planting materials; vegetable products not elsewhere specified	3.1	15.0	249.0	2.5	2.5	96.0	9.0	9.0	62.0	0.9	4.4	53136.0	2.5	2.5	0.0	10.0	10.0	881.0
15	Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavagte products; prepared edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes	7.9	20.0	70687.0	24.7	40.0	12166.0	12.2	15.0	20291.0	4.4	19.1	1383572.0	24.7	40.0	1883.0	16.9	20.0	179471.0
16	Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, mollusks or other acquatic invertebrates	14.5	15.0	14424.0	16.5	20.0	10816.0	19.0	19.0	7696.0	3.9	35.0	2219202.0	16.5	20.0	2071.0	20.0	20.0	24735.0
17	Sugars and sugar confectionary	27.0	40.0	12781.0	22.3	40.0	15169.0	20.2	23.0	32606.0	16.6	159.3	1489288.0	20.8	40.0	2705.0	16.6	20.0	87036.0
18	Cocoa and cocoa preparations	12.2	15.0	5174.0	7.8	20.0	5731.0	20.4	23.0	11759.0	13.8	180.8	1404323.0	7.8	20.0	496.0	16.7	20.0	21459.0
19	Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks' products	14.0	40.0	39899.0	15.9	20.0	15757.0	20.2	21.0	28242.0	18.1	253.5	1775215.0	15.9	20.0	3427.0	19.7	20.0	52520.0
20	Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants	12.9	15.0	19609.0	16.4	40.0	18029.0	17.0	17.0	26035.0	8.9	131.8	2604900.0	16.4	40.0	1520.0	19.8	20.0	71338.0
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	11.3	15.0	77451.0	17.0	20.0	24578.0	19.1	21.0	57580.0	14.5	102.4	1240015.0	17.4	30.0	3701.0	17.0	20.0	71624.0
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	25.0	40.0	22327.1	17.5	20.0	23194.0	23.0	23.0	27305.0	3.7	57.1	8027408.0	26.8	35.0	2756.0	19.2	20.0	188683.0
23	Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder	6.2	15.0	40664.0	4.4	20.0	23654.0	9.1	17.0	25968.0	4.7	98.0	615516.0	4.4	20.0	276.0	15.0	20.0	187294.0
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	7.9	30.0	6829.0	25.3	35.0	4123.0	17.6	23.0	27283.0	51.0	350.0	1129986.0	25.3	35.0	563.0	16.7	20.0	12711.0
25	Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering material, lime and cement	2.9	15.0	16694.0	3.7	20.0	17380.0	6.8	9.0	15952.0	0.3	3.3	2726093.0	3.7	20.0	4307.0	5.2	10.0	68649.0
26	Ores, slag and ash	0.4	5.0	105.0	3.4	10.0	29383.0	5.6	7.0	717.0	0.6	8.5	1554320.0	3.4	10.0	0.0	5.0	5.0	13248.0
27	Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes	4.6	10.0	594731.0	12.8	35.0	1068508.0	0.7	9.0	530152.0	0.8	13.1	117123438.0	6.9	35.0	15511.0	7.7	15.0	540677.0
28	Inorganic chemicals: organic or inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare earth metals, of radioactive elements or of isotopes	0.3	10.0	34161.0	3.0	15.0	21591.0	8.8	13.0	20449.0	2.7	10.3	7017780.0	3.0	15.0	578.0	7.0	10.0	163823.0
29	Organic chemicals	0.2	10.0	50392.0	2.6	15.0	17195.0	8.6	17.0	74422.0	5.4	14.6	34002442.0	2.6	15.0	129.0	5.8	15.0	532338.0
30	Pharmaceutical products	1.3	5.0	141249.0	7.5	15.0	42304.0	11.3	17.0	110416.0	0.0	0.0	12170124.0	7.5	15.0	2188.0	8.4	15.0	407002.0
31	Fertilizers	1.2	5.0	31723.0	0.4	10.0	3307.0	4.4	9.0	42504.0	0.0	0.0	1713512.0	0.4	10.0	1444.0	5.0	5.0	43451.0

TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	El Salvador			Trinidad and Tobago			Uruguay			United States			Saint Vicent			Venezuela		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
32	Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, pigments and other colouring matter; paints and varnishes; putty and other mastics; inks	3.1	15.0	43848.0	8.9	25.0	15603.0	12.8	17.0	36073.0	5.9	11.9	2707279.0	8.9	25.0	2530.0	9.5	15.0	115304.0
33	Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations	7.8	15.0	47271.0	12.6	20.0	18860.0	16.5	21.0	42657.0	1.3	6.0	2632863.0	12.6	20.0	1432.0	13.3	20.0	186390.0
34	Soap, organic surgace, active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepared waxes, polishing or scouring preparations, candles and similar articles, modelling pastes, dental waxes and dental preparations with a basis of plaster	7.0	15.0	49532.0	14.4	20.0	7979.0	16.4	21.0	36781.0	2.5	7.4	1491509.0	14.4	20.0	2199.0	15.2	20.0	85400.0
35	Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues; enzymes	4.2	15.0	7364.0	5.3	15.0	4447.0	15.7	19.0	8093.0	3.0	12.9	1244997.0	5.3	15.0	295.0	9.5	20.0	32510.0
36	Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations	9.0	15.0	3785.0	10.2	20.0	1735.0	14.7	17.0	2048.0	3.0	6.5	267043.0	10.2	20.0	108.0	11.2	20.0	16348.0
37	Photographic or cinematographic goods	8.2	10.0	8920.1	10.2	20.0	5392.0	12.2	17.0	12173.0	2.7	6.5	2706949.0	9.7	20.0	308.0	5.9	10.0	55860.0
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	2.5	15.0	50227.0	4.0	20.0	58792.0	12.3	17.0	76796.0	4.5	12.7	4388316.0	4.0	20.0	2944.0	8.4	15.0	302464.0
39	Plastics and articles thereof	4.4	15.0	187421.2	8.6	20.0	99667.0	14.4	21.0	187359.0	4.7	10.3	18976651.0	8.3	20.0	5674.0	14.7	20.0	433026.0
40	Rubber and articles thereof	4.8	15.0	44852.0	6.6	35.0	29646.0	14.6	19.0	60905.0	2.2	14.0	10092905.0	6.1	25.0	1613.0	11.0	20.0	269962.0
41	Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather	3.8	10.0	8000.0	2.5	2.5	260.0	8.9	13.0	59928.0	2.0	5.0	1166717.0	2.5	2.5	10.0	7.5	15.0	14835.0
42	Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silk worm)	12.4	15.0	5113.0	18.3	20.0	1949.0	23.0	23.0	7459.0	8.1	20.0	7130435.0	18.3	20.0	285.0	18.7	20.0	42105.0
43	Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof	15.0	15.0	346.0	5.1	20.0	3.0	18.7	23.0	422.0	2.0	6.5	330392.0	5.1	20.0	0.0	9.2	20.0	756.0
44	Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal	7.4	15.0	26019.0	8.7	20.0	36443.0	10.5	17.0	23345.0	2.1	10.7	15448090.0	8.7	20.0	6514.0	12.0	20.0	59524.0
45	Cork and articles of cork	0.0	0.0	202.0	5.6	20.0	178.0	9.8	13.0	1069.0	0.7	14.0	175100.0	5.6	20.0	6.0	8.5	10.0	1493.0
46	Manufactures of straw, of esparto or of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork	15.0	15.0	65.0	13.4	20.0	95.0	15.0	15.0	301.0	4.3	18.0	300374.0	13.4	20.0	34.0	19.2	20.0	2136.0
47	Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material; waste and scrap of paper or paperboard	0.0	0.0	12156.0	2.5	2.5	4768.0	6.8	7.0	12747.0	0.0	0.0	3380918.0	2.5	2.5	0.0	5.5	10.0	123154.0
48	Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard	5.0	15.0	147928.0	7.4	20.0	82805.0	15.6	19.0	120920.0	1.0	6.8	15384458.0	7.5	25.0	6430.0	14.3	20.0	349590.0
49	Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts, typescripts and plans	5.2	15.0	29547.0	6.6	20.0	13511.0	7.2	19.0	6750.0	0.5	2.1	3488849.0	6.6	20.0	2124.0	20.0	20.0	149179.0
50	Silk	10.5	20.0	455.0	2.5	2.5	142.0	14.8	21.0	917.0	2.0	5.5	293713.0	2.5	2.5	10.0	13.0	20.0	463.0
51	Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and woven fabric	9.9	20.0	5361.0	2.5	2.5	46.0	13.5	21.0	17773.0	7.7	31.8	414377.0	2.5	2.5	2.0	16.5	20.0	4381.0
52	Cotton	16.8	20.0	180579.2	2.5	2.5	4516.0	18.8	21.0	11824.0	9.5	24.5	2104208.0	2.5	2.5	160.0	17.7	20.0	91613.0
53	Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper	8.4	20.0	1902.0	2.5	2.5	88.0	12.9	21.0	914.0	2.6	18.7	185055.0	2.5	2.5	0.0	13.1	20.0	1379.0
54	Man-made filaments	14.9	20.0	50628.0	2.5	2.5	1445.0	18.7	21.0	13298.0	12.5	31.1	2089336.0	2.5	2.5	175.0	16.5	20.0	39759.0
55	Man-made staple fibres	15.0	20.0	64931.0	2.5	2.5	23434.0	18.7	21.0	19121.0	12.7	31.0	1165589.0	2.5	2.5	425.0	17.7	20.0	51579.0
56	Wadding, felt and non-wovens; special yarns; twine, cordage, ropes and cables and articles thereof	10.4	20.0	6693.0	7.3	20.0	4940.0	18.4	21.0	7928.0	6.3	18.3	849080.0	7.3	20.0	209.0	15.0	15.0	25011.0
57	Carpets and other textile floor coverings	20.0	20.0	4311.0	20.0	20.0	2799.0	23.0	23.0	4866.0	4.1	8.8	1464389.0	20.0	20.0	313.0	20.0	20.0	9698.0
58	Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics; lace; tapestries; trimmings; embroidery	17.8	20.0	57702.0	3.1	15.0	4659.0	21.0	21.0	1790.0	8.5	23.1	591387.0	3.1	15.0	121.0	19.6	20.0	8871.0



TABLE A1 (continued)

Chapt.	Description	El Salvador			Trinidad and Tobago			Uruguay			United States			Saint Vicent			Venezuela		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use	8.4	20.0	11193.0	4.6	20.0	5915.0	18.1	19.0	6332.0	4.5	14.9	791308.0	4.6	20.0	84.0	15.5	20.0	36622.0
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	18.0	20.0	65212.0	2.5	2.5	5172.0	21.0	21.0	6391.0	11.2	19.5	1004006.0	2.5	2.5	3.0	20.0	20.0	22226.0
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted	24.6	25.0	426270.0	19.9	20.0	4150.0	23.0	23.0	29051.0	13.5	33.0	26355156.0	19.9	20.0	835.0	20.0	20.0	176782.0
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted	25.0	25.0	114139.0	19.8	20.0	6384.0	23.0	23.0	22932.0	12.2	29.3	32733184.0	19.8	20.0	1854.0	20.0	20.0	205820.0
63	Other made-up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags	22.9	25.0	19367.0	16.6	20.0	4864.0	22.5	23.0	16379.0	7.9	22.1	4571567.0	16.6	20.0	666.0	20.0	20.0	53985.0
64	Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles	16.9	20.0	35509.0	16.6	20.0	9909.0	22.6	23.0	37711.0	17.4	58.8	14855456.0	16.6	20.0	1001.0	19.2	20.0	107015.0
65	Headgear and parts thereof	12.5	15.0	661.0	15.0	20.0	541.0	22.7	23.0	1259.0	5.6	11.6	1244793.0	15.0	20.0	69.0	17.9	20.0	5807.0
66	Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof	10.7	15.0	621.0	12.5	20.0	334.0	22.5	23.0	813.0	4.1	12.0	283614.0	12.5	20.0	65.0	17.9	20.0	2589.0
67	Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flows; articles of human hair	13.9	15.0	852.0	16.3	20.0	686.0	19.0	19.0	581.0	4.0	17.0	1090751.0	16.3	20.0	125.0	18.8	20.0	7258.0
68	Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or similar materials	7.5	15.0	10698.0	10.1	25.0	8048.0	12.1	17.0	15538.0	1.8	9.0	3430446.0	9.9	20.0	412.0	14.6	15.0	54537.0
69	Ceramic products	9.7	15.0	41692.0	11.9	25.0	17787.0	15.1	23.0	18230.0	6.5	30.8	4066576.0	11.6	20.0	1733.0	14.8	20.0	107872.0
70	Glass and glass ware	4.6	15.0	24299.0	6.4	25.0	10344.0	14.9	21.0	24572.0	5.8	38.0	4373075.0	5.9	25.0	1605.0	13.5	20.0	60134.0
71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones, precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewelry; coin	8.2	20.0	4182.0	19.4	35.0	2190.0	12.8	21.0	2645.0	3.0	13.5	29809194.0	14.2	25.0	1258.0	12.4	20.0	17226.0
72	Iron and steel	2.8	15.0	97362.0	3.7	15.0	57801.0	13.4	17.0	52116.0	2.3	10.0	14594446.0	3.7	15.0	2892.0	8.0	15.0	237592.0
73	Articles of iron or steel	5.2	15.0	71515.0	9.1	32.5	94388.0	18.0	23.0	46224.0	2.1	12.5	14075984.0	8.9	32.5	4014.0	14.9	20.0	596530.0
74	Copper and articles thereof	1.5	15.0	8485.0	3.7	20.0	8458.0	14.1	19.0	7834.0	2.1	3.0	5125512.0	3.7	20.0	328.0	11.2	20.0	65382.0
75	Nickel and articles thereof	0.0	0.0	141.0	2.5	2.5	36.0	13.3	19.0	115.0	2.2	3.0	1542607.0	2.5	2.5	1.0	5.0	5.0	3920.0
76	Aluminum and articles thereof	4.8	15.0	40749.0	6.5	20.0	24718.0	15.3	19.0	22790.0	3.7	6.5	9193794.0	6.5	20.0	2073.0	12.6	20.0	112060.0
78	Lead and articles thereof	1.5	5.0	263.0	2.5	2.5	1250.0	11.9	19.0	52.0	1.8	3.0	214723.0	2.5	2.5	5.0	9.1	15.0	3679.0
79	Zinc and articles thereof	0.0	0.0	1580.0	2.5	2.5	482.0	11.3	19.0	1601.0	2.2	4.2	1343581.0	2.5	2.5	4.0	6.4	15.0	24660.0
80	Tin and articles thereof	0.0	0.0	341.0	2.5	2.5	236.0	12.0	19.0	189.0	1.9	3.0	340596.0	2.5	2.5	1.0	8.3	15.0	1997.0
81	Other base metals, cermet; articles thereof	0.1	5.0	1130.0	2.5	2.5	186.0	6.9	11.0	131.0	3.6	15.0	1106714.0	2.5	2.5	0.0	5.1	10.0	5891.0
82	Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts thereof of base metal	3.4	15.0	12738.0	6.9	20.0	13020.0	20.6	21.0	14779.0	4.3	22.3	4522401.0	6.9	20.0	652.0	13.9	20.0	110428.0
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	5.1	15.0	18349.0	7.6	20.0	12837.0	19.0	19.0	9007.0	3.0	7.5	4612797.0	7.2	20.0	794.0	15.6	20.0	52574.0
84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts thereof	1.4	15.0	333284.6	4.4	35.0	428634.0	7.2	23.0	365582.0	1.3	9.9	179436464.0	4.1	32.5	9910.0	9.4	20.0	2767146.0
85	Electrical machinery and equipment and arts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles	3.8	15.0	422098.7	9.6	35.0	165495.0	12.7	23.0	303478.0	2.0	15.0	184973949.0	9.4	35.0	11371.0	11.7	20.0	1810135.0
86	Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway or tramway track fixtures and fittings and parts thereof; mechanical (including electro-mechanical) traffic signalling equipment of all kinds	0.0	0.0	781.0	2.5	2.5	213.0	6.0	6.0	408.0	4.9	15.6	1827788.0	2.5	2.5	9.0	5.4	15.0	23527.0
87	Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock and parts and accessories thereof	8.4	30.0	236366.2	10.8	35.0	148468.0	13.8	23.0	297770.0	2.7	25.0	164763385.0	10.6	35.0	8416.0	16.5	35.0	1555136.0

**TABLE A1 (continued)**

Chapt.	Description	El Salvador			Trinidad and Tobago			Uruguay			United States			Saint Vicent			Venezuela		
		mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp	mfn	max	Imp
88	Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof	2.3	5.0	12673.0	4.8	20.0	232669.0	2.1	23.0	4584.0	0.2	3.0	18167602.0	4.8	20.0	240.0	5.6	10.0	143886.0
89	Ships, boats and floating structures	4.8	15.0	1245.0	4.3	20.0	31780.0	10.5	23.0	486.0	0.5	2.7	1189122.0	4.3	20.0	422.0	12.2	20.0	80934.0
90	Optica, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof	1.6	15.0	66163.0	7.1	25.0	50425.0	10.0	23.0	63846.0	1.6	16.0	36096055.0	7.1	25.0	1518.0	7.2	20.0	364687.0
91	Clocks and watches and parts thereof	10.4	25.0	3742.0	22.3	35.0	886.0	21.9	23.0	4347.0	5.9	31.7	3321251.0	19.3	30.0	113.0	8.1	20.0	28326.0
92	Musical instruments; parts and accessories thereof	8.5	15.0	1663.0	10.4	20.0	529.0	19.6	21.0	1369.0	2.7	8.7	1412778.0	10.4	20.0	29.0	6.1	20.0	5040.0
93	Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof	30.0	30.0	2930.0	23.9	35.0	610.0	23.0	23.0	1218.0	1.7	13.3	836390.0	23.9	35.0	19.0	16.4	20.0	16690.0
94	Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps and lighting fittings, not elsewhere specified or included; illuminated signs, illuminated name-plates and the like; prefabricated buildings	12.5	15.0	35607.0	17.0	20.0	27080.0	20.2	21.0	61413.0	2.4	13.5	23825638.0	17.0	20.0	4359.0	17.9	20.0	143715.0
95	Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof	11.7	15.0	17920.0	14.2	20.0	6686.0	23.0	23.0	24753.0	1.8	9.2	19244561.0	14.2	20.0	657.0	18.6	20.0	143421.0
96	Miscellaneous manufactured articles	9.2	30.0	26808.0	14.0	20.0	4666.0	20.9	21.0	13320.0	5.3	35.7	2852373.0	14.0	20.0	1062.0	17.5	20.0	46579.0
97	Works of art, collectors pieces and antiques	20.0	30.0	205.7	20.0	20.0	116.0	7.0	7.0	159.0	0.0	0.0	5860919.0	20.0	20.0	230.0	10.0	20.0	2728.0

Source: DATAINTAL for all countries, except for: U.S. (USDOC), Canada (Statistics Canada) and Mexico (Secretary of Economy). Data from 2000, except Saint Kitts and Nevis (1997) and Bahamas, Belize, Barbados and Grenada (1999).



**TABLE A2  
ANTI-DUMPING NOTIFICATIONS**

**U.S. vs:**

	<b>Canada</b>	<b>Mexico</b>	<b>Chile</b>	<b>Central America</b>	<b>Caribbean</b>	<b>Andean Community</b>	<b>Mercosur</b>
Notifications between January 2001 and March 2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Certain corrosion resistant carbon steel flat products.</li> <li>- Cut-to-length carbon steel plate.</li> <li>- Greenhouse tomatoes.</li> <li>- Iron construction castings.</li> <li>- Oil country tubular goods.</li> <li>- Live processed blue mussels.</li> <li>- Certain softwood lumber products.</li> <li>- Porcelain-on-steel cookware.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Circular-welded non-alloy pipe.</li> <li>- Cut-to-length carbon steel plate.</li> <li>- Grey Portland cement and clinker.</li> <li>- Oil country tubular goods.</li> <li>- Porcelain-on-steel cookware.</li> <li>- Certain welded large diameter line pipe.</li> <li>- Stainless steel sheet and strip in coils.</li> <li>- Carbon steel rod.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fresh Atlantic salmon.</li> <li>- Preserved mushrooms.</li> <li>- Individually quick frozen red raspberries.</li> <li>- Table grapes.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Carbon steel rod.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Venezuela.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Silicomanganese.</li> <li>- Carbon steel rod.</li> <li>- Certain cold-rolled flat products of carbon steel.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Argentina.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Honey.</li> <li>- Hot-rolled carbon steel flat products.</li> <li>- Cold-rolled carbon steel products</li> </ul> <p><b>Brazil.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Frozen concentrated orange juice.</li> <li>- Silicon metal.</li> <li>- Certain hot-rolled flat-rolled carbon-quality steel products.</li> <li>- Cold-rolled carbon steel products.</li> </ul>
Revocation of anti-dumping measures		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Oil country tubular goods.</li> </ul>					<p><b>Argentina.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Silicon metal.</li> <li>- Silicomanganese.</li> <li>- Stainless steel bar.</li> </ul>
Suspension agreements in force		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Tomatoes.</li> </ul>					
Price undertakings in effect as of June 2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Brass sheet and strip.</li> <li>- Corrosion resistant carbon steel flat products.</li> <li>- Iron construction castings.</li> <li>- New steel rails.</li> <li>- Pure magnesium and magnesium alloy.</li> <li>- Stainless steel sheet in coils.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Stainless-steel butt-welded pipe fittings.</li> <li>- Certain small-diameter, seamless carbon steel and alloy standard line and pressure pipe.</li> <li>- Circular-welded non-alloy steel pipe.</li> <li>- Cut-to-length carbon steel plate.</li> <li>- Grey Portland cement and clinker.</li> <li>- Oil country tubular goods.</li> <li>- Porcelain-on-steel cookware.</li> <li>- Stainless steel sheet and strip in coils.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Preserved mushrooms.</li> <li>- Fresh Atlantic salmon.</li> </ul>				<p><b>Argentina.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Barbed wire.</li> <li>- Oil country tubular goods.</li> <li>- Certain seamless carbon and alloy steel standard line and pressure pipe.</li> <li>- (LT walled) rectangular welded carbon steel pipe and tube.</li> </ul> <p><b>Brazil.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Brass sheets and strips.</li> <li>- Carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings.</li> <li>- Circular-welded, non-alloy pipe.</li> <li>- Cut-to-length carbon steel sheets.</li> </ul>

**U.S. vs:** (continued)

	Canada	Mexico	Chile	Central America	Caribbean	Andean Community	Mercosur
							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Frozen concentrated orange juice.</li> <li>- Industrial-grade nitrocellulose.</li> <li>- Iron construction castings.</li> <li>- Silicomanganese.</li> <li>- Silicon metal.</li> <li>- Stainless steel bar.</li> <li>- Stainless steel wire bar.</li> <li>- (Seamless) standard line and pressure pipe.</li> </ul>

Canada vs:

	U.S.	Mexico	Chile	Central America	Caribbean	Andean Community	Mercosur
Notifications between January 2001 and March 2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Certain grain corn.</li> <li>- Electric refrigerators, dishwashers and dryers.</li> <li>- Certain oil and gas well casing made of carbon steel.</li> <li>- Machine-tufted carpets.</li> </ul>					<p><b>Venezuela.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Certain carbon steel welded pipe.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Argentina.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Certain carbon steel welded pipe.</li> </ul> <p><b>Brazil.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Certain carbon steel welded pipe.</li> <li>- Certain hot-rolled carbon and alloy sheet.</li> <li>- Cold-rolled steel sheet.</li> </ul>
Anti-dumping measures in force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Corrosion resistant steel sheets.</li> <li>- Fiberglass pipe insulation.</li> <li>- Machine tufted carpet.</li> <li>- Oil and gas web casings.</li> <li>- Whole potatoes (non-size A Russets from Washington State).</li> <li>- Iceberg lettuce.</li> <li>- Refined sugar.</li> <li>- Polyiso insulation board.</li> <li>- Cement panels.</li> <li>- Prepared baby foods.</li> <li>- X-ray contrast media.</li> <li>- Electric refrigerators, dishwashers and dryers.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Hot-rolled carbon steel plates.</li> </ul>				<p><b>Venezuela.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Carbon steel welded pipe.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Argentina.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Certain carbon steel welded pipe.</li> </ul> <p><b>Brazil.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Corrosion resistant steel sheet.</li> <li>- Certain carbon steel welded pipe.</li> <li>- Certain hot-rolled carbon steel plates.</li> <li>- Stainless steel round bar.</li> </ul>
Price undertakings in force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fold-flat plastic bags.</li> <li>- Bingo paper.</li> </ul>						

**Mexico vs:**

	U.S.	Canada	Chile	Central America	Caribbean	Andean Community	Mercosur
Notifications between January 2001 and March 2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Swine for slaughter.</li> <li>- Long-grain white rice.</li> <li>- Hydrogen peroxide.</li> <li>- Cut bond paper.</li> <li>- Cuts of bovine meat, boneless and with bone.</li> <li>- Type 1 steel beams</li> </ul>			- Standard tubing		<b>Peru.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Acrylic fibre.</li> </ul>	<b>Brazil.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Electric transformers exceeding 10,000 KVA.</li> <li>- Synthetic polybutadiene-styrene rubber (SBR)</li> <li>- Hydrogen peroxide.</li> </ul>
Anti-dumping measures in force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Polyvinyl chloride.</li> <li>- Caustic soda.</li> <li>- Ammonium sulfate.</li> <li>- Gasoline additives.</li> <li>- Hydrogen peroxide.</li> <li>- High-fructose corn syrup.</li> <li>- Corrugated rods.</li> <li>- Cut bond paper.</li> <li>- Swine for slaughter.</li> <li>- Live bovine animals, bovine meat and edible offal.</li> </ul>					<b>Venezuela.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Corrugated rods.</li> </ul>	<b>Brazil.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Corrugated rods.</li> <li>- Synthetic rubber.</li> <li>- Malleable iron connections.</li> </ul>
Price undertakings in force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Apples.</li> </ul>					<b>Venezuela.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cold-rolled sheet.</li> <li>- Steel plate in coils.</li> <li>- Hot-rolled sheet.</li> </ul>	
Revocation of anti-dumping measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Acrylic fibre.</li> <li>- Crystal polystyrene.</li> <li>- Seamless steel tubing.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Steel plate in coils.</li> </ul>				<b>Venezuela.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cold-rolled sheet.</li> <li>- Steel plate in coils.</li> <li>- Hot-rolled sheet.</li> </ul>	<b>Brazil.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cold-rolled sheet.</li> <li>- Steel plate in coils.</li> <li>- Hot-rolled sheets.</li> </ul>

**Andean Community vs:**

	U.S.	Canada	Mexico	Chile	Central America	Caribbean	Mercosur
Notifications between January 2001 and March 2002	- Polyvinyl chloride not mixed with any other substances obtained by polymerization in suspension (PVC suspension).		- Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) polymer (PET resin - bottle grade).	- Cast steel balls for the milling of metal ores.		- Low carbon bars and rods.	
Price undertakings in force as of June 2001	- Orthophosphoric acid. - Polyvinyl Chloride not mixed with any other substances obtained by polymerization in suspension (PVC suspension). - Homopolymer polypropylene.		- Cornstarch. - Glucose syrup.	- Woven labels. - Steel balls.			
Revocation of anti-dumping measures							<b>Brazil.</b> - Calcium carbide.

18

**Caribbean vs.:**

	U.S.	Canada	Mexico	Chile	Central America	Andean Community	Mercosur
Notifications between January 2001 and March 2002						<b>Venezuela.</b> - Table salt.	
Investigations in progress						<b>Venezuela.</b> - Sweetened and unsweetened biscuits.	



**Mercosur vs:**

	U.S.	Canada	Mexico	Chile	Central America	Andean Community	Caribbean
Notifications between January 2001 and March 2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Toluene diisocyanate.</li> <li>- Polyethyl polyol.</li> <li>- Products containing insulin.</li> <li>- Methyl Methacrylate.</li> <li>- Vacuum blood containers made of glass and plastic.</li> <li>- Laboratory reagents on a backing of glass and plastic.</li> <li>- Phenol.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Straight handsaw blades made from high-speed steel.</li> <li>- Grey Portland cement.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Woven fabrics of flat and tubular polypropylene.</li> <li>- Polystyrene foam trays for food products.</li> <li>- Electrolytic copper wire of rectangular or square cross-section, insulated with dielectric paper tape.</li> <li>- Glass wood agglomerated with thermosetting resins, with or without lining.</li> <li>- Electrolytic copper wire of rectangular or square cross-section, insulated with dielectric paper tape.</li> <li>- Board.</li> </ul>			
Anti-dumping measures in force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Polyvinyl chloride not mixed with any other substances obtained by polymerization in suspension (PVC suspension).</li> <li>- Vacuum blood containers made of glass and plastic.</li> <li>- Laboratory reagents on a backing of glass and plastic.</li> <li>- Polyvinyl chloride.</li> <li>- Polycarbonate resins.</li> <li>- Hydrocele cellulose.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Polyvinyl chloride not mixed with any other substances obtained by polymerization in suspension (PVC suspension).</li> <li>- Straight handsaw blades made from high-speed steel.</li> <li>- Polyvinyl chloride.</li> <li>- Cold-rolled stainless.</li> <li>- Portland cement.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cast steel balls for the milling of metal ores.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Aluminum cable.</li> <li>- Portland cement.</li> </ul>	
Price undertakings in force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Products containing insulin.</li> </ul>						

**Mercosur**

Notifications between January 2001 and March 2002	Argentina vs. Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Vacuum flasks.</li><li>- Hot-rolled iron sections, L-shaped with equal sides.</li><li>- Automatic front-loading washing machines for household use, complete or unassembled.</li><li>- Steel granules, excluding those of stainless steel.</li><li>- Phenolic plywood panels.</li><li>- Twist drills with cylindrical shank to DIN standards.</li><li>- Single-mode optical fibre cable, conventional and dispersion-shifted.</li></ul>
Anti-dumping measures in force		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Copper-steel javelins.</li><li>- Aluminum cable.</li><li>- Straight handsaw blades made from high-speed steel.</li><li>- Steel gas cylinders.</li><li>- Chickens.</li></ul>
Price undertakings in force		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Polystyrene foam trays.</li><li>- Natural or artificial abrasive powder or grain, on a base of textile material, of paper, of paperboard, or of other materials, whether or not cut to shape or sewn or otherwise made up, especially waterproof abrasive paper, abrasive paper, heavy-weight abrasive paper, fibre discs and emery paper.</li><li>- Patent-type chains with links 2.5 mm or more but less than 20 mm, of cast iron, iron or steel.</li></ul>
Notifications between January 1 and June 30, 2001, and price undertakings in force	Brazil vs. Argentina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Milk.</li></ul>
	Brazil vs. Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Milk.</li></ul>
Notifications between January 1 and June 30, 2001	Uruguay vs. Argentina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Edible oil of vegetable origin, consisting of mixtures of pure, refined and packaged oils.</li></ul>

Source: World Trade Organization, 2001 Report of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices and the OAS.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- AADITYA, MATTOO. "Negotiating Improved Market Access Commitments", in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Philip English (Eds.), *Development, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook*, The World Bank. June, 2002.
- ADLUNG, RUDOLF; *ET AL.* "The GATS Key Features and Sectors", in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Philip English (Eds.), *Development, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook*, The World Bank. June, 2002.
- GARAY, JORGE LUIS AND RAFAEL CORNEJO. "Rules of Origin in Free Trade Agreements in the Americas", in Miguel Rodríguez Mendoza, Patrick Low and Barbara Kotschwar (Eds.), *Trade Rule in the Making, Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999.
- GRANADOS, JAIME. *El ALCA y la OMC: Especulaciones en torno a su interacción*, INTAL-ITD Documento de Trabajo N° 4. Buenos Aires: BID-INTAL. August, 1999.
- ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES - OAS, TRADE UNIT. *Acuerdos de Inversión en el Hemisferio Occidental: Un Compendio*, Grupo de Negociación de Inversión del ALCA.
- SCHOTT, JEFFREY. *Prospects for Free Trade in the Americas*. Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Economics. 2001.
- SECRETARÍA DE COMERCIO Y FOMENTO INDUSTRIAL DE MÉXICO. "Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte", *Diario Oficial de la Federación*. December 20, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_ . "Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, la República de Venezuela y la República de Colombia", *Diario Oficial de la Federación*. January 9, 1995.
- \_\_\_\_\_ . "Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y la República de Costa Rica", *Diario Oficial de la Federación*. January 10, 1995.
- \_\_\_\_\_ . "Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y la República de Bolivia", *Diario Oficial de la Federación*. January 11, 1995.
- \_\_\_\_\_ . "Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, la República de Nicaragua", *Diario Oficial de la Federación*. July 1, 1998.
- \_\_\_\_\_ . "Tratado de Libre Comercio entre la República de Chile y los Estados Unidos Mexicanos", *Diario Oficial de la Federación*. July 28, 1999.
- \_\_\_\_\_ . "Decimosexto protocolo Adicional del Acuerdo de Complementación Económica N° 5 entre México y Uruguay", *Diario Oficial de la Federación*. February 28, 2001.

SECRETARÍA DE COMERCIO Y FOMENTO INDUSTRIAL DE MÉXICO. "Tratado de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, las Repúblicas de EL Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras", *Diario Oficial de la Federación*. March 14, 2001.

UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL SERVICE, US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. *Country Commercial Guides*, several countries. <http://www.usatrade.gov/website/ccg.nsf/ccghomepage?openform>

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE. *Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices*, several countries. <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rpts/eptp/2001/wha/>

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. *Trade Act of 2002*. 2002.

UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE. *National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers*, varios países, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000.  
<http://www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2002/index.htm>

\_\_\_\_\_. *USTR Report on "Super 301 and Special 301"*. 1999-2001.

\_\_\_\_\_. *US Position papers on FTAA*. <http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/01/01-06.html>

\_\_\_\_\_. *Fourth Report to the Congress on the Operation of the Caribbean Basin Initiative Economic Recovery Act*. December 31, 2001.

\_\_\_\_\_. *2002 Trade Policy Agenda and 2001 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program*. <http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2002.html>

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION - OMC, *Acuerdo General sobre el Comercio de Servicios*. 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio*. 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Trading into the Future*, 2<sup>a</sup> Edition reviewed. March, 2001.

\_\_\_\_\_. *WTO Members Report on Anti-Dumping Activity 2001*. 2001.

\_\_\_\_\_. TRADE POLICY REVIEW BODY. *Trade Policy Review of the United States*. August, 2001.

## **Chiefs of State and Trade Ministerial Declarations**

*First Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Principles*, Miami. December, 1994.

*Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago Declaration*, Santiago. April, 1998.

*Third Summit of the Americas, Quebec City Declaration*, Québec. April, 2001.

*First Ministerial Trade Meeting, Joint Declaration*, Denver Colorado. June, 1995.

*Second Ministerial Trade Meeting, Joint Declaration*, Cartagena. March, 1996.

*Third Ministerial Trade Meeting, Joint Declaration*, Belo Horizonte. May, 1997.

*Fourth Ministerial Trade Meeting, Joint Declaration*, San José. March, 1998.

*Fifth Ministerial Trade Meeting, Joint Declaration*, Toronto. November, 1999.

*Sixth Ministerial Trade Meeting, Joint Declaration*, Buenos Aires. April, 2001.

*Seventh Ministerial Trade Meeting, Joint Declaration*, Quito. November, 2002.

*Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration*, Doha, Qatar. November 14, 2001.



## **INTAL PUBLICATIONS**

### **REGULAR PUBLICATIONS**

*Integration & Trade*. Two journal issues (English and Spanish) by subscription or individual issue purchase.  
*INTAL Monthly Newsletter* (English, Portuguese and Spanish - Internet).

### **SUB-REGIONAL INTEGRATION REPORTS**

*ANDEAN Report*. Annual publication (Spanish). English version: Internet.  
*CARICOM Report*. Annual publication (English).  
*CENTRAL AMERICAN Report*. Annual publication (Spanish). English version: Internet.  
*MERCOSUR Report*. Annual publication (English, Portuguese and Spanish).

### **SPECIAL REPORTS**

*Integración energética en el Cono Sur* (Spanish). Mario A. Wiegers. 1996.  
*Integración en el Sector Transporte en el Cono Sur* (Spanish):  
    *Transporte Terrestre*. José Alex Sant'Anna. 1997.  
    *Puertos y vías navegables*. Martín Sgut. 1997.  
    *Los ferrocarriles y su contribución al comercio internacional*. Ian Thomson. 1997.  
*El impacto sectorial de la integración en el MERCOSUR* (Spanish and Portuguese). Juan José Taccone and Luis Jorge Garay (Eds.) 1999.  
*Impacto del TLCAN en las exportaciones de prendas de vestir de los países de América Central y República Dominicana*. Spanish (Internet).  
*INTAL: 35 años de Compromiso con la Integración Regional*. Spanish.  
*América Latina a principios del Siglo XXI: Integración, Identidad y Globalización. Actitudes y expectativas de las elites latinoamericanas*. Spanish (Internet).  
*Perspectivas y Desafíos del Proceso de Integración Argentino-Chileno a Diez Años del ACE 16* (Spanish). 2002.

### **WORKING PAPERS**

*The Integration Movement in the Caribbean at Crossroads: Towards a New Approach of Integration* (English). Uziel Nogueira. 1997.  
*MERCOSUL e Comércio Agropecuario* (Portuguese). Ives Chaloult and Guillermo Hillcoat. 1997.  
*Las relaciones de comercio e inversión entre Colombia y Venezuela* (Spanish). Eglé Iturbe de Blanco. 1997.

### **DISSEMINATION PAPERS**

*Integración y democracia en América Latina y el Caribe* (Spanish). Alvaro Tirado Mejía. 1997.  
*Estado de evolución en la elaboración e implementación de las Normas ISO 14.000 y CODEX Alimentarius* (Spanish). Laura Berón. 1997.



*Evolución institucional y jurídica del MERCOSUR* (Spanish). Vicente Garnelo. 1998.

*Comercio Electrónico: conceptos y reflexiones básicas* (Spanish). Gerardo Gariboldi. 1999.

*Cómo expandir las exportaciones de los países dentro de una economía globalizada* (Spanish). Rubens Lopes Braga. 1999.

*La dimensión cultural: base para el desarrollo de América Latina y el Caribe: desde la solidaridad hacia la integración.* (Spanish) Alejandra Radl. 2000.

*Capital social y cultura. Claves olvidadas del desarrollo* (Spanish). Bernardo Kliksberg. 2000.

*Los países pequeños: Su rol en los procesos de integración* (Spanish). Lincoln Bizzozero - Sergio Abreu. 2000.

*El Tratado de Libre Comercio entre el Istmo Centroamericano y los Estados Unidos de América. Oportunidades, desafíos y riesgos* (Spanish). Eduardo Lizano and Anabel González. 2003.

## **DATABASES - SOFTWARE**

*DATAINTAL (CD-ROM) Sistema de estadísticas de comercio de América*

*Base INTAL MERCOSUR (BIM)*

*Base de datos bibliográficos (INTEG)*

*Directorio de las Relaciones Económicas de América Latina y el Caribe con Asia-Pacífico (CD-ROM)*

*Instrumentos básicos de integración económica en América Latina y el Caribe.* Updated to July, 2002.

*Rueda de Negocios*

## **INTAL/ITD/STA PUBLICATIONS**

### **WORKING PAPERS - SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON TRADE AND INTEGRATION (SITI)**

*Free Trade Area of the Americas: The Scope of the Negotiations* (English and Spanish). Herminio Blanco M. and Jaime Zabludovsky K. 2003.

### **WORKING PAPERS**

*Una evaluación de la homogeneidad macroeconómica y del desarrollo de la región centroamericana* (Spanish). Florencio Ballester. 1998.

*Towards an Evaluation of Regional Integration in Latin America in the 1990s* (English). Robert Devlin and Ricardo French-Davis. 1998.

*Negotiating Preferential Market Access: The Case of NAFTA* (English). Antoni Estevadeordal. 1999.

*El ALCA y la OMC: Especulaciones en torno a su interacción* (Spanish). Jaime Granados. 1999.

*The New Regionalism in the Americas: The Case of MERCOSUR.* (English). Antoni Estevadeordal, Junichi Goto and Raúl Saez. 2000.

*What's New in the New Regionalism in the Americas?* (English and Spanish). Robert Devlin and Antoni Estevadeordal. 2001.

*Metodología para el análisis de regímenes de origen. Aplicación en el caso de las Américas* (Spanish). Luis J. Garay S. y Rafael Cornejo. 2001.

*A ALCA no limiar do século XXI: Brasil e EUA na negociação comercial hemisférica* (Portuguese). Antonio José Ferreira Simões. 2002.

*The Outlier Sectors: Areas of Non-Free Trade in the North American Free Trade Agreement* (English). Eric Miller. 2002.

*Las trabas no arancelarias en el comercio bilateral agroalimentario entre Venezuela y Colombia* (Spanish). Alejandro Gutiérrez S. 2002.

*Métodos casuísticos de evaluación de impacto para negociaciones comerciales internacionales* (Spanish). Antonio Bonet Madurga. 2002.

*Regional Banks and Regionalism: A New Frontier for Development Financing* (English). Robert Devlin and Lucio Castro. 2002.

## **OCCASIONAL PAPERS**

*ALCA: Un proceso en marcha* (Spanish). Nohra Rey de Marulanda. 1998.

*The Caribbean Community: Facing the Challenges of Regional and Global Integration* (English). Anneke Jessen and Ennio Rodríguez. 1999.

*Government Procurement and Free Trade in the Americas* (English). Jorge Claro de la Maza and Roberto Camblor. 1999.

*Financial Services in the Trading System: Progress and Prospects* (English). Eric Miller. 1999.

*The FTAA: Some Longer Term Issues* (English). Robert Devlin, Antoni Estevadeordal and Luis Jorge Garay. 1999.

*The Free Trade Area of the Americas and MERCOSUR-European Union Free Trade Processes: Can they Learn from Each Other?* (English). Robert Devlin. 2000.

*Negotiating Market Access between the European Union and MERCOSUR: Issues and Prospects* (English). Antoni Estevadeordal and Ekaterina Krivonos. 2000.

*La integración comercial centroamericana: Un marco interpretativo y cursos de acción plausible* (Spanish). Jaime Granados. 2001.

*NAFTA and the Mexican Economy: Analytical Issues and Lessons for the FTAA* (English). J. Ernesto López-Córdova. 2001.

*Breaking from Isolation: Suriname's Participation in Regional Integration Initiatives* (English). Anneke Jessen and Andrew Katona. 2001.

*Regional Public Goods in Official Development Assistance* (English). Marco Ferroni. 2001.

*Search for a New Partnership in Trade and Investment between Latin America and Asia-Pacific* (English). Mikio Kuwayama. 2001. Spanish version: Internet.

*The Trade Policy-Making Process Level One of the Two Level Game: Country Studies in the Western Hemisphere* (English and Spanish). 2002.

*Mercosul em sua primeira década (1991-2001): Uma avaliação política a partir do Brasil* (Portuguese). Paulo Roberto de Almeida. 2002.

*Diseños institucionales y gestión de la política comercial exterior en América Latina* (Spanish). Jacint Jordana and Carles Ramió. 2002.

A Study on the Activities of IFIs in the Area of Export Credit Insurance and Export Finance (English). Malcom Stephens and Diana Smallridge. 2002.

*El proceso de integración Argentina-Brasil en perspectiva: El ciclo cambiario y la relación público-privada en Argentina* (Spanish). Ricardo Rozemberg and Gustavo Svarzman. 2002.

*Regional Aspects of Brazil's Trade Policy* (English). Eduardo A. Haddad (coord.), Edson P. Domínguez and Fernando S. Perobelli. 2002.

*The External Dimension of MERCOSUR: Prospects for North-South Integration with the European Union* (English). Paolo Giordano. 2003.

*Zonas Francas y otros regímenes especiales en un contexto de negociaciones comerciales multilaterales y regionales* (Spanish). Jaime Granados. 2003.

*Desigualdad regional y gasto público en México* (Spanish). Rafael Gamboa and Miguel Messmacher. 2003.

*The Trade and Cooperation Nexus: How Does Mercosur-EU Process Measure Up?* (English). Robert Devlin, Antoni Estevadeordal and Ekaterina Krivonos. 2003.

## **INT/ITD PUBLICATIONS**

### **WORKING PAPERS**

*Common Market of the Southern Cone: MERCOSUR*. Martin Arocena. Working Paper # 204. September 1995 (also available in Spanish).

*From Miami to Cartagena: Nine Lessons and Nine Challenges of the FTAA*. Robert Devlin and Luis Jorge Garay. Working Paper # 211. July 1996 (also available in Spanish).

*Facts, Fallacies and Free Trade: A Note on Linking Trade Integration to Labor Standards*. Donald J. Robbins. Working Paper # 214. May 1997.

*What can European Experience Teach Latin America About Integration*. L. Alan Winters. Working Paper # 215. May 1997.

*Economic Integration and Equal Distribution*. Willem Molle. Working Paper # 216. May 1997.

*Towards Free Trade in the Western Hemisphere: The FTAA Process and the Technical Support of the Inter-American Development Bank*. Enrique V. Iglesias. Working Paper # 217. July 1997 (also available in Spanish)

*Convergence and Divergence Between NAFTA, Chile, and MERCOSUR: Overcoming Dilemmas of North and South American Economic Integration*. Raúl A. Hinojosa-Ojeda, Jeffrey D. Lewis and Sherman Robinson. Working Paper # 219. May 1997.

*Transport Infrastructure in Latin America*. Arturo Vera Aguirre. Working Paper # 221. July 1997 (also available in Spanish).

*MERCOSUR: Achievements and Challenges*. Carlos Sepúlveda and Arturo Vera Aguirre. Working Paper # 222. September 1997 (also available in Spanish).

## **SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS**

*Periodic Note on Integration and Trade in the Americas*, July 1995; February, August and December 1996; July and December 1997; August and December 1998; February and October 1999; October and December 2000; May 2002; December 2002. (also available in Spanish and 1997 versions are available in Portuguese).

*The Euro and its Effect on the Economy and the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean*. Roberto Zahler. Paper presented at the Seminar "Euro and its International Impact" on occasion of the Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors. France, March 16, 1999 (also available in Spanish).

*Extract from the Bank's 1996 Report on Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, Part II, Chapter 2: Trade Liberalization*, 1996 (also available in Spanish).

*European Economic and Monetary Union: Recent Progress and Possible Implications for Latin America and the Caribbean*. March 1997 (also available in Spanish).

*Globalization and Regional Integration: Consequences for Latin America*. Speech delivered by Enrique V. Iglesias at the Seminar on "A Critical View of Globality". Mexico City, November 1997 (also available in Spanish).

*Protection, Preferential Tariff Elimination and Rules of Origin in the Americas - An Overview*. Luis Jorge Garay and Antoni Estevadeordal. June 1995 (also available in Spanish).

*The New Face of Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Speech delivered by Enrique V. Iglesias at The Annual World Bank Conference on Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Montevideo, July 1997 (also available in Spanish).

*Free Trade Area of the Americas: From Miami to Belo Horizonte*. Speech delivered by Enrique V. Iglesias at the III Business Forum of the Americas. Belo Horizonte, May 1997 (English, Portuguese and Spanish).

*Transpacific Partnership: Latin America's Role*. Speech delivered by Enrique V. Iglesias at the XII International General Meeting of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC XII). Santiago, September, 1997 (also available in Spanish).



*Special Initiative on Trade and Integration*